Marshall v. Stratton
| Decision Date | 31 January 1910 |
| Docket Number | 14,187 |
| Citation | 96 Miss. 465,51 So. 132 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | FRANCES B. MARSHALL ET AL. v. SYDNEY V. STRATTON ET AL |
FROM the circuit court of Adams county, HON. MOYSE H. WILKINSON Judge.
Mrs Marshall and another, administrators de bonis non of the estate of Mary Louise Williams, deceased, appellants, were plaintiffs in the court below; Sydney V. Stratton and others appellees, were defendants there. From a judgment in defendant's favor the plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court.
The plaintiffs as administrators, sued the defendants in replevin to recover designated household furniture claimed by plaintiffs as having been the property of their testatrix. It was shown that the furniture had belonged to Mrs. Caroline M Williams who died in 1863, leaving her property to her three children Caroline M. Stratton, Irene S. Williams and Mary Louise Williams; that the furniture, by division of property among the three, was awarded to Mary Louise Williams. Shortly after the death of her mother Mary Louise Williams went to the home of her sister, Caroline M. Stratton, and carried with her the furniture and placed it in Mrs. Stratton's home. Later Mary Louise Williams visited, and remained in the home of, her other sister Irene S. Williams, but left the furniture in the home of Mrs. Stratton where it remained until after the death of Mrs. Stratton in 1908.
The defendants declined to deliver up the furniture, claiming that they were entitled to its ownership and possession as heirs of Mrs. Stratton; and they introduced evidence tending to show that some two or three months before the death of Mary Louise Williams there had been an oral agreement between her and Mrs. Stratton that the survivor of the two should own the furniture. Mary Louise Williams died in 1906, and by her will, which had been duly probated and was introduced in evidence, she named her two sisters, Mrs. Stratton and Irene Williams as executors thereof and bequeathed the furniture to Irene Williams. Mrs. Stratton declined to act. Mrs. Williams took out letters of executorship, but failed to make any inventory of the personalty of the estate or to cause any appraisement to be made. Mrs. Stratton died in October, 1908 and Mrs. Williams about one month later. The will of Mrs. Stratton, duly probated and introduced in evidence, purported to make a disposition of the furniture to two of the defendants. The opinion of the court further states the facts.
Judgment affirmed.
Martin & Bowman, for appellants.
The material question in this case is, whether there is sufficient legal evidence to establish a gift of the furniture by Miss Mary Louise Williams to Mrs. Caroline M. Stratton. If not, then the title never passed from Miss Williams, and appellants, as her present representatives, are entitled to recover. The only direct evidence on this point is that one witness, Mrs. Wheeler, had overheard on several occasions conversations between the ladies which the witness had understood as conveying information to the following effect,--that if Miss Mary Louise Williams died first, the furniture was to go to Mrs. Stratton, and that if Mrs. Stratton died first, the furniture was to go to Miss Williams. Now, in considering this proposition, it must be borne in mind that when these two ladies were talking about the furniture they were talking about something that belonged to Miss Williams. The court will note that the witness herself recognized that the furniture had been the property of Miss Williams. Now, the substance of these conversations was introduced in evidence for the purpose of establishing the gift to Mrs. Stratton from Miss Williams, upon the theory either that they are in themselves and of their own force sufficient to create a gift, or that they constitute some evidence that such a gift had been made prior thereto. Whatever the law may be, it is manifest that the words cannot be given any force or effect other than or different from their plain meaning and intent, and that if they create a gift, or are evidence that a gift has been made, the gift so created, or evidenced, must be of the character described in the words. Ascribing to the witness absolute accuracy, both in her recollections and report of the conversation, we have evidence of the following arrangement between the ladies, namely, that this furniture, which belonged to Miss Williams, was, in case Mrs. Stratton outlived Miss Williams, to be the property of Mrs. Stratton, otherwise to remain the property of Miss Williams. It is perfectly clear from a critical examination of what Mrs. Wheeler said that she was testifying to just this sort of parol agreement or understanding between Miss Williams and her sister, Mrs. Stratton; and in placing such construction upon her testimony we are practically ignoring the very significant statement that the conversations in which this agreement was spoken of, were of a jocular nature. Giving them, however, their full effect and disregarding the jocular feature as not causing a doubt whether they really meant what they said, the question arises as to whether a valid and binding gift from Miss Williams to Mrs. Stratton was either created or sufficiently evidenced by them. We assert the contrary with great confidence. We claim that from a legal standpoint, all such conversations were merely the idle chat of an hour, and that no rights were thereby vested either in Mrs. Stratton or lost to Miss Williams. Gifts to be valid and binding between the parties must be either inter vivos or causa mortis. In the instant case the alleged and supposed gift can not be sustained as a gift causa mortis, as it lacks the most essential feature of such a gift, the necessity of having been made in sickness and contemplation of death. Kiff v. Weaver, 55 Am. Rep. 601; Wilson v. Jourdan, 79 Miss. 133; 20 Cyc. 1230.
The evidence is, without contradiction, that when these conversations occurred, Miss Mary Louise Williams was not sick, but in very good health, and that there was absolutely no feature of a gift causa mortis. Nor can the alleged gift be sustained upon the theory that it was a gift taking effect inter vivos, unconditionally, immediately and irrevocably. So far as possession is concerned the alleged donee simply remained in possession of the property that had been left with her for a long time, but the trouble with appellees' case is that the supposed gift was not unconditional, not to take effect in...
To continue reading
Request your trial