Martel v. Hall Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1927
• Citation: 255 P. 3,36 Wyo. 166
• Parties: MARTEL et al. v. HALL OIL CO. et al.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

255 P. 3

36 Wyo. 166

MARTEL et al. v. HALL OIL CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Wyoming

April 12, 1927

Error to District Court, Converse County; Cyrus O. Brown, Judge.

On petition for rehearing. Rehearing denied.

For original opinion, see 253 P. 862.

John J. Spriggs, of Lander, for plaintiffs in error.

Frederick D. Anderson, of Denver, Colo., A. C. Campbell, of Cheyenne, and Hagens & Murane, of Casper, for defendants in error.

Before BLUME, C. J., and POTTER and KIMBALL, JJ.

OPINION

BLUME C. J.

Counsel for plaintiffs, in his argument in support of a petition for rehearing, seems to think that we have not heretofore sufficiently discussed the points raised by him, although we did discuss the vital and controlling points in the case at considerable length-at greater length, perhaps, than the members of the bar generally, who continuously ask for short opinions, would approve. Counsel complains because we did not mention the fact that defendants took what counsel calls fixtures from the land, by which, we presume, he means some casing which defendants had put in the well, and which they removed when the well was abandoned. The only right that plaintiffs had in the land was to explore it for oil and gas and remove these minerals therefrom, if found; and it follows, of course, that they had no right in any fixtures on the land, and they could not complain of the removal of the casing from the well, unless the defendants thereby injured plaintiffs’ oil and gas right. But, as pointed out in the original opinion, there was no evidence of such injury, sufficient to take the case to the jury.

Nor do we see how plaintiffs can be held responsible, as counsel claims they are, for the fact that defendants did not plug the well in accordance with the statutes of this state, and why, accordingly, the cost of plugging it in accordance with such statutes, if that should become necessary, should be awarded to plaintiffs. No duty in that respect on the part of the plaintiffs has been pointed out.

And we cannot agree with counsel that the case should have been submitted to the jury on the question of damages for injury to the feelings of plaintiffs. No such damages are ordinarily allowable in a case like that at bar. 8 R. C. L. 528; 17 C. J. 836, and see Crawford v. Doggett, 82 Tex. 139, 17 S.W. 929, 27 Am. St. Rep. 859; Chappell v. Ellis, 123 N.C. 259, 31 S.E. 709, 68 Am. St. Rep. 822. Whatever exceptions there may be to the rule, it is clear that no such damages would be allowable in this case, since we held no punitive damages recoverable herein, and since there is no testimony in the record of any injured feeling, aside from what would naturally exist in any ordinary case of dispute or lawsuit between parties. Indeed, the amended petition herein fails to disclose that plaintiffs labored under any mental anguish on account of the trespass of defendants.

Again, we did not, as counsel claims, disregard the rule that a question of fact should be left to the jury, where the evidence in the case fairly permits different inferences to be drawn therefrom, but believed, as fully explained in the original opinion, that the trial court was justified in holding that the rule was not applicable in the case at bar because of the conjectural character of the evidence.

Counsel also claims that we were wrong in holding that each party should pay his own costs, and claims that, under the holding of the case of Kiehl v. Holliday (Mont). 251 P. 527 he should have been allowed his costs. The Kiehl Case was an action in trespass, and the court held that plaintiff was entitled to recover his costs, and based its decision on the provision of a statute which allows costs to plaintiff "in an action for the recovery of real property, or damages thereto ." The words in italics are not in section 5917, W. C. S. 1920, which provides for costs for plaintiff in an action for the recovery of real property. The Montana case is not,...