Martin-Erb v. Mo Com'n On Human Rights

• Decision Date: 28 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. SC 83704.,SC 83704.
• Citation: 77 S.W.3d 600
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, ex rel. Roma MARTIN-ERB, Appellant, v. MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

77 S.W.3d 600

STATE of Missouri, ex rel. Roma MARTIN-ERB, Appellant, v. MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, et al., Respondents.

No. SC 83704.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

May 28, 2002.

Frank E. Wallemann, Jefferson City, for Appellant.

Lowell D. Pearson, Marshall V. Wilson, Jane C. Drummond, Jefferson City, Alan L. Rupe, Wichita, Kan., Husch & Eppenberger, LLC, for Respondent Wal-Mart.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., James R. Layton, State Sol., Keith D. Halcomb, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent Mo. Com'n on Human Rights.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

Ms. Roma Martin-Erb filed a complaint in 1997 with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) alleging that she was fired by Wal-Mart because of her race, in violation of section 213.055, RSMo 1994¹ of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Three years later, the executive director of the MCHR determined there was "no probable cause" to believe that discrimination occurred and closed her complaint. Ms. Martin-Erb sought a writ of mandamus to compel the MCHR to follow its own procedures in reviewing her complaint and to grant her relief against Wal-Mart. On motion of the MCHR and Wal-Mart, the circuit court dismissed the petition, finding the executive director's decision was not reviewable. Ms. Martin-Erb appealed.

This Court holds that the executive director's "no probable cause" determination is reviewable under section 536.150 as a noncontested case for the limited purpose of determining whether she arbitrarily exercised or refused to exercise her statutory and regulatory duties in making that determination. The executive director is a necessary party to such a suit, however, because she is the one on whom the statute imposes the duty. Because Ms. Martin-Erb sued only the MCHR and its chairperson, the court's judgment quashing its preliminary writ is affirmed, but the case is remanded.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Wal-Mart hired Ms. Martin-Erb on August 5, 1991. She began as a hourly photo lab associate and was later promoted to photo lab manager on August 24, 1991. She was terminated on January 11, 1997. Ten days later, she filed a complaint with the MCHR alleging that Wal-Mart discharged her on the basis of race in violation of the MHRA.

After investigating her complaint for over three years, the executive director of the MCHR sent Ms. Martin-Erb a "no probable cause" letter on February 4, 2000, stating that, after investigation, a finding of "no probable cause" was made and her complaint closed. The letter also informed her that she had 30 days to seek judicial review of the "no probable cause" determination. Within that time period and pursuant to section 536.150, Ms. Martin-Erb filed what she styled as a petition for writ of review and mandamus requesting that the court set the matter for full evidentiary hearing on the merits; find Wal-Mart violated chapter 213; find the MCHR failed to fulfill its statutory duties in processing a meritorious complaint; find its decision was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and involved an abuse of discretion; and direct that she be made whole and offered back pay and reinstatement. The court issued a preliminary order in mandamus. Wal-Mart intervened, and it and the MCHR moved for dismissal.

The court quashed the preliminary writ and dismissed the petition, concluding that Ms. Martin-Erb's petition was, in effect, a civil action against Wal-Mart, and that she could have sought a "right to sue" letter from the MCHR permitting her to file such an action, but that she had failed to do so within the two-year statutory period provided in section 213.111. It held that section 536.150 did not give her a separate right to seek judicial review of the "no probable cause" determination once the two-year period had passed and that the earlier opportunity to seek a "right to sue" letter provided her with an adequate remedy at law, precluding equitable relief. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

II. PROVISIONS OF THE MISSOURI HUMAN RIGHTS ACT

It is helpful to briefly set out certain pertinent provisions of the MHRA as they relate to the issuance of a "probable cause" letter and the right to file suit. A person who claims to have been subjected to an unlawful discriminatory practice may, within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, file a complaint with the MCHR, providing details of the alleged discriminatory conduct and such other information as the MCHR may need. Sec. 213.075.1. The MHRA provides that "[t]he executive director shall, with the assistance of the commission's staff, promptly investigate the complaint." Sec. 213.075.3. The statute further specifically requires that "[t]he investigation, [and] determination of probable cause ... shall be conducted according to such rules, regulations and guidelines as the commission shall prescribe." Id. The MCHR accordingly adopted regulations providing that the investigation and "probable cause" determination will be:

accomplished by methods including, but not limited to, fact-finding conferences, personal interviews, written interrogatories, tests, requests for production of documents, books or papers, or other materials and reviews of investigations of other civil rights agencies.

8 CSR 60-2.025(9).

Under the MHRA, if the MCHR has not completed its administrative processing of the complaint and issued its determination within 180 days, the complainant may request it to issue a "right to sue" letter. Sec. 213.111.1. If the letter is timely requested, the MCHR must provide it. Id. The complainant must file any civil action against the person or entity allegedly committing the discrimination within 90 days of the date of the MCHR's letter, but in no event later than two years after the alleged discrimination occurred or was discovered. Id.² Once a complainant is provided with a "right to sue" letter, the MCHR is precluded from further pursuing that complaint. Id.

If no "right to sue" letter is requested, the executive director must continue investigating the complaint to determine whether "probable cause" exists to find discrimination. If, after investigation, the executive director determines that "probable cause" exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint, the statute requires the executive director to use various means to attempt to immediately eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice. Sec. 213.075.3. Ultimately, if conciliation fails, the MCHR chooses whether to set the matter for hearing and determination. If it does so, its ruling may be reviewed as a contested case pursuant to sections 213.085 and 536.100.³

If the executive director finds "no probable cause," then the complaint is closed and the complainant can proceed no further. Although the statute does not directly address whether or how the executive director's "no probable cause" determination can be reviewed, agency regulations have, since 1988, provided for judicial review, stating:

Any person aggrieved by dismissal of a complaint may obtain judicial review by filing a petition in the circuit court of the county of proper venue within thirty (30) days after the mailing or delivery of the notice of dismissal. Judicial review shall be in the manner provided by Chapter 536, RSMo for noncontested cases.

8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(E). The "no probable cause" letter received by Ms. Martin-Erb informed her that her complaint was closed upon a finding of "no probable cause" and that she had a right to seek judicial review within 30 days. She filed her petition for review in conformity with these provisions.

III. SUIT AGAINST WAL-MART

Although Ms. Martin-Erb filed her petition for review and mandamus against only the MCHR and its chairperson, she asked the circuit court to hold a hearing on the merits of her claim against Wal-Mart and to grant her reinstatement and back pay. As noted, Wal-Mart intervened and the circuit court later held that her claims against it were time-barred under section 213.111.

The trial court was correct in dismissing Ms. Martin-Erb's request for relief directly against Wal-Mart. Section 213.111 is clear that any civil suit against the alleged discriminating party must be filed within two years of the occurrence or discovery of the discrimination. Sec. 213.111.1. Ms. Martin-Erb alleged the discriminatory conduct occurred on January 11, 1997. After filing a complaint with the MCHR, she chose to continue pursuing remedies through the administrative process rather than seeking a "right to sue" letter. Once two years had passed—that is, after January 11, 1999—Ms. Martin-Erb could no longer sue Wal-Mart for the discrimination directly, but was limited to seeking action by the MCHR. To the extent that Ms. Martin-Erb asked the trial court to grant her relief directly against Wal-Mart, it properly denied her relief.⁴

IV. RELIEF AGAINST THE MCHR

Ms. Martin-Erb also alleged that the MCHR's finding of "no probable cause" "fails to comply with the requirements of Chapter 213 for processing a meritorious complaint," that the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and that it involved an abuse of discretion. She has asked this Court to remand the matter to the circuit court and order the petition be reinstated and a de novo hearing held.

The MCHR asserts that the executive director's decision is a discretionary, non-reviewable determination and that the same reasoning that precludes her from suing Wal-Mart at this juncture also precludes her from suing the MCHR. It further contended at oral argument that to the extent the MCHR provided for an alternative method of interlocutory judicial review in 8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(E), it has exceeded its statutory authority and the regulation is void.

The MCHR is correct that none of the governing provisions of the MHRA provide for judicial review of the executive director's "no probable cause" decision. Sections 213.075.16 and...