Martin v. Cochran

Decision Date18 September 1923
Docket Number(C. C. No. 241.)
Citation119 S.E. 174
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesMARTIN et al. v. COCHRAN et al.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certified from Circuit Court, Taylor County.

Action by Mary A. Martin and others against Z. B. Cochran and others. The court overruled a demurrer to plaintiffs' summons in unlawful entry and detainer, and certified the questions arising thereunder for review. Affirmed.

Cornelius C. Davis, of Clarksburg, and G. W. Ford, of Grafton, for plaintiffs.

Strother & McDonald, of Clarksburg, for defendants.

LIVELY, J. Defendants demurred to plaintiffs, summons in unlawful entry and de tainer; the court overruled the demurrer, and certified the questions arising under the demurrer and his action thereon, for review, to this court.

There are two grounds of demurrer: (1) That the summons does not show that defendants have not withheld the premises over three years prior to the institution of the action: (2) that the summons demands $150 as damages for the detention of the premises, while chapter 89 of the Code, under which the action is instituted, does not provide for damages in such actions.

We have not been cited to any case in the Virginias arising under this statute which holds that the summons, which takes the place of the declaration, must aver that the defendant has withheld the property in controversy less than three years before the institution of the action; nor have we been able to find by diligent search any such decision. In that valuable work, Burks' Pleading and Practice (2d Ed.) § 86, the author states that the summons should show on its face that possession has not been held over three years, which is the limitation prescribed by the statute. The reason for so holding is that the action is statutory, and it is believed that the limitation is of the right and not merely of the remedy, and therefore should be pleaded. We are cited to Lambert v. Ensign Mfg. Co., 42 W. Va. 813, 26 S. E. 431, which was an action arising under sections 5 and 6 of chapter 103 of the Code (Code 1913, §§ 4409, 4410), for death by wrongful act, and which statute requires "that every such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such deceased person." The declaration in that case averred that the wrongful death was caused in November, 1892, and the issuance of the writ, which was made a part of the record by oyer, was commenced on the 24th day of January, 1895, more than two years after the wrongful act, and in the face of the statute. It appeared from the face of the record that the suit was instituted too late, and was subject to demurrer. In the instant case there is nothing in the record to show when the unlawful detainer began. The Lambert Case is quite different from the one before us. The commencing of the action within three years from the time of the unlawful entry or detainer is an essential element of the right to sue, and before there can be a recovery it must appear affirmatively. It can be controverted, and, if so, it becomes a fact to be determined by the court or jury. Hicks v. City of Blue-field, 86 W. Va. 367, 103 S. E. 323.

The only plea which the defendant can file under the statute is that of "Not guilty, " and the question of three years' limitation is raised under that issue. This proceeding in the circuit court was designed as a summaryand speedy remedy for the recovery of the possession of property where it is unlawfully detained, and should be construed in consonance with its evident purpose. Superior v. Peters, 92 W. Va.—, 118 S. E. 540; Moore v. Douglass, 14 W. Va. 70S. In Superior v. Peters, cited, we held that a summons in unlawful entry and detainer which states that "defendants unlawfully withhold from the plaintiff the possession of the premises" sufficiently complies with section 1, c. 89, of the Code (Code 1913, § 4065), which requires the summons to set forth "that the defendant is in the possession and unlawlawfully withholds from the plaintiff the premises in question." The statute says that the summons may issue requiring defendant to answer the complaint of the plaintiff; that the defendant is in possession and unlawfully withholds from the plaintiff the premises in question. That is all that the statute in terms requires. The defendant is charged with unlawfully withholding the premises. If defendant has been in...

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8 cases
  • Marshall County Bank v. Citizens Mut. Trust Co..
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 27, 1934
    ...pleadings at law is deemed surplusage. 21 Ency. PI. & Pr., p. 230. It not only does not vitiate a pleading on demurrer, Martin v. Cochran, 94 W. Va. 432, 119 S. E. 174, but it may properly be disregarded at the trial. 21 Ency. PI. & Pr., p. 257. "Facts not necessary to maintain the action o......
  • Marshall County Bank v. Citizens' Mut. Trust Co.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 27, 1934
    ... ... Martin ... Brown, of Moundsville, for defendant in error ...          MAXWELL, ...          This is ... a writ of error to a judgment ... 21 ... Ency. Pl. & Pr., p. 230. It not only does not vitiate a ... pleading on demurrer, Martin v. Cochran, 94 W.Va ... 432, 119 S.E. 174, but it may properly be disregarded at the ... trial. 21 Ency. Pl. & Pr., p. 257. "Facts not necessary ... to ... ...
  • Horchler v. Van Zandt
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 4, 1938
    ...is mere surplusage. Pleadings are not vitiated by surplusage. Thomas v. Electrical Company, 54 W.Va. 395, 46 S.E. 217; Martin v. Cochran, 94 W.Va. 432, 119 S.E. 174. it is insisted that the court erred in impaneling twenty-four jurors instead of twenty. The larger number was directed by the......
  • Theo Horchler v. Joe Van Zandt, (No. 8762)
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 4, 1938
    ...is mere surplusage. Pleadings are not vitiated by surplusage. Thomas v. Electrical Company, 54 W. Va. 395, 46 S. E. 217; Martin v. Cochran, 94 W. Va. 432, 119 S. E. 174. Again, it is insisted that the court erred in impaneling twenty-four jurors instead of twenty. The larger number was dire......
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