Martin v. Benson
| Decision Date | 18 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. COA95-1417,COA95-1417 |
| Citation | 481 S.E.2d 292,125 N.C.App. 330 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Jannett J. MARTIN and Richard W. Martin, Plaintiffs v. John Michael BENSON and Industrial Electric, Inc., Defendants. |
Frazier, Frazier & Mahler, L.L.P. by Torin L. Fury, Greensboro, for defendant-appellees.
Mary K. Nicholson, Greensboro; and Joseph A. Williams, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellants.
On 28 November 1990, plaintiff, Jannett Martin, was operating a motor vehicle when the truck operated by defendant, John Benson, crossed the median and collided with plaintiff. The truck was owned by defendant, Industrial Electric, Inc. Defendant's negligence was stipulated and the jury awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $50,000.00.
Plaintiff's evidence established that prior to the accident she was a very active and social person, but after the accident she became quiet and depressed. The evidence also showed that she was treated for headaches, depression, chronic pain, not sleeping or eating, anxiety, crying spells and memory difficulty and that she was employed before the accident, but became disabled and unable to work afterward. She incurred medical expenses in the amount of $100,041.22.
Plaintiff presented medical evidence of her course of treatment after the injury. This evidence included the testimony of Dr. James Adelman, a neurologist who specialized in treating patients with headaches. Dr. Adelman first saw plaintiff on 18 January 1991 and diagnosed her with musculoskeletal pain, posttraumatic and post-concussion headaches. He stated that even though plaintiff did not report losing consciousness from the accident, the fact that plaintiff reported feeling dazed at the time of the accident was sufficient to show an alteration in the functioning of the brain, which is symptomatic of a closed head injury. Dr. Adelman's testimony included the following:
Q: Okay. All right. So, do you have an opinion satisfactory to yourself and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether or not the original diagnosis you made was directly related to or could or might have been related to the accident of November 28, 1990?
. . . . .
On 27 March 1995, defendants moved to have plaintiff examined by a neuropsychologist for the purpose of updating information on plaintiff's medical condition. Thereafter, a week before the trial began on 17 April 1995, plaintiff submitted to an evaluation by a neuropsychologist, Dr. Elizabeth Gamboa, who was retained by the defendants. Dr. Gamboa examined plaintiff for approximately three hours and reviewed plaintiff's medical records. At trial Dr. Gamboa was permitted to testify as follows:
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Gamboa was allowed to testify as to her own medical diagnosis and opinion of disability based on that diagnosis when, by statutory definition of her profession, she had no expertise. According to Dr. Gamboa, she received a bachelor's degree in psychology, obtained a doctorate degree in psychology and completed a post-doctoral year of training in neuropsychology. At the time, she was working as a neuropsychologist in a brain injury unit at a rehab hospital. Defendant contends it was within the trial court's discretion whether to allow Dr. Gamboa's testimony under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702 and absent an abuse of discretion, there was no error in the trial court's admitting this evidence.
The issue presented in this case, whether a neuropsychologist is qualified to testify that the plaintiff did not suffer a closed head injury in this accident, appears to be one of first impression in this State. In other jurisdictions which have considered similar issues, the courts have split. The jurisdictions allowing the neuropsychologist to testify regarding the medical causation of a plaintiff's condition base their arguments on an interpretation of the state's rule of evidence patterned after the Federal Rule of Evidence 702, dealing with the expert witness testimony. See Hutchison v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa.Sup.Ct.1994); Cunningham v. Montgomery, D.M.D., 143 Or.App. 171, 921 P.2d 1355 (1996).
In Hutchison, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that while the practice of medicine was statutorily excluded from the practice of psychology in its state, nevertheless, the Court would follow a liberal interpretation of Rule 702 and allow such testimony if the criteria for qualification under Rule 702 were met. Hutchison, at 887-88.
The Oregon Court of Appeals, in its recent decision of Cunningham, supra, follows the holding of the Iowa court. Again, the Oregon court noted that its Rule 702 reflected the view that an expert witness on a medical subject need not be a person licensed to practice medicine. The Court reversed the trial court, which had limited the neuropsychologist's testimony to identifying mental impairments of the plaintiff, holding that the neuropsychologist could testify to the medical causation of plaintiff's condition. Cunningham, 921 P.2d at 1360.
However, in a well reasoned dissent, the minority pointed out that the neuropsychologist testified that she was a specialist who focused on the mental and behavioral characteristics of individuals who have brain impairment due to dementia, other brain disease or head injury. Therefore, the neuropsychologist was qualified to test plaintiff's mental abilities and express an opinion about whether plaintiff's abilities were impaired and it did not necessarily follow that the neuropsychologist was qualified to determine the cause of the impairment. The minority then concluded that, Id. at 1363-64. 1
Further, the State of Georgia does not allow neuropsychologists to testify as to medical causation based on its statutory definition of the practice of psychology. In Chandler Exterminators, Inc. v. Morris et al., 262 Ga. 257, 416 S.E.2d 277 (1992), the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed its Court of Appeals, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a neuropsychologist to testify that the plaintiffs had organic brain damage from exposure to chemicals. The Court upheld the trial court's determination that "[the neuropsychologist], though qualified to state which mental dysfunctions [p]laintiffs may be suffering, is not competent to testify as to causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty." The Court, in finding the statute defining and limiting the practice of psychology to be controlling authority, observed that medical causation is not a subject within the scope of a psychologist's expertise. Id. 416 S.E.2d at 278.
In this case, the trial court, in allowing the testimony of Dr. Gamboa, relied upon N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (1992). The rule provides:
Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,...
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State v. Hayes, COA97-697.
...339 N.C. at 521, 453 S.E.2d at 845-46). We cannot discern from that opinion or the opinion issued by this Court, Martin v. Benson, 125 N.C.App. 330, 481 S.E.2d 292 (1997), rev'd, ___ N.C. ___, 500 S.E.2d 664 (1998), the extent of the hearing conducted by the trial court in response to the m......
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...do otherwise would allow psychologists to invade the realm reserved for the practice of medicine. See, e.g., Martin v. Benson, 125 N.C.App. 330, 481 S.E.2d 292, 296 (N.C.App.1997), rev'd, 348 N.C. 684, 500 S.E.2d 664 (N.C.1998) (issue not properly preserved for appeal). The majority of juri......
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Landers v. Chrysler Corp.
... ... LaRue Construction Co., 215 Ga.app. 453, 451 S.E.2d 792 (1994)); and Martin v. Benson, 125 N.C.App. 330, 481 S.E.2d 292 (1997) (neuropsychologist not competent to testify to medical causation as opinion invaded field reserved ... ...
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State Carolina v. Norman
...358 N.C. at 462, 597 S.E.2d at 688. Defendant contends that the improper qualification found by our Court in Martin v. Benson, 125 N.C.App. 330, 481 S.E.2d 292 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 348 N.C. 684, 500 S.E.2d 664 (1998), supports his argument that Mr. Glover was improperly qualified......