Martin v. Bd. of Trs. of the Police Pension Fund of the Vill. of Shiloh
| Decision Date | 29 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5–16–0344,5–16–0344 |
| Citation | 2017 IL App (5th) 160344,92 N.E.3d 932 |
| Parties | David MARTIN, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICE PENSION FUND OF the VILLAGE OF SHILOH, Defendant–Appellant (The Village of Shiloh, Intervener–Appellant). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Dennis J. Orsey, of Dennis J. Orsey, P.C., of Granite City, for appellants.
Edward J. Kionka, of Carbondale, and Jon Rosenstengel, of Bonifield & Rosenstengel, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, David Martin, applied to the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the Village of Shiloh, Illinois (Board), for a line-of-duty disability pension pursuant to section 3114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code). 40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2012). Alternatively, plaintiff requested a not-on-duty disability pension pursuant to section 3–114.2 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.2 (West 2012). The Board denied plaintiff a line-of-duty disability pension but granted him a not-on-duty disability pension.
¶ 2 Plaintiff sought administrative review of the Board's decision in the circuit court of St. Clair County, naming the Board as a defendant. The Village of Shiloh intervened in the proceedings. The circuit court reversed the Board's decision. On appeal, the Board argues it appropriately denied plaintiff a line-of-duty disability pension because plaintiff was not performing an "act of duty" when he was injured. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment reversing the Board.
¶ 4 Plaintiff was a detective employed by the Village of Shiloh Police Department. On May 25, 2012, while riding as a passenger in the front seat of an unmarked squad car, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident after the squad car, which was stopped at a stoplight, was rear-ended by another vehicle. Plaintiff sustained cervical spine injuries
in his neck and back. There is no dispute regarding the permanent disabilities plaintiff incurred as a result of the accident. There is also no dispute that plaintiff was on duty when the accident occurred. Specifically, plaintiff was returning to the Shiloh police department from the St. Clair County courthouse, where he was conducting police work with the State's Attorney's office. This work included obtaining subpoenas for an ongoing investigation and filing traffic tickets and other citations.
¶ 5 Plaintiff is a fully vested member in the Village of Shiloh Police Pension Fund. On July 15, 2013, petitioner filed an application for disability with the Board, seeking a line-of-duty disability pursuant to section 3–114.1 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2012). The Village of Shiloh subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, which was allowed without objection.
¶ 6 An administrative hearing was held before the Board on August 11, 2015, where plaintiff presented evidence and testimony in support of his application for a line-of-duty disability. Additionally, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Code, the Board considered the medical reports of three licensed physicians who specialize in the treatment and examination of cervical spine
injuries. 40 ILCS 5/3–115 (West 2012). In their medical reports, the physicians opined that plaintiff suffered disabling injuries as a result of the accident that would prevent him from performing the duties of a police officer. As previously stated, the parties do not dispute plaintiff suffered disabling injuries. Also at the hearing, plaintiff orally moved to amend his application, requesting, in the alternative, a not-on-duty disability pursuant to section 3–114.2 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.2 (West 2012).
¶ 7 The Board entered an order denying plaintiff's request for a line-of-duty disability pension on October 19, 2015, finding plaintiff failed to meet his burden that he sustained a line-of-duty disability under section 3–114.1 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2012). Instead, the Board concluded plaintiff was entitled to a not-on-duty disability pension pursuant to section 3–114.2 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.2 (West 2012). In reaching its conclusion, the Board noted that plaintiff's request for a line-of-duty disability pension necessitates a determination of whether plaintiff was performing an "act of duty" as required for entitlement to a line-of-duty disability pension under section 3–114.1 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2012). The Board outlined several factors in support of its conclusion that plaintiff failed to establish his disability resulted from the performance of an "act of duty":
Since the Board concluded plaintiff was not performing an "act of duty" at the time of the accident, it denied his application for a line-of-duty disability pension.
¶ 8 Plaintiff timely filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's order on November 9, 2015, in the circuit court of St. Clair County. The parties submitted briefs to the trial court, and oral arguments were heard on May 18, 2016. After considering the parties' arguments, the trial court entered an order reversing the Board's decision on July 12, 2016. The trial court concluded that our supreme court's ruling in Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund , 114 Ill. 2d 518, 104 Ill.Dec. 221, 502 N.E.2d 718 (1986), controlled the facts of this case. Specifically, the court stated, "[h]aving considered the capacity in which [plaintiff] was injured, the Court finds he is entitled to" a line-of-duty disability pension.
¶ 9 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 The Board contends it appropriately denied plaintiff a line-of-duty pension because plaintiff was not performing an "act of duty" at the time of the accident, a requirement for entitlement to a line-of-duty disability under section 3–114.1 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2012). In administrative cases, we review the decision of the administrative agency, not that of the trial court.
Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board , 225 Ill. 2d 497, 531, 312 Ill.Dec. 208, 870 N.E.2d 273 (2006). We are limited to considering the evidence presented at the administrative hearing and may not hear additional evidence for or against the agency's decision. Marconi , 225 Ill. 2d at 532, 312 Ill.Dec. 208, 870 N.E.2d 273.
¶ 12 The standard of review employed in reviewing administrative decisions depends upon the question presented. Marconi , 225 Ill. 2d at 532, 312 Ill.Dec. 208, 870 N.E.2d 273. A question of fact is reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, a question of law is reviewed de novo , and a mixed question of law and fact is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Marconi , 225 Ill. 2d at 532, 312 Ill.Dec. 208, 870 N.E.2d 273. Here, the relevant facts are undisputed, and the parties' dispute turns on the interpretation of "act of duty" as that term is defined under section 3–114.1 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2012). Accordingly, because the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Code presents a question of law, our review is de novo . Fedorski v. Board of Trustees of the Aurora Police Pension Fund , 375 Ill. App. 3d 371, 373, 313 Ill.Dec. 720, 873 N.E.2d 15 (2007). We further note that under any standard of review, a plaintiff to an administrative proceeding bears the burden of proof, and relief will be denied if he or she fails to sustain that burden. Marconi , 225 Ill. 2d at 532–33, 312 Ill.Dec. 208, 870 N.E.2d 273.
¶ 13 Initially, we observe that the primary consideration in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Jones v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund , 384 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068, 323 Ill.Dec. 936, 894 N.E.2d 962 (2008). Legislative intent is best derived from the statutory language itself, which, if unambiguous, should be enforced as written. Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund , 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876 (2005). However, if the statutory language is susceptible to more than one interpretation, legislative intent may be ascertained by considering the act as a whole, its nature, its object, and the consequences resulting from different constructions. Taddeo , 216 Ill. 2d at 595–96, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876. Importantly, a court must consider the statute in its entirety. Jones , 384 Ill. App. 3d at 1068, 323 Ill.Dec. 936, 894 N.E.2d 962. It is well settled that to the extent there is any question regarding legislative intent and the clarity of the language of a pension statute, it must be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner. Prazen v. Shoop , 2013 IL 115035, ¶ 39, 375 Ill.Dec. 709, 998 N.E.2d 1.
¶ 14 As we set forth above, this case involves plaintiff's application for an award of a line-of-duty disability pension. Alternatively, plaintiff requested an award of a not-on-duty disability pension. We outline those relevant sections of the Code as follows.
¶ 15 Section 3–114.1 of the Code provides for a pension equal to 65% of the officer's salary if the officer becomes disabled as a result of "the performance of an act of duty." 40 ILCS 5/3114.1 (West 2012). Specifically, section 3–114.1 provides:
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