Martin v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Laramie Cnty.

• Decision Date: 02 February 2022
• Docket Number: S-21-0071
• Citation: 2022 WY 21
• Parties: SEAN M. MARTIN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LARAMIE COUNTY and KENNETH GUILLE, in his capacity as Laramie County Assessor, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

2022 WY 21

SEAN M. MARTIN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LARAMIE COUNTY and KENNETH GUILLE, in his capacity as Laramie County Assessor, Appellees (Defendants).

No. S-21-0071

Supreme Court of Wyoming

February 2, 2022

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County The Honorable Peter Froelicher, Judge

Representing Appellant: David Ziemer, Legal Aid of Wyoming Inc., Cody, Wyoming; Wendy S. Owens, Legal Aid of Wyoming Inc., Gillette, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Ziemer.

Representing Appellees: Bridget Hill, Attorney General; Brandi Lee Monger, Deputy Attorney General; Karl D. Anderson, Supervising Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Anderson.

Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS ^[*] , KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

KAUTZ JUSTICE.

[¶1] Sean M. Martin brought a declaratory judgment action against the Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County and Laramie County Assessor Kenneth Guille (collectively referred to herein as "the County") seeking a declaration that the durational residency requirement in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-105(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2021), which allows qualified veterans to claim a property tax exemption, is unconstitutional. The district court concluded the residency requirement is constitutional and granted summary judgment in favor of the County. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] Mr. Martin presents a single issue for our determination, which we rephrase:

Does Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-105(a)(vi), which grants qualified veterans an annual property tax exemption provided they have been Wyoming residents for at least three years, violate the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the constitutional right to interstate travel?

FACTS

[¶3] The facts and course of proceedings in this case are straightforward. Section 39-13-105(a)(vi) provides a modest property tax exemption for qualifying veterans who have been bona fide citizens of the State of Wyoming for at least three years. Mr. Martin is a decorated and honorably discharged veteran who owns real property in Laramie County. However, he had not been a resident of Wyoming for three years when he filed suit.

[¶4] Mr. Martin brought this action seeking a declaration that the durational residency requirement for the veteran tax exemption is unconstitutional. Mr. Martin filed a motion for summary judgment and the County filed a response, which the district court considered a cross-motion for summary judgment.^[1] After a hearing, the district court denied Mr. Martin's motion and granted summary judgment to the County. Mr. Martin appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶5] Under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 56(a), a movant is entitled to summary judgment when he shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." This Court reviews de novo the district court's order granting summary judgment. Gowdy v. Cook, 2020 WY 3, ¶ 21, 455 P.3d 1201, 1206-07 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Bear Peak Res., LLC v. Peak Powder River Res., LLC, 2017 WY 124, ¶ 10, 403 P.3d 1033, 1040 (Wyo. 2017) (other citations omitted)).

[¶6] The determination of whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, over which this Court exercises de novo review. Harrison v. State, 2021 WY 40, ¶ 11, 482 P.3d 353, 357 (Wyo. 2021) (citing Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶ 3, 437 P.3d 830, 833 (Wyo. 2019)) (other citations, quotation marks, and italics omitted). "'Statutes are presumed constitutional, and we resolve any doubt in favor of constitutionality.'" Dugan v. State, 2019 WY 112, ¶ 87, 451 P.3d 731, 756 (Wyo. 2019), cert. denied, U.S., 140 S.Ct. 1298, 206 L.Ed.2d 377 (2020) (quoting Sheesley, ¶ 3, 437 P.3d at 833). See also, Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 43, 184 P.3d 687, 700 (Wyo. 2008) ("[t]here is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute") (citing Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 2004)).

DISCUSSION

[¶7] The veteran tax exemption applicable to Mr. Martin is found in § 39-13-105(a)(vi):^[2]

(a) The following persons who are bona fide Wyoming residents for at least three (3) years at the time of claiming the exemption are entitled to receive the tax exemption provided by W.S. 39-11-105(a)(xxiv):

(vi) An honorably discharged veteran who served in the military service of the United States, who was awarded the armed forces expeditionary medal or other authorized service or campaign medal indicating service for the United States in any armed conflict in a foreign country[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-105(a)(xxiv) (LexisNexis 2021) lists property belonging to veterans as one of the categories exempt from property taxation. Section 39-13-105(b) limits the annual exemption to $3, 000 of assessed property value.

[¶8] The veteran tax exemption has been available in Wyoming in various statutory forms since 1917. Miller v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Natrona, 79 Wyo. 502, 510 517, 337 P.2d 262, 263, 266 (Wyo. 1959). There have been challenges to the statute's constitutionality over the years, and each time it has passed muster. Id. See also, State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs of Goshen Cnty. v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 P. 771 (1923); Harkin v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Niobrara Cnty., 30 Wyo. 455, 222 P. 35 (1924). However, none of the cases address the precise issue presented here.

The Fourteenth Amendment and The Right to Travel

[¶9] Mr. Martin claims the three-year durational residency requirement for receiving the veteran tax exemption in § 39-13-105(a)(vi) violates his federal constitutional rights to the equal protection of the law, the privileges and immunities of United States citizens, and the right to interstate travel.^[3]

[¶10] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that states will not interfere with United States citizens' rights to equal protection of the law and the privileges and immunities of all citizens.

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

[¶11] The right to interstate travel is not specifically found in the Constitution. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 1524, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999). "Yet the 'constitutional right to travel from one State to another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence." Id. (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966)). In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." In Shapiro, the court recognized the right to interstate travel (and relocation) as a fundamental right under the equal protection clause. Id., 394 U.S. at 628-30, 638, 89 S.Ct. at 1328-29, 1333. In Saenz, the court ruled the privileges and immunities provision protects interstate travel, particularly the rights of citizens who elect to become permanent residents of a state to be treated like other citizens of the state. Id., 526 U.S. at 501-03, 119 S.Ct. at 1526. Despite identifying a different provision of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the right to interstate travel, the court in Saenz used an analysis similar to its equal protection evaluation in Shapiro. Id., 526 U.S. at 501-507, 119 S.Ct. at 1525-28.

[¶12] "Equal protection requires that 'all persons similarly situated . . . be treated alike.'" Bird v. Wyo. Bd. of Parole, 2016 WY 100, ¶ 6, 382 P.3d 56, 61 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). Equal protection analysis, therefore, begins with a determination of whether the classes, which the claimant alleges are treated differently under a statute, are similarly situated. Bird, ¶ 7, 382 P.3d at 61 (citing Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 26, 36 P.3d 586, 594 (Wyo. 2001)). If the classes are not similarly situated, there can be no equal protection violation. Id.

[¶13] Once a court determines the classes are similarly situated, the next step in an equal protection analysis is to determine whether the legislature was justified in treating them differently. To do so, we must decide what level of equal protection scrutiny applies. Hageman v. Goshen Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91, ¶ 54, 256 P.3d 487, 503 (Wyo. 2011). See also, Bird, ¶ 7 n.1, 382 P.3d at 61 n.1. The level of scrutiny depends upon the nature of the classification. Hageman, ¶ 54, 256 P.3d at 503 ("If we determine that the classification does 'treat similarly situated persons unequally,' we apply . . . different levels of scrutiny depending upon the nature of the classification to determine whether equal protection is violated.") (quoting Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 944 (Wyo. 1994)).

[¶14] "The rational relationship test is utilized when an ordinary interest is involved." Mills v Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 53 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Hays v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 768 P.2d 11 (Wyo. 1989)). See also,...