Martin v. Blattner

• Decision Date: 22 October 1885
• Citation: 68 Iowa 286,25 N.W. 131
• Parties: MARTIN v. BLATTNER AND ANOTHER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

68 Iowa 286

25 N.W. 131

MARTIN

v.BLATTNER AND ANOTHER.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed October 22, 1885.

Appeal from Mahaska circuit court.

The plaintiff brought this suit in chancery under Code, § 1543, as amended by chapter 143 of the Acts of the Twentieth General Assembly, to restrain the defendants and another from maintaining a nuisance by keeping a place for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. A preliminary injunction was allowed. Defendants, C. Blattner and Gibbs, appeal.John F. Lacy, Bolton & McCoy, J. C. Williams, and Phillips & Greer, for appellants, C. Blattner and another.

Gleason & Haskell, for appellee, C. Martin.

BECK, C. J.

1. The original petition contains sufficient averments, charging that Charles and Fred Blattner maintained a nuisance by keeping a place for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. Fred, by his answer, not under oath, denies the allegations. Charles, in a verified answer, makes a like denial, and pleads that the statute under which the proceeding is instituted is unconstitutional, and that the action is barred by reason of the fact that he was adjudged not guilty in two separate criminal proceedings wherein he was charged with violating the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors. In an amended petition it is alleged that Gibbs is the owner of the premises wherein the unlawful sales of intoxicating liquors were made, and that the other defendants are his lessees. Gibbs, in his answer, admits that he owns the premises in question, and alleges that he leased them October 1, 1883, for the term of three years. He does not state to whom the lease was made, or its terms, nor for what purpose the premises were leased. He alleges that the statute under which the proceedings are had is in conflict with the constitution of the United States, and that plaintiff has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. The allegations of the petition were supported by certain affidavits filed by plaintiff. Upon the pleadings and proof the circuit court ordered that an injunction issue restraining all of the defendants “from keeping and maintaining a nuisance, and from selling intoxicating liquors, or keeping the same for sale, and from permitting the same to be kept or sold or drank in or on” the premises in question, properly describing them. Charles Blattner and Gibbs appeal, and present various objections to the decision of the circuit court, which we will proceed to consider.

2. It is insisted that as it is alleged in the answer of Charles Blattner, and shown by the affidavit of himself and Fred, that he had no interest in the saloon, and was not concerned in keeping it, the injunction should not have been allowed as against him. We think the proof sufficiently shows that he was concerned in the saloon. It is not denied that he had been at one time interested in and an owner of the saloon, and it is not shown that he had parted with his interest in it. The proof shows that he was regarded as the owner by those who patronized the saloon, and that he was, by at least one witness, seen there exercising the authority of an owner, and claiming certainproperty found there. The circuit court had ample ground to hold that he was concerned in the violation of the law by the sale of intoxicating liquors at the place described in the petition.

3. It is next insisted that Gibbs, being the lessor of the premises in which the law was violated, cannot be reached by an injunction. We think the consideration of some familiar principles of the law and provisions of the statute will establish the contrary conclusion. Under the statute real estate used with the knowledge or consent of the owners for unlawful traffic in intoxicating liquors is subject to a lien for all judgments rendered for fines and penalties provided for the violation of the law by such traffic. Code, § 1558. And the building, without regard to its ownership, in which such traffic is carried on is declared to be a nuisance. Code, § 1543. It is a well-settled rule of the law that all property of the citizen is held subject to such police and other regulations which the legislature may provide for the protection of the health and safety of the people, and that no right of property can intervene to arrest the enforcement of penalties for the violation of the criminal statutes of the state. The welfare of the people in their health, property, and lives is above the rights of the individual citizen. When the state, in the exercise of its sovereign authority, declares that an act is unlawful, no citizen may disobey such a statute for the reason that the act was before the legislation lawful, and that he held property exclusively used in the commission of the act. A contrary rule would arrest progress by legislation in efforts to suppress vice and crime. The owner of property cannot by leasing it remove it from the operation of these principles. His lease, being in conflict with the law, is void; he cannot plead it as an instrument which sanctifies crime and the violation of law. By the violation of the law the lease ceases to be of force, and it becomes the duty of the lessor to exercise the right which he possesses to oust the lessee from the possession of the premises unless he ceases to violate the law. Without special reference to the numerous authorities supporting these views, it is sufficient to refer to the following of that class: Cooley, Const. Lim. 583; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330;Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179;Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, etc., 5 Cow. 538.

The defendant Gibbs having leased the property to the vendor of liquors, forbidden by the statute, and refusing to exercise his right and authority to forbid the traffic, and oust the violator of the law from his land, becomes an aider and abettor of the violator of the law. And his abetting of the crime becomes active when he comes into a court of justice and contends with the other violators of the law for its defeat, and the criminals escape from the penalties and remedies provided for suppressing the crimes in which they are engaged. We are of the opinion that he is a proper party...