Martin v. Hale
| Decision Date | 19 May 1934 |
| Citation | 71 S.W.2d 211,167 Tenn. 438 |
| Parties | MARTIN et al. v. HALE et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Wilson County; J. W. Stout, Chancellor.
Suit by Robert F. Martin and others against Mrs. Gertie Hale and others. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Robert L. Forrester, of Watertown, and Louis Chambers, of Lebanon for appellants.
Haskell B. Talley and Hancock & Hancock, all of Murfreesboro, C. C Davis, of Watertown, and E. D. Hancock, of Murfreesboro, for appellees.
John W Bryan died in 1913, leaving a wife and two children, a single daughter, Anna C., and a married daughter, Ida B. Martin. He left a will, executed in 1907, by which, in item 2, he bequeathed to his wife and unmarried daughter an estate for life in his home place known as the "Ashley Young" property; and, in item 3, bequeathed the remainder of his estate to his two daughters. The daughter Anna died in 1918. The wife remained in possession until April, 1933, when she died. Meanwhile, the married daughter had died in March preceding. She bore no children, but left a will by which she devised her property and all interests therein to her husband and his children, who are the complainants claiming under the will of Mrs. Ida B. Martin, insisting that John W. Bryan died intestate as to this Ashley Young property and that, upon his death, the fee in this property passed to his daughters, then living, subject to the life estate of his wife and single daughter; that upon the death of the single daughter her interest was inherited by her surviving sister, Mrs. Martin.
The defendants are next of kin of John W. Bryan as of the death of the wife, and insist that, properly construed, the effect of item 2 of the will was to vest this part of the testator's property in his next of kin occupying that relationship "at the death of the wife Ellen M Bryan"; that, this death not occurring until after the death of both daughters, without issue, they are takers as such next of kin.
As suggested, construction of items 2 and 3 of the will is called for. These read as follows:
The case for the defendants rests on the insistence (1) that the concluding words of item 2, "and further that at the death of the wife Ellen M. Bryan all of aforesaid property is to revert to my estate," were intended as a devise of this home place to take effect at the death of the wife; and (2) that the "remainder" expressly devised in item 3 was intended to refer only to property of the testator other than this tract or parcel. For complainants it is contended (1) that no disposition was intended to be made of the fee by this language in item 2, with the legal result that the property in which life estates were created in the wife and daughter by this item passed to the then next of kin of the testator, his two daughters, and so vested, upon his death; and (2) that, consistently with this view, the testator, by item 3, immediately following, intended, by the express devise of "the remainder of my estate both real and personal," to include in this bequest to his daughters named in this connection, or "the heirs of their bodies equally," the fee in this particular parcel, and that, this being so, their interest therein vested upon his death.
The chancellor held with the complainants that the fee was not devised by item 2 and that the fee in the remainder vested at once upon the death of the testator in his then next of kin, his daughters.
We do not understand it to be controverted that, unless the fee was devised by the use, in item 2, of the words, "all of aforesaid property is to revert to my estate," Bryan died intestate as to this parcel, and the fee vested upon his death in these daughters.
The difficulty with the contention that a devise was made by this language is that no devisee is designated. The argument is that "to revert to my estate" should be taken to mean "to revert to my" heirs, "at the death of the wife Ellen M. Bryan." But "estate and heirs are not equivalent terms; the estate is the subject matter with which the grantor deals; the heirs are possible distributees." 21 C.J. 914. The essential of identity in designation of the devisee is wanting.
It is the use of the term "revert" which is responsible for the apparent confusion. It seems reasonable to infer that in using the word "revert" the testator's purpose was to emphasize and confirm the limitation of the estate devised to the wife to her life; to repeat that his gift to her was of a life estate only, that else and otherwise his fee was to be unaffected. It was this life estate which was to return, come back, revert.
But, however this may be, we find, as already indicated, a fatal want of designation of a donee or devisee in the words used.
Counsel for complainants, devisees of Mrs. Ida Martin, cite and rely chiefly on Downing v. Grigsby, 251 Ill. 568, 96 N.E. 513, 514; Gardner v. Anderson, 116 Kan. 431, 227 P. 743; Estate of Glass, 164 Cal. 765, 130 P. 868; and Lyman v. Sohier, 266 Mass. 4, 164 N.E. 460. We quote from and adopt the following from the opinion in the Downing Case, supra, as directly in point:
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