Martin v. Circuit Court of City of St. Louis, 37269

• Citation: 580 S.W.2d 307
• Decision Date: 17 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 37269,37269
• Parties: Favis Clay MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CIRCUIT COURT OF the CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Missouri, Lester A. Aubuchon and Celina Aubuchon, Defendants-Appellees. . Louis District, Division Four
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 307

580 S.W.2d 307

Favis Clay MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CIRCUIT COURT OF the CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Missouri, Lester A.

Aubuchon and Celina Aubuchon, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 37269.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Four.

Oct. 17, 1978.

Daphne A. Carter, The Legal Aid Society of the City & County of St. Louis, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

Mark I. Bronson, Newman & Bronson, St. Louis, for defendants-appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Favis Clay Martin, father of Michael Henry Clay Martin, appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis dismissing, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, his pro se "bill for review" which sought vacation of an adoption decree granted as to his son Michael. As grounds for the vacation, appellant alleges the invalidity of a Texas court order terminating his parental rights.

Appellant's brief fails to comply with Rule 84.04(d) which provides that the "points relied on shall state briefly and concisely what actions or rulings of the trial court are sought to be reviewed and Wherein and why they are claimed to be erroneous . . . ." (Emphasis added).

Each of appellant's three points relied on states briefly, although very generally, what action of the trial court is alleged to be erroneous, but fails to say concisely wherein and why the court erred.

Appellant's first point relied on reads: "The court erred in denying appellant's bill for review because appellant stated a claim for which relief could be granted." However, appellant fails to state specifically what allegations in his "bill for review" support his contention that the trial court erred in dismissing his pleading.

Point II reads: "The court erred in granting full faith and credit to an invalid Texas termination order which denied appellant procedural and substantive due process." Again, the point contains no specific reasons to support this conclusory claim, nor any basis, factual or otherwise, for a refusal by the courts of Missouri to grant full faith and credit to the Texas judgment. In other words, appellant failed to indicate wherein and why the court erred.

In Point III of his brief, appellant alleges error in the failure of the trial court to appoint counsel for appellant in prosecuting his "bill for review" but fails to say why this is alleged to be error.

The requirements of Rule 84.04(d) are mandatory, Bell v. Bell, 538 S.W.2d 733, 735(1) (Mo.App.1976), and must be strictly applied. Matter of Estate of Langford, 529 S.W.2d 31, 32(3) (Mo.App.1975). Noncompliance with this rule preserves nothing for review, Powers v. Powers, 544 S.W.2d 339, 340(3) (Mo.App.1976), and justifies a dismissal of the appeal. Cope v. McClain, 529 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Mo.App.1975).

The Missouri Supreme Court in a recent decision has explained in detail what is required by Rule 84.04(d). In Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. banc, 1978), the court refused to consider nine points raised by appellant because they failed to state wherein and why the court erred.

In clarifying the reasons for, and emphasizing the importance of, the requirements of Rule 84.04(d), the Supreme Court said:

The requirement that the point relied on clearly state the contention on appeal is not simply a judicial word game or a matter of hypertechnicality on the part of appellate courts. It is rooted in...