Martin v. Bozeman

• Decision Date: 08 March 1965
• Docket Number: No. 6329,6329
• Citation: 173 So.2d 382
• Parties: Gordon H. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mrs. Catherine Garrity BOZEMAN, Administratrix of Succession of Annie Garrity O'Reilly, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 382

173 So.2d 382

Gordon H. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mrs. Catherine Garrity BOZEMAN, Administratrix of Succession of Annie Garrity O'Reilly, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 6329.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

March 8, 1965.

Joseph H. Simpson, of Schilling & Simpson, Amite, for appellant.

Harold J. Lamy, of Dodd, Hirsch, Barker & Meunier, New Orleans, for appellee.

Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, LANDRY, REID and BAILES, JJ.

BAILES, Judge.

This is an action brought by plaintiff, Gordon H. Hartin, against the administratrix of the Succession of Annie Garrity O'Reilly to recover the sum of $27,000 allegedly due plaintiff for services rendered to Annie Garrity O'Reilly, hereinafter called decedent, for a period of 30 years, commencing in 1933 and ending in 1963.

After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4630, together with legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid, and for all costs. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant, in answer to the appeal, contends that the award of the trial court is excessive and should be reduced to $1500.

The background facts are these. The plaintiff was married twice. The first time to Alice Scully, the niece of decedent. The first wife was reared by decedent from about age nine, her parents having died sometime prior thereto. The relationship between the niece and the decedent was a very close one, actually approximating that of mother and daughter. In fact, few persons knew the true relationship between them. In 1932, plaintiff and his first wife were married. Nor many months thereafter decedent came to live with them, and she remained in the home and was treated in every respect as a member of the family until the plaintiff's first wife died.

In March, 1956, while his first wife was on her death bed in the hospital, and the decedent expressing to him her concern of what would happen to her after her niece died, plaintiff told decedent that she could continue to live with him, and that he would provide for her just as he had done in the past. In response to his offer, the decedent on this occasion, and on several occasions thereafter expressed her appreciation and told him that she would leave him what she had at her death. Although plaintiff did provide for her from March, 1956, until she left his home in 1961, when she died in 1963, plaintiff learned that she had not carried out her repeated promise to provide for him in her will.

The record is replete with proof that the plaintiff did continue to provide for decedent from the time his first wife died in March, 1956, until the decedent left plaintiff's home in 1961. After decedent left plaintiff's home, her mental condition gradually deteriorated to an extent that it became necessary in August, 1962, for her friends (not including plaintiff) to have her committed to the asylum at Jackson. She remained there as a patient until she died in April, 1963. Even after decedent was committed to the asylum at Jackson, plaintiff and his (second) wife made several trips to visit her there, and upon her death they made the necessary arrangements for her burial in accordance with the wishes she had expressed during her lifetime.

After plaintiff's first wife died, decedent and plaintiff resided together in plaintiff's home until plaintiff married his second wife in June, 1958. Upon this marriage, plaintiff moved to the home of his new wife where they resided until April, 1961. During these years, plaintiff maintained his own home for the exclusive use of decedent, and during this period of time he continued to provide for all her needs, requirements, pleasures and comforts, took her on pleasure trips, trips to New Orleans, to Rosaryville, about town where ever she wished to go, to the grocery store, post office, and any other place she desired or had need to go, and he administered constantly to her. In April, 1961, plaintiff and his wife decided to move into the plaintiff's home which had been occupied alone by decedent. This move was dictated by the economic situation of the plaintiff. In preparation of moving back, all of which had been fully discussed with decedent, plaintiff added an additional bedroom and bath to his home at a considerable cash outlay all in order to more comfortably accommodate the three of them, that is, decedent, plaintiff and his wife. After the improvements were completed and as plans finalized for the move to be made, decedent without any cause or reason removed herself from the home. At this time, plaintiff admonished decedent that he would no longer be responsible for her care, keep and welfare.

The trial judge denied recovery to plaintiff for any and all services rendered to decedent between 1933 and March, 1956, on the ground that it was a gratuity; allowed plaintiff partial recovery for the period of time from March 1956 to June, 1958, charging him, in effect with an offset for value of services rendered by decedent to plaintiff while they inhabited together the plaintiff's home; and allowed recovery on strict proof of value of residence occupancy, food and utilities in the amount of $4630.

For convenience of consideration, the plaintiff's claim for restitution over this thirty year period is best divided into two periods: The first period will be that extending from 1933 to 1956, that is, the entire period of time during which decedent lived in the plaintiff's home during the lifetime of his first wife, Alice Scully; and the second period will be that running from March, 1956 to the date of decedent's death in 1963.

We note the following statement in the plaintiff's brief regarding these two periods:

'* * * Gordon Martin's claim against the estate before 1956 depends on the theory of unjust enrichment, which the trial judge mistakenly applied to the claim after 1956. His claim against the estate after 1956 depends on the theory of implied-in-fact contract, and recovery should be on a quantum meruit basis. * * *.'

We will consider the case in the order of the plaintiff's assignment of errors.

Quoting further from his brief, the plaintiff says:

'The learned trial judge's first error was in not allowing recovery for the period 1933--1956. Gordon Martin should recover on the theory of unjust enrichment of the estate of decedent as outlined in the case of Succession of Dugas (215 La. 13), 39 So.2d 750. This is a Supreme Court case. The statement that is of particular interest regarding the Dugas case appears as a footnote in the case of Muse v. Muse (215 La. 238), 40 So.2d 21.'

Counsel for the plaintiff, in oral argument, made a stirring plea that this court consider 'unjust enrichment' as the controlling principle of law in this case, through the application of which his client should recover for the services which he rendered to the decedent during the twenty-three year period between 1933--1956. In order for us to consider the application of this theory or principle, we must first make some general observations.

From the plaintiff's argument (and as the court observes from a perusal of the record) there is no question of an express contract or a contract implied-in-fact between plaintiff and decedent for the payment of the rendition of services between 1933--1956. Thus by eliminating these types of contracts, we should consider the constructive or quasi-contract, or contract implied-in-law. As we view the plaintiff's case, and while plaintiff nowherke in his brief alludes to a quasi-contract, constructive contract or a contract implied-in-law, the doctrine of unjust enrichment can arise or find application only from such a legal involvement.

This doctrine is expressed in 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 6, page 566, as follows:

'Contracts implied-in-law, or, as stated supra § 4, more properly quasi or constructive contracts, are a class of obligations which are imposed or created by law without regard to the assent of the party bound, on the ground that they are dictated by reason and justice, and which are allowed to be enforced by an action ex contractu. They rest solely on a legal fiction and are not contract obligations at all in the true sense, for there is no agreement; but they are clothed with the semblance of contract for the purpose of the remedy, and the obligation arises not from consent, as in the case of true contracts, but from the law or natural equity. The courts employ the fiction of quasi or constructive contract with caution.

'Generally, quasi or constructive contracts rest on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another, and on the principle that whatsoever it is certain that a man ought to do, the law supposes him to have promised to do. The obligation to do justice rests on all persons, and if one obtains money or property of others without authority, the law, independently of express contract, will compel restitution of compensation.

'In this respect, the terms 'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment' are modern designations for the older doctrine of quasi contracts, and the substance of an action for 'unjust enrichment' lies in a promise, implied by law, that one will restore to the person entitled thereto that which in equity and good conscience belongs to him. Quasi-contractual obligations may be imposed despite, and frequently in frustration of, the intention of the parties, and no promise to repayment need be shown. * * *.'

We do not believe the doctrine of unjust enrichment to be controlling of the period in question. Rather, we believe that the plaintiff's claim for recompense to be defeated by the facts contained in the record which leave no room for doubt that those benefits conferred on the decedent, in fact, were rendered gratuitously, without any idea, hope or thought of being remunerated therefor under any pretext, operation or consequence of law. We are supported in this position by the following testimony taken from the transcript:

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