Martin v. Helstad
| Decision Date | 23 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-C-566-C.,81-C-566-C. |
| Citation | 578 F. Supp. 1473 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
| Parties | Henry L. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. Orrin L. HELSTAD, Gerald J. Thain, and Joseph R. Thome, Defendants. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Henry L. Martin, pro se.
Jonathan P. Siner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendants.
On August 17, 1981, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendants, acting under color of state law, violated plaintiff's constitutional rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He based his claims on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Initially, plaintiff sought declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. In his amended complaint filed on August 24, 1981, plaintiff added requests for compensatory damages of $24,500 and punitive damages of $10,000.
On August 26, 1981, this court held a hearing on plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. I found that plaintiff had a property interest in his admission to the law school based on the law school's offer of admission and plaintiff's acceptance of that offer. However, I determined that plaintiff had received all the process he was due. Accordingly, I denied the request from the bench and on August 27, 1981, I entered an order denying the preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1983).
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the remaining issues in the case. From the complaint, affidavits submitted by the parties, and documents in the record, I conclude that there is no genuine dispute with regard to the following facts.
In December 1980, plaintiff Henry Martin applied for admission to the University of Wisconsin Law School for the year commencing in August, 1981. His application was dated December 15, 1980.
On January 10, 1978, plaintiff was convicted in federal district court in Oregon of seven counts of aiding and abetting interstate transportation of forged securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. See United States v. Martin, 587 F.2d 31 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 1222, 59 L.Ed.2d 459 (1979). On February 27 or 28, 1978, plaintiff was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. When he prepared and submitted his application for admission to the law school, plaintiff was confined in the Federal Correctional Institution at Milan, Michigan.
On his application for admission to law school, plaintiff listed an address in Milwaukee, Wisconsin as his present and permanent address. He did not provide an address or telephone number in Milan, Michigan. On a page of the application entitled "Record of Residence," plaintiff identified as a previous address from 1973 to 1980 a Milwaukee address and he identified a different Milwaukee address as both his permanent and present addresses since August 20, 1980. On the same page, plaintiff listed as his occupations or activities during the past two-year period two activities in Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Pap's Family Restaurant during 1978 and 1979 and General Educational Development Tutor during 1979 and 1980.
Plaintiff answered "yes" in response to question 6(b) of the application, which asks, "Have you ever been convicted of, pled guilty or no contest to, or forfeited bail for any criminal conduct under law or ordinance, excluding only minor traffic violations?" In addition to an affirmative response to question 6(b), question 6 requires that the applicant "fully explain the circumstances in the space below or attach a supplemental page." To this, plaintiff advised:
A "Caveat from the Dean" accompanied the application form advising that questions like number 6 on the application form would likely be asked in great detail of lawyers seeking admission to a state bar. In this regard, the dean advised: "You would be well advised to make full disclosure to us, so as to establish a record of openness about any past conduct, starting at least three years before bar admission is sought."
On his law school application and supporting documents, plaintiff supplied no other information about his 1978 conviction other than that quoted above in response to question 6.
By letter dated March 5, 1981, Arlen Christenson, Chairperson of the Admissions Committee, notified plaintiff that the Admissions Committee of the University of Wisconsin Law School had voted to accept plaintiff for the class scheduled to register in August 1981. In two letters also dated March 5, 1981, defendant Joseph R. Thome, Chairperson of the Legal Education Opportunities Program, informed plaintiff about financial assistance and about the Legal Education Opportunities Program. Subsequently, the law school sent a notice to plaintiff asking him, as an accepted applicant, to notify the law school of his intention to attend or to decline the invitation to attend the law school. Before April 10, 1981, plaintiff advised the Admissions Committee that he planned to attend the University of Wisconsin Law School.
In the March 5, 1981 acceptance letter, the Admissions Committee advised plaintiff that around April 1, 1981, they would ask accepted applicants to tell the law school if they would accept the offer of admission. The letter requested applicants deciding not to attend the University of Wisconsin Law School to notify the Admissions Committee promptly, stating, "We need your cooperation if we are to continue our present policy against requiring any deposit to hold a place in the class, and as a matter of fairness to other applicants whose chance to come here may depend on your decision."
In order to attend the law school, plaintiff had to obtain a community treatment center placement in Madison, Wisconsin for a six month period until March, 1982, when he was scheduled to be released from confinement. In June, 1981, the appropriate authorities approved the community treatment center placement for the plaintiff.
In May, 1981, plaintiff entered into a housing contract with the University of Wisconsin and he made a $50 advance deposit.
The Legal Education Opportunities Program planned an orientation for students admitted to the law school through the Legal Education Opportunities Program. The orientation was scheduled during the week of August 15 or 16 through 21 or 22, 1981. Plaintiff's case manager at FCI-Milan, Catherine Tucker, prepared a request for furlough to enable plaintiff to attend the orientation program. In conjunction with this furlough request, on July 21 or 22, 1981, Tucker telephoned the University of Wisconsin Law School to obtain information about the orientation schedule. On July 22, 1981, defendant Thome spoke with Tucker about the furlough request. This conversation provided defendant Thome and the other defendants with their first knowledge of plaintiff's 1978 conviction and incarceration. On July 22, 1981, defendant Thome requested additional information from Tucker regarding plaintiff's incarceration and conviction. After obtaining a signed waiver from plaintiff, Tucker provided defendant Thome with the requested information.
Also on July 22, 1981, defendant Thome spoke with plaintiff on the telephone. In that conversation, defendant Thome advised plaintiff that there was a problem with his admission to the law school because of his response to question 6. Plaintiff informed defendant Thome that he did not provide more information about his 1978 conviction because that conviction was being appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and he expected the judgment to be vacated. Defendant Thome then requested plaintiff to write a letter explaining the circumstances of his 1978 conviction and incarceration.
In response, plaintiff wrote defendant Thome an eight-page letter dated July 22, 1981, in which he stated: "There are several reasons why I did not mention or detail my 1978 conviction." The primary reason detailed in the July 22, 1981 letter concerned plaintiff's belief that the conviction would soon be vacated.
The offense for which I was convicted was under appeal and is presently scheduled for hearing on August 12, 1981.... While it is generally considered improper, if not premature, to discuss the result in a criminal case prior to announcement of the court's formal decision, I believe that sufficient information is available to permit me to advise you that an Order vacating the judgment of conviction will be entered in this matter shortly after August 12, 1981.
Plaintiff continued by arguing the merits of the appeal and then discussed his belief that his conviction should not be considered in the admission decision: "One may avoid explaining a situation if he feels that such explanation will create more questions than it resolves or that it will somehow prove unduly prejudicial." Plaintiff elaborated on his right to withhold information from the Admissions Committee:
I did not want to be considered for admission to UW-Madison Law School either on the basis of an unjust conviction or because the conviction was soon to be vacated. I did not want the Admissions Committee to base its admission decision on this conviction in any way. The circumstances of this particular case were such that knowledge of it would have actually contributed very little to an informed admissions decision. While the Admissions Committee has the right to base its decision on the basis of all relevant information provided by the applicant or specifically requested by the Committee, the applicant nevertheless has the ultimate responsibility of deciding what information he will provide the committee with as a basis for official decision-making. This does not mean that an applicant should deliberately seek to...
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...and Osteen, which involved students who had been expelled from their respective schools, and this court's decision in Martin v. Helstad, 578 F.Supp. 1473 (W.D.Wis.1983), in which school officials revoked a student's admission to law Had plaintiff paid the fine before filing his lawsuit, he ......
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