Martin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:18-cv-00033-SLC |
| Parties | GAIL A. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, sued as Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Before the Court is a Motion of Award of Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Equal Justice Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. Section 2412 (ECF 32), and two supplemental motions (ECF 37, 42), filed by Plaintiff Gail Martin. The Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") has filed a response to Plaintiff's initial motion (ECF 35) and most recent supplemental motion (ECF 44). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's EAJA fee requests (ECF 32, 37, 42) will be GRANTED IN PART, as the fees will be reduced.
Martin initiated this matter on February 8, 2018, appealing to the district court from a final decision of the Commissioner denying her application under the Social Security Act for disability insurance benefits. (ECF 1). Martin's complaint and subsequent briefings were filed by and through her attorney, Joseph Shull. (See ECF 1, 16, 22). In her opening brief, Martincontended that the second ALJ2 to review her application: (1) failed to fully incorporate her mental limitations in the residual functional capacity ("RFC") determination; (2) improperly evaluated the medical opinions of her mental health counselor, the non-examining state agency physicians, and an examining state agency physician; (3) failed to incorporate her moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace in the RFC determination; and (4) erred in deviating from the first ALJ's findings under the "law of the case" doctrine.3 (ECF 16; see also ECF 41 at 2). On March 22, 2019, this Court issued an Opinion and Order affirming the Commissioner's decision. (ECF 23). Martin subsequently appealed the Court's decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (ECF 26). For the appeal, Martin was represented by a separate attorney—Attorney Randal Forbes (ECF 25)—who advanced the same arguments raised by Attorney Shull at the district court level with the exception of the argument regarding Martin's mental health counselor's opinion. (ECF 35 at 3-4; ECF 31).
On February 7, 2020, the Seventh Circuit reversed this Court's Opinion and Order affirming the Commissioner's decision and remanded the matter with an instruction to award Martin benefits. Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. 2020); (see also ECF 31). On May 7, 2020, Attorney Shull, on behalf of Martin, filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (ECF 32), along with a supporting memorandum (ECF 33) and affidavit (ECF 34), requesting $19,796.00 in attorney fees for 98 hours of work performed by him at the district court level. The Commissioner filed a response asserting that the fee request should be denied because his position opposing Martin'saward of benefits was substantially justified, or in the alternative, that Attorney Shull's request should be reduced. (ECF 35). On May 31, 2020, and June 18, 2020, respectively, Attorney Shull filed supplemental requests for attorney fees, eventually requesting a total of $34,511.70 for 170.85 hours of work litigating both Martin's social security appeal and the request for EAJA fees. (ECF 37, 42). The Commissioner filed a separate response (ECF 44), again opposing Attorney Shull's request for fees, asserting that the request should be denied, or in the alternative, any fees should be reduced. It also should be noted that Attorney Forbes filed a separate request for fees pursuant to the EAJA (ECF 39), and the parties subsequently stipulated to a fee award of $14,198.00 for 72.4 hours of attorney work plus 2.2 hours of paralegal work (ECF 40).
Under the EAJA, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The substantial justification standard requires that the Commissioner show that its position was grounded in "(1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory propounded." Conrad v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Cunningham v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 862, 864 (7th Cir. 2006); Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 382 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing that its position was substantially justified. Cunningham, 440 F.3d at 863; Golembiewski, 382 F.3d at 724.
"[T]he Supreme Court has entrusted the question whether the [C]ommissioner's position is substantially justified to the discretion of the district court, in no small part because the analysis is not susceptible to a firm rule or even a 'useful generalization.'" Bassett v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561-62 (1988)). In fact, "[t]he [C]ommissioner's position may be substantially justified even if it turns out to be completely wrong." Id. (citing Jackson v. Chater, 94 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565-66 ().
"For example, the ALJ's opinion might offer merely a 'cursory and inadequate' analysis of an important point, but that shortcoming alone usually will not be enough to poison the opinion—or the [C]ommissioner's defense of the opinion." Bassett, 641 F.3d at 859 (citing United States v. Thouvenot, Wade & Moerschen, Inc., 596 F.3d 378, 387 (7th Cir. 2010)). "That is because the requirement that the ALJ must articulate an assessment of the evidence is deliberately flexible, so the ALJ's failure to connect all the dots in the analysis—and the [C]ommissioner's defense of those gaps in the ALJ's reasoning—is likely to be grounded in a reasonable, albeit erroneous, interpretation of the facts and law." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Indeed it typically takes something more egregious than just a run-of-the-mill error in articulation to make the [C]ommissioner's position unjustified—something like the ALJ's ignoring or mischaracterizing a significant body of evidence, or the [C]ommissioner's defending the ALJ's opinion on a forbidden basis." Id. (citing Golembiewski, 382 F.3d at 724). "Strong language against the government's position in an opinion discussing the merits of a key issue is evidence in support of an award of EAJA fees." Golembiewski, 382 F.3d at 724.
In making a determination of substantial justification, EAJA fees may be awarded if either the Commissioner's pre-litigation conduct or its litigation position was not substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D); Cunningham, 440 F.3d at 863; Golembiewski, 382 F.3d at 724. However, the Court must "make only one determination for the entire civil action." Golembiewski, 382 F.3d at 724. In other words, the Court must make a "global assessment" to determine whether the Commissioner was "substantially justified in continuing to push forward at each stage." United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 200 F.3d 1076, 1081 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Commissioner contends that the Agency's position defending this matter was substantially justified, noting in part that the Seventh Circuit ultimately accepted its arguments regarding Martin's mental RFC and did not fully address her "rule of the case argument." (ECF 35 at 4-5 (citing Martin, 950 F.3d at 374-75)). Indeed, the Appellate Court did note that the second ALJ "did not take any of the shortcuts on Martin's [concentration, persistence, or pace] limitations that we have found problematic in other cases." Martin, 950 F.3d at 374. Similarly, it recognized the application of the rule of the case doctrine was "complex and underdeveloped" in this area and "[left] the issue for another day." Id. at 375.
The Seventh Circuit, however, ultimately concluded that the second ALJ's determination that Martin could perform physical work at all exertional levels found "nowhere close to substantial support in the record." Id. More specifically, the Court of Appeals determined that, in crediting the opinion of Dr. David Ringel, an examining state agency doctor, the ALJ ignored medical evidence supporting Martin's claims of debilitating neck and back problems. Id. at 376. The Commissioner, however, asserts that there was ample caselaw which supported the secondALJ's decision to credit the opinions of other medical sources, over the opinion of Dr. Ringel. (ECF 35 at 5-6). Similarly, the Commissioner contends the Seventh Circuit's decision to award benefits without another remand was "due to a mechanical application of Plaintiff's age, education, previous work experience, and physical limitations to the Commissioner's grid rules." (Id. at 8 (citing Martin, 950 F.3d at 377)).
While the Commissioner is correct that the Seventh Circuit did not find against him in regard to Martin's mental RFC and the rule of the case argument, the Court cannot analyze each argument piecemeal, but must "make only one determination for the entire civil action." Golembiewski, 382 F.3d at 724; see also Lane v. Apfel, No. 99 C 2640, 2001 WL 521835, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2001) (). ...
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