Martin v. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Division

• Citation: 178 S.E.2d 183,226 Ga. 860
• Decision Date: 05 November 1970
• Docket Number: No. 26049,26049
• Parties: Frank H. MARTIN v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, FISHER BODY DIVISION.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 183

178 S.E.2d 183

226 Ga. 860

Frank H. MARTIN v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, FISHER BODY DIVISION.

No. 26049.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 5, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where a judgment is not based on the verdict of the jury, it is in the breast of the court during the term in which it is rendered, and in the exercise of a sound discretion, the judge may set it aside on motion to set aside of the party against whom the judgment is entered, even though the motion is on equitable grounds and does not conform to the requirements of an equitable complaint.

2. The claimant was estopped by his conduct from obtaining a judgment on agreements filed with the Board of Workmen's Compensation in 1958, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in setting aside the judgment obtained on such agreements.

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Charles L. Drew, Robert L. Cowles, Atlanta, for appellant.

King & Spalding, R. William Ide, III, Atlanta, for appellee.

MOBLEY, Presiding Justice.

Frank H. Martin obtained a judgment against General Motors Corporation in Fulton Superior Court, in the amount of $3,810, under the provisions of Code § 114-711, for accrued workmen's compensation benefits through October 31, 1967, on agreements entered into between the parties in 1958, for an injury received by the claimant on March 15, 1958. Notice of the judgment was served on the employer.

During the same term of court in which the judgment was entered, the employer filed a motion to set aside the judgment and enjoin further proceedings. The claimant moved to strike this pleading as failing to state a legal defense or any legal ground for relief. The motion to set aside was amended, and equitable grounds were alleged. After a hearing, the trial judge remanded the case to the Board of Workmen's Compensation for further findings of fact, retaining jurisdiction of the case. The claimant appealed from this order, and this court dismissed the appeal as being premature. Martin v. General Motors Corp., 224 Ga. 677, 164 S.E.2d 107.

After a hearing, the Board of Workmen's Compensation made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and held that it could give the employer no credits against the judgment. Thereafter the judge of the superior court entered an order holding that 'the facts in the record' required that the judgment be set aside, and it was set aside.

The claimant appealed from this judgment, asserting that the court erred in setting aside the judgment on the employer's motion to set aside; that it was error to allow credits against the judgment; and that reasonable attorney's fees should have been allowed him.

1. The claimant (appellant here) urges that under the Civil Practice Act a motion to set aside must be predicated upon some nonamendable defect appearing upon the face of the record or pleadings, and that the motion to set aside, asserting equitable defenses to the compensation judgment, was not an available method of attacking the judgment. The motion to set aside was brought in the court rendering the judgment, and notice was effected by rule nisi.

The Civil Practice Act (Ga.L.1966, pp. 609, 662; Ga.L.1967, pp. 226, 239, 240; Code Ann. § 81A-160) provides that a judgment void on its face may be attacked in any court by any person, and that in all other instances, 'judgments shall be subject to attack only by a direct proceeding brought for that purpose in one of the methods hereinafter prescribed.' These methods are by motion for new trial, motion to set aside, or complaint in equity. A motion to set aside must be predicated upon some nonamendable defect appearing upon the face of the record or pleadings. A complaint in equity must proceed by complaint and summons.

It has always been the rule in this State that where a judgment is not based on the verdict of a jury, but is the act of the judge, it is in the breast of the court during the term in which it is rendered, and in the exercise of a sound discretion, the judge may set it aside. Walton v. Jones, 53 Ga. 91; Dover v. Dover, 205 Ga. 241(1), 53 S.E.2d 492. Where a meritorious motion is made to set aside a judgment during the term in which it is rendered, the proceeding may be entertained on motion made in the case, even though the motion is not based on a defect appearing on the face of the record. Allen v. Allen, 218 Ga. 364, 127 S.E.2d 902. These principles have not been changed by the Civil Practice Act, since the power of the court to change its judgment during the term in which it is rendered is an inherent power.

The trial judge had a right to consider the motion to set aside filed in the present case at the term in which the judgment was rendered.

2. The employer asserted in its motion to set aside that: (1) The claim for compensation benefits during the period from June 20, 1966, through October 31, 1967, is barred because the maximum period of benefits is 400 weeks. (2) The claimant is barred by the two-year statute of limitation under Code Ann. § 114-709, in that he did not assert his claim for disability within two years of the date the Workmen's Compensation Board was notified of the final payment of the claim on September 15, 1958. (3) During the identical periods for which the claimant seeks compensation benefits, he applied to the employer for, and collected, disability payments in excess of the statutory weekly compensation benefits upon his signed statement that the disability was not due to his employment. During the periods claimed in the petition for judgment for compensation benefits, he was no longer disabled as a result of the original injury. The claimant's assertion that his disabilities did not arise out of his work or on his job when applying for disability benefits misled the employer into paying the disability benefits to him, which would not have been done had the employer known that the claimant would subsequently claim that the periods were compensable because the disability was caused by his employment. The claimant is estopped from claiming that his periods of disability are compensable, since he heretofore stated that they were not, and wilfully misled the employer, at a time when it could have asked for a hearing on the question of the claimant's condition.

From the record it appears that the claimant was an employee of General Motors during all the period of time between the date of the 1958 injury and the date of the judgment obtained by him, which has been set aside. In his petition for judgment the claimant did not attempt to recover for periods of time when he worked, but he claimed compensation benefits for those periods of time when he was prevented from working by disabilities which, he admits, were not caused by his employment.

In September, 1958, a compensation settlement receipt was filed with the Workmen's Compensation Board, signed by the claimant, acknowledging receipt in full of compensation for his injury. In accordance with the practice at that time, no approval of...