Marta v. Whitley
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-1020 (APM) |
| Parties | WAYNE P. MARTA, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. WHITLEY, Acting Secretary of the Army, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Lieutenant Colonel Wayne P. Marta attempted to transfer unused Post-9/11 GI Bill education benefits to his dependents after completing his active duty service. His request was rejected on the ground that such a transfer had to be made while on active duty. Marta then petitioned the Army Board for Correction of Military Records ("ABCMR" or "the Board") to correct his military records to reflect an active-duty election. The Board denied his request. Marta now claims that the Board's denial was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The court agrees. For the reasons that follow, the court will enter judgment in favor of Marta and against Defendant, Acting Secretary of the Army John E. Whitley, and remand the case to the ABCMR for further consideration consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
In 2008, Congress passed the "Post-9/11 Veterans Education Assistance Act of 2008" ("Post-9/11 GI Bill" or "the Act"). See 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. The Post-9/11 GI Bill provides monetary benefits to qualifying service members to assist them in readjusting to civilian life, particularly through financial assistance for higher education. See id. § 3311(a). The Act authorizes eligible military personnel to transfer their unused education benefits to family members, see id. § 3319, but, critical to this case, the Act provides that an individual "may transfer such entitlement only while serving as a member of the Armed Forces when the transfer is executed," id. § 3319(f)(1) (emphasis added). Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to "prescribe regulations" that Id. § 3319(j)(1)-(2).
Pursuant to the Act, the Department of Defense ("DOD") issued Directive-Type Memorandum 09-003 ("DTM 09-003"), which, among other things, established the policy "for authorizing the transferability of education benefits." A.R. at 38.2 DTM 09-003 directs the secretaries of military departments to implement policies to "[e]nsure that all eligible active duty members and members of the Reserve Components are aware that they are automatically eligible for educational assistance under the Post-9/11 GI Bill program upon serving the required active duty time," A.R. at 43, and to "[p]rovide active duty participants and members of the Reserve Components with qualifying active duty service individual pre-separation or release from activeduty counseling on the benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill and document accordingly," id. Consistent with the statutory language in section 3319(f), DTM 09-003 also notes that "[a]n individual approved to transfer entitlement to educational assistance under this section may transfer such entitlement to the individual's family member only while serving as a member of the Armed Forces." A.R. at 54.
A.R. at 73-74. Thus, under both DOD and Army policy, every soldier transitioning out of the Army was to receive documented counseling on the education benefits available under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Such counseling presumably would include direction on the transfer of education benefits to eligible family members. Marta maintains he never received such counseling. A.R. at 24. The Army produced no evidence to the contrary.
Marta served in the U.S. Army Reserve for 26 years. See A.R. at 147-48. He was last recalled to active duty on or about November 10, 2008, and remained on active duty until his release on May 30, 2012, effectively retiring on June 2, 2012. See id. Marta availed himself ofsome Post-9/11 GI Bill education benefits but failed to transfer the balance of those benefits to his children while on active duty. See A.R. at 132, 389.
Approximately three years after retiring, on May 25, 2015, Marta attempted to transfer his unused education benefits to his children on the Department of Veterans Affairs website, but his request was denied. See id. Thereafter, Marta filed an application for correction with the ABCMR, requesting that it "[c]orrect [his] record to reflect an election made to transfer [his] unused Post-9/11 GI Bill Education Benefits equally to [his] two children." A.R. at 131. In his application, Marta argued the DOD was required by 38 U.S.C. § 3323(b) "to give members notice of their entitlement and rights 'and other important aspects' of the education assistance provided under the statute," but had failed to do so. See A.R. at 133, 135. Marta asserted that he was not aware of the rule that education benefits could be transferred only while on active duty. See A.R. at 132.
Id. The Board also stated that it found Marta's claim that "DOD was required to personally notify each and every person who was eligible for the TEB program [to be] without merit." See id.
On March 20, 2017, Marta filed an application for reconsideration with the ABCMR, again requesting the same correction of his records. A.R. at 11, 17. In his second application, Martaargued that (1) the Army failed to provide him "individual pre-separation or release from active duty counseling on the benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill," as required by DTM 09-003; and (2) Thompson v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 3d 462 (E.D. Va. 2015), a case from the Eastern District of Virginia, compelled the Board to grant relief in his case. See A.R. at 22-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On January 8, 2020, the Board denied Marta's request for reconsideration. A.R. at 2-9. The Board once again pointed out that active-duty status was a pre-condition to transfer education benefits: "Without taking into effect the alleged lack of notification to transfer education benefits prior to his retirement, the applicant is advised the requirement is embedded in public law." A.R. at 6. The Board also observed that Marta had used some Post-9/11 GI Bill education benefits while on active duty, a fact the Board found "does not support the alleged lack of knowledge of the program." Id. The Board also determined that "[t]here is no evidence that shows [Marta] attempted to transfer education benefits and that the transfer was not processed and approved in a timely manner, which would enable the Board to possibly correct the record to show the request was accepted and approved timely." Id. "Without such evidence," the Board explained, it "must adhere to this law." Id. Finally, although not expressly mentioning the Eastern District of Virginia's decision in Thompson, the Board acknowledged that Marta had brought "[s]imilar cases" to its attention but said "[e]ach case is considered on its own individual merit." Id. The Board concluded that "there is insufficient evidence to amend the previous Board's decision." Id.
On April 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting that the Board's denial of his application violated the APA. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on August 28, 2020. Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. on the A.R., ECF No. 13 [hereinafter Pl.'s Mot.].Defendant cross-moved on October 2, 2020. See Def.'s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 15 [hereinafter Def.'s Mot.]. The parties' cross-motions are now ripe for consideration.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate when "the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But in a case involving review of a final agency action, the Rule 56 standard "does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record." See AFL-CIO v. Chao, 496 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2007). Instead, "[g]enerally speaking, district courts reviewing agency action under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard do not resolve factual issues, but operate instead as appellate courts resolving legal questions." James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1993))....
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