Martin v. Blea

• Decision Date: 12 July 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-00698 AWI SKO (PC)
• Parties: JARED ANDREW MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. DALE J. BLEA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

JARED ANDREW MARTIN, Plaintiff,
v.
DALE J. BLEA, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00698 AWI SKO (PC)

United States District Court, E.D. California

July 12, 2022

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 21-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE

SHEILA K. OBERTO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jared Andrew Martin, a pretrial detainee, is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 9, 2022. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff generally alleges Defendants Dale J. Blea, Ernest J. Licalsi, the County of Madera and the City of Madera are working cooperatively to get Plaintiff convicted of crimes he did not commit.

For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned will recommend Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by pretrial detainees or prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is

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frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

III. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

“Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations,” not his legal theories. Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled,” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not

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sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).

IV. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff asserts three claims. As to each claim, Plaintiff contends his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution have been violated.

In his first claim, Plaintiff contends Madera County Superior Court Judge Dale J. Blea “is not fair or impartial,” refuses to allow Plaintiff to represent himself, refused to allow Plaintiff to move for dismissal during arraignment proceedings, and refused to allow Plaintiff to present witnesses and evidence. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff contends Defendant Blea “repeatedly interrupts” him and does “not allow the Plaintiff to exercise his rights under federal law and the U.S. Constitution.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Defendant Blea would not permit Plaintiff to represent himself at the arraignment and “continues to speak down to and negative about” Plaintiff, abusing his power and discretion as a judge “by allowing the prosecutors to lie and clearing the courtroom without excuse.” (Id.)

As to his second claim, Plaintiff contends he wants “U.S. Attorney assistance and FBI protection because California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation correctional officers have beat, abused and tried to murder” him. (Doc. 1 at 4.)^[1] Plaintiff contends Defendants Blea, Licalsi, “the District Attorney and Madera County Sheriff have conspired to send [Plaintiff] back to prison knowing these charges ... are false.” (Id.) Plaintiff further contends he has been prevented from presenting evidence of his innocence and that “these people, Madera County and the City of Madera are knowingly, willingly, and intentionally trying to put” him in prison for crimes he did not commit. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that when he attempts to “explain the details and give background” concerning how he “was beaten, terrorized and tortured and sexually harassed by correctional officers,” the City of Madera and County of Madera “employees silence” him. (Id.) Plaintiff concludes that “Judge Blea and local government officials and employees are

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trying to murder” him to “keep their secrets.” (Id.)

Finally, in his third claim, Plaintiff contends he “want[s] a jury trial for this lawsuit” because “people need to know how city and county prosecutors, judges, and correctional officers, along with the Sheriff's Department, have used the Madera resources to abuse poor and black.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff contends he is “being set up by Judge Blea,” and that the City of Madera and County of Madera are “supporting corrupt judges, including Ernest J. Licalsi.” (Id.) He asserts “there is no way Judge Blea, Warden Raythel Fisher, Sergeant Darren Huckaby or Noah Marshall could get away with tampering with evidence or obstructing justice or torturing, terrorizing, seizing [his] court papers, legal documents, legal paperwork or evidence of [his] innocence with the backing and support of the City of Madera and County of Madera.” (Id.) Plaintiff repeats his wish for “U.S. Attorney assistance” and “FBI protection.” (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of “state and federal investigations of Judge Dale J. Blea,” a jury trial, “U.S. Attorney assistance and FBI protection,” $200,000,000.00 in damages, and “stays, injunctions and restraining order[s] to stop” the violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff wants “those involved fired and arrested,” and repeats his “need” for “U.S. Attorney assistance and FBI protection.” (Id.)

V. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides a ‘method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles,

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697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir 2006).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This...