Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1906
• Parties: MARTIN v. DES MOINES EDISON LIGHT CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

131 Iowa 724

106 N.W. 359

MARTIN

v.DES MOINES EDISON LIGHT CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 8, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; James Howe, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff's intestate. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals. Reversed.Clark & McLaughlin and James B. Weaver, Jr., for appellant.

Parrish, Dowell & Parrish and Spurrier, Mills & Perry, for appellee.

WEAVER, J.

The defendant is a corporation engaged in the business of operating a system of electric lights in the city of Des Moines, Iowa, and at the time of the accident of which complaint is made the intestate, William H. Bass, was a laborer in its employ. Among the furnishings of the plant was a device known as a switchboard to which several wires bearing the electric current centered. This switchboard was constructed of heavy marble slabs set upright in an iron frame, and rested upon the top of a brick wall built up for that purpose from the basement. To effect some contemplated change or improvement in the premises the company undertook to lift or raise the board about two inches. For this purpose a series of jackscrews was so adjusted below the board that, when operated together, the frame with the included slabs could be slowly and evenly raised to the desired position. To assist in this movement and to sustain the board in position, iron rods attached to the iron framework inclosing the marble slabs extended upward, passing through holes in a heavy beam or pole which had been suspended for that purpose from the steel truss supporting the roof of the building. The upper end of these rods were fitted with iron taps or burrs, and as the jackscrews below slowly pushed the switchboard upward these taps or burrs were screwed down, thus causing a portion of the weight to be suspended from the pole. This work which we attempted to describe was done very slowly and occupied several days in its accomplishment. The method and manner of it is described at great length and with technical nicety in the testimony of the witnesses and restated several times in the arguments of counsel, but the foregoing abridgment we think is sufficient to give a fair idea thereof. To understand the nature of the alleged accident we must also refer, as briefly as possible, to the system of wiring by which in operating the light plant the current was brought to the switchboard. To attempt to go into the minute details would be confusing, rather than enlightening, to the nonexpert reader. It is enough to say that the wires extended from the dynamo to the back of the switchboard, where by means of various devices the current was controlled and switched or distributed to the several service wires. The safety of persons engaged in this employment required the insulating of the wires and the prevention of any contact between an electric wire and the iron frame inclosing the switchboard. When this was properly done, there was no danger of injury by electric shock to any one coming in contact with the switchboard or frame. If, however, by carelessness or otherwise, the iron frame became charged with electricity, it was a source of danger to those employed about it, and if, under such circumstances, a person standing upon or being in touch with any ground connection should also come into contact with the frame, the current would instantly pass off through his person to his injury and possible death.

The evidence tends to show that during a part of the time in which the board was being raised the connection with the power was suspended at times; but on the day in question, one current, known as the “alternating current,” was turned on with a voltage of about 2,300. So far as appears, no notice of the turning on of the current was given to the workmen. Bass, the plaintiff's intestate, had at this time been in the employment of the company for several months assisting generally as a common or unskilled laborer in making such repairs as were required upon and about the building. He was not an electrician and had no duties to perform in relation to the management and control of the electric current, and so far as appears from the record had no experience or expert knowledge in reference to such matters. On the day in question it became his duty to attend to the turning of one of the iron taps or burrs at the upper end of the rods extending, as we have already described, from the iron frame of the switchboard through the pole or beam suspended from the trusswork of the roof. For this purpose he ascended a ladder, carrying in his hand a wrench with which he began to turn the burr. While so engaged he reached up with his left hand and, evidently to assist in supporting himself on the ladder, took hold of an upright iron rod extending to the steel work supporting the roof. While in this position a peculiar sound attracted the attention of one Lynch, whose business it was to regulate the voltage, and looking up, he discovered Bass standing on the ladder stiff and rigid, with outstretched arms, and at once turned off the current, at which moment Bass fell to the floor dead. It is the theory of plaintiff that by the negligence of defendant the frame of the switchboard and with it the iron rods by which its weight was suspended from the pole had become charged with electricity, and that when Bass, with one hand, brought the wrench in contact with the upper end of the suspending rod and with the other grasped the roof iron, a circuit was completed for the discharge of the electric fluid. It may also here be said that experiments made soon after the death of Bass tended to show that the roof iron which he grasped in his left hand did have a ground connection, and that, if we assume the correctness of the claim that the iron frame was charged with electricity, the plaintiff's theory of the cause and manner of the accident is fairly maintainable.

The plaintiff's petition charges the defendant with negligence by which the death of his intestate was occasioned: (1) In turning on or having on the current of electricity while Bass was employed in a place of danger; (2) in failing to notify Bass that the current was on; (3) in ordering Bass to tighten the burrs while a dangerous current was on; (4) in failing to instruct Bass as to the dangerous character of the work; (5) in allowing the switchboard, frame, and rod to become charged with electricity; and (6) in failing to exercise proper care in the management and location of the wires and in insulating the same and in maintaining the insulation in proper repair, whereby the frame, rods, and bolts connected with the switchboard became charged with a dangerous current of electricity. The answer of the defendant denies all the plaintiff's allegations of negligence and alleges the fact to be that Bass was familiar with the operation of the electric light plant “and had long known the risk incident to the employment in which he was engaged and assumed all the risks in connection with such employment.” There was a verdict and judgment against defendant in the sum of $5,000. Many errors are alleged as grounds for the reversal of the judgment, and to these, so far as is necessary for the disposal of the case, we shall now give attention, though not entirely in the order in which counsel have here presented them.

1. The court defined negligence to the jury as “the want or omission of reasonable care and diligence, the failure to do something which a reasonable person, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affiairs, under the circumstances would do, or the doing of something which such person under such circumstances, would not do.” This instruction is criticised as an incorrect statement of the law because, counsel say, it makes the conduct of a “reasonable man,” rather than that of a “reasonably careful and prudent man,” the standard of due care. We may assume the correctness of counsel's conception of the law in this respect without accepting their conclusion. It is true the definition given by the court does not include the words “careful” and “prudent”; but, as we read it, the very thought contended for on behalf of the appellant is none the less clearly expressed. If one acts as a reasonable person, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate human conduct, would act under similar circumstances, he comes as near furnishing an example of reasonable prudence and care as frail humanity is capable of. There was no error in the instructions in this respect.

2. In paragraph 6 of the charge the jury were told that it was the “duty of the defendant to furnish the deceased a reasonably safe place to work.” This is said to be erroneous because the employer is not required to insure his employé an absolutely safe place to work, but simply that he will exercise reasonable care and skill so to do. If the charge as given were reasonably open to the inference that the master warrants or insures the absolute safety of the place where the servant works, it would, of course, be wrong; but such is not the case. In the same paragraph and in the same connection with the language criticised the court told the jury that the duty incumbent on the defendant was to use the reasonable care and diligence which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. As men of average intelligence, the jury must have understood from the instructions that, if defendant exercised reasonable care under all the circumstances for the safety of its workmen, it had discharged its full duty. The statement of the duty of the employer to furnish his employé a safe place to work is justified by the language of text-writers and courts without number; but it is a universally recognized proposition that when the employer has used all reasonable care and diligence in this respect, his duty is done, and that a place...