Martin v. Courtney

• Decision Date: 08 August 1902
• Citation: 87 Minn. 197,91 N.W. 487
• Parties: MARTIN v. COURTNEY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

87 Minn. 197

91 N.W. 487

MARTIN

v.COURTNEY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 8, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Sherburne county; A. E. Giddings, Judge.

Action by Margaret K. Martin against Walter Courtney. Verdict for defendant. From an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Lewis and Brown, JJ., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In an action against a physician for malpractice, facts considered, and held, that the order of the trial court directing a verdict in favor of defendant should be sustained upon the view that a finding by the jury in favor of the plaintiff should have been set aside as a matter of law, since the evidence did not reasonably tend to support a verdict in her favor. F. D. Larrabee, for appellant.

How, Taylor & Mitchell and Pierce Butler, for respondent.

LOVELY, J.

After the last remand of this action from this court (81 Minn. 112, 83 N. W. 503), a change of venue was granted from Crow Wing to Sherburne county, where the cause was again tried to a jury. At the close of the evidence the court directed a verdict for defendant. A ‘case’ containing the evidence was duly settled, a motion for a new trial was made and denied, and from this order plaintiff appeals.

The claim of Mrs. Martin, as administratrix, for the alleged negligence of defendant in the surgical treatment of her husband, has been twice before this court. The first review was upon the merits, when a new trial was granted, for the reason that the predonderance of evidence was so strongly in favor of defendant that a retrial before a new jury was required. 75 Minn. 255, 77 N. W. 813. On the last review a new trial was ordered for misconduct of plaintiff's attorney at the trial. Upon the record now before us the only question to be considered is whether the whole evidence required a submission of the issues of fact to the jury; if so, the direction in defendant's favor was error, and should be reversed. Concededly it should be a clear case to authorize interference by the court with the functions of the jury to determine by its verdict the result of the evidence. In recognizing this responsibility, the trial court held on the motion for a new trial that its direction for defendant should be sustained upon the ground that it would have been required to set aside any verdict that might have been rendered in plaintiff's favor. This is a fair test of judicial duty in such a case. It has also been held that the court should direct a verdict where the evidence has no reasonable tendency to support it. That such corrective power must exist under any system of jurisprudence is essential to protect parties litigant either from palpable injustice or a plain misunderstanding of the application of the law to the facts. The exact limits of this authority are not easily prescribed nor definable. It is not an arbitrary power, but a judicial trust, confided to the court under conditions where the law can establish no fixed rule of duty, to be exercised in sound judgment of justice and right. That this authority must be enforced has the highest sanction, and without such reserved power to correct a miscarriage of justice courts would be of no more potent force than calculating machines, or moderators of public assemblies. The wisdom of this imposition of duty upon judicial tribunals is justified by a very casual reference to the reported cases, where it will be found that courts with much reluctance, but where necessity demands, have repeatedly sustained orders of this kind. Hence the importance of realizing from the record before us just conclusions upon the evidence is manifest. We are sensible of this duty, and from what we believe to have been a candid examination of the entire evidence certain results may be summarized, which are of controlling significance on this review.

Plaintiff's intestate was injured in a railroad accident at Brule, in Wisconsin, on the 24th day of May, 1895. His right foot was run over and the toes crushed by a railway car, when an immediate amputation of these members was made by a local surgeon at West Superior. The next day he was removed to the Brainerd hospital, of which defendant was the superintendent, aided by an assistant and trained nurses. He remained at the hospital under defendant's care until July 16th, when he returned to his home in Brainerd, but visited the hospital at frequent intervals for further treatment until the 16th of September, when he again returned to the hospital, where a further operation was performed by the amputation of an additional portion of less than an inch of the foot. The patient continued at the hospital without pronounced improvement until about October 19th, when a decided change in his condition for the worse took place. He rapidly declined, and died on the afternoon of October 23, 1895. The legal obligation of the physician to his patient, where his conduct is questioned in an action of this character, demands of him no more than the exercise of such reasonable care and skill as is usually given by physicians or surgeons in good standing of the same school of practice. Getchell v. Hill, 21 Minn. 464;Martin v. Courtney, 75 Minn. 255, 77 N. W. 813. To exact more than this would be an unjust imposition upon the physician, to encourage expectations of miraculous power that could not be fulfilled, for he is not an insurer of absolute success. The white headstones and monuments that glisten in the sunshine within the sacred precincts devoted to the repose of the dead in the suburbs of every city and hamlet in the land testify with unerring certainty that man is mortal, and the most effective efforts of the healing art are incapable of resisting the conqueror of all. The very best results of science recognize this truth. The medical art of late years has made great advances in resisting the ravages of disease, but it has its limitations, and its achievements are still but an approximation to its highest ideals. It is perhaps unfortunate for the profession that too much is expected from it. Confidence in the physician by the patient is essential, but it should not be such an unwavering faith in his powers as the superstitious savage gives to his medicine man, or makes success the sole metewand of duty, but rather a sensible and intelligent trust that expects reasonable efforts, and, when these have been bestowed, submits with Christian resignation to the inevitable; for ‘he censures God who quarrels with the imperfections of man.’ The ubiquitous protectorate which jurisprudence extends to all material interests and to every science and to every art takes note of our common fate, with the possibilities of failure in the professional treatment of disease, and accords the medical practitioner in every case the presumption that he has done his whole duty, which imposes upon those who challenge his conduct in the courts the burden of establishing his negligence. The unfortunate termination of Mr. Martin's illness is without doubt attributable to septicaemia, or blood poisoning, the germs of which had...