Martin v. Houck
| Decision Date | 08 May 1906 |
| Citation | 54 S.E. 291,141 N.C. 317 |
| Parties | MARTIN v. HOUCK et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Caldwell County; O. H. Allen, Judge.
Action by S. C. Martin against Calvin Houck and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Mere words are sufficient to constitute an imprisonment, if they impose a restraint and deprivation of liberty, though there was no touching of the person of the party arrested.
Defendants called on plaintiff in the night-time, and defendant H. said to him: Plaintiff asked for the warrant and H. replied: To which plaintiff replied: "I will go with you." Defendants then stated that plaintiff need not go that night, if he would come to town the next morning, which he promised to do, and did. Held, that such facts were sufficient to show an imprisonment.
The action was brought to recover damages for an unlawful arrest and false imprisonment. The defendant, Calvin Houck, was a policeman of Granite Falls, when he was informed that the plaintiff had stolen a pair of shoes from a store while it was on fire. He and his codefendants, J. O. Deal and George Lefevers, who acted as deputies, went to the plaintiff's house, which was two miles from the town, in the night and after the plaintiff and his wife had retired, and arrested him, after searching the house at plaintiff's request, as the state's evidence tended to show. The plaintiff's wife was compelled to dress in the presence of these strangers. The plaintiff, when accused of stealing the shoes denied his guilt, but voluntarily agreed to go with the defendants to town, and answer the charge. The defendants then told him that he need not go that night if he would come to town the next morning, which he promised to do. He went to Granite Falls the next morning, but no warrant was ever issued, and no accusation made against him for stealing the shoes. The defendants had no warrant for the plaintiff when they went to his home for the purpose of arresting him, nor does it appear that any formal charge was ever made against him, before or after the arrest. There was evidence on the part of defendants tending to show that, while they had entered his house that night, they had not arrested him. The defendants offered to prove that the plaintiff was seen with a pair of shoes two weeks after the night of the fire and further that the defendant, Calvin Houck, had been told by A. M. Martin of a report made to him (Martin) that the plaintiff had stolen shoes from the burning building. This testimony was excluded, and defendants excepted. The court instructed the jury upon the law as applicable to the different phases of the case and to this part of the charge there was no exception. The defendants requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: "That in no view of the case could they return a verdict against the defendants, Deal and Lefevers, they having been summoned by Houck who was chief of police of the town of Granite Falls to go with him in search for stolen goods, and that there was no testimony that either of the defendants, Deal or Lefevers, in any manner attempted to arrest the plaintiff or in any manner restrained or assisted to restrain him of his liberty." The court refused to give this instruction, and the defendants (Deal and Lefevers) excepted. The court, in lieu of said instruction, charged the jury as follows: The arrest if made at all, is admitted to have been made outside the town of Granite Falls; and, no authority being shown for a policeman of Granite Falls to arrest outside of the town limits by the evidence in this case, the defendants Deal and Lefevers were not required to obey Houck, and if the plaintiff was actually arrested, and the defendants Deal and Lefevers were present and participated in it, they would be liable. Defendants excepted. The jury found, under issues properly submitted, that the defendants did unlawfully arrest the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $200. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, and the defendants appealed.
W. C. Newland, for appellants.
Lawrence Wakefield and E. B. Cline, for appellee.
WALKER, J. (after stating the case).
The court in its charge fully explained to the jury the law applicable to the power of an officer to arrest without a warrant, and also instructed them as to the powers of a town policeman. The only two exceptions made to the charge are really the same in substance and are sufficiently presented in the exception noted. The statute provides as follows: "As a peace officer, the constable shall have within the town all the powers of a constable in the county; and as a ministerial officer, he shall have power to serve all civil and criminal process that may be directed to him by any court within his county, under the same regulations and penalties as prescribed by law in the case of other constables, and to enforce the ordinances and regulations of the board of commissioners as the board may direct." Revisal of 1905, § 2939. "Every person in whose presence a felony has been committed, may arrest the person whom he knows or has reasonable ground to believe to be guilty of such offense, and it shall be the duty of every sheriff, coroner, constable or officer of police, upon information, to assist in such arrest." Section 3177. "Every sheriff, coroner, constable, officer of police or other officer, entrusted with the care and preservation of the public peace, who shall know or have reasonable ground to believe that any felony has been committed, or that any dangerous wound has been given, and shall have reasonable ground to believe that any particular person is guilty, and shall apprehend that such person may escape if not immediately arrested, shall arrest him without warrant, and may summon all bystanders to aid in such arrest." Section 3178. "Every person arrested without warrant shall be either immediately taken before some magistrate having jurisdiction to issue a warrant in the case, or else committed to the county prison and, as soon as may be, taken before such magistrate, who on proper proof, shall issue a warrant and thereon proceed to act as may be required by law." Section 3182.
We see therefore, that an officer may arrest for a felony without a warrant, if he knows or has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been committed, and that a particular person is guilty, and he also believes that he will escape if not immediately apprehended; while an individual may arrest in such a case, if the offense has been committed in his presence and he knows or has reasonable ground to believe the suspected party to be guilty. A policeman, as a peace officer, is given within the town all the powers of a constable in the county, and as a ministerial officer he has the power to serve process directed to him by a court. In this case it appears that Houck had no warrant, so that he was not acting as a ministerial officer. What, then, are the powers of a constable in the county which he has under the statute as a peace officer? State v. Freeman, 86 N.C. 685. A police officer was not known to the common law and therefore he can exercise only such powers as are given by the statute. His right to arrest...
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