Martin v. Marshall
| Decision Date | 06 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-00681-AWI-EPG |
| Parties | JARED ANDREW MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. NOAH MARSHALL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS (ECF NO 1)
Plaintiff Jared Andrew Martin is confined at the Madera County Jail and proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 11). The complaint, filed on June 6, 2022 generally alleges that Defendants Noah Marshall, a deputy district attorney for the County of Madera County; Sally O Moreno, the district attorney for the County of Madera; the County of Madera; and the City of Madera, are conspiring to unlawfully convict him of crimes in state court despite knowing that he is innocent.
The Court concludes that the complaint fails to state any cognizable claims that can proceed at this time, in light of the ongoing state criminal proceedings. Under settled Federal law, this Court will generally not intervene in a pending state court proceeding. Plaintiff must challenge the evidence used against him in that state proceeding, and, if found guilty, on appeal. Additionally, Plaintiff's claim of malicious prosecution fails to state a claim because he cannot allege that the case was terminated in his favor and because he does not allege that the motive of the prosecution was to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by pretrial detainees or prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or its officers or employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (); § 1915A(c) (). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court also screens the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 11). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff's legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) ().
Plaintiff's complaint lists three claims and states that the violations of his rights occurred in Madera, California. For each claim, he lists the following Constitutional Amendments as having been violated-the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments-and provides a brief recitation of facts.
For his first claim, Plaintiff states that he began contacting the Madera County District Attorney's Office in April 2020, informing them that correctional officers “in prison” were “beating and abusing” him.[1] He asked that certain correctional officers be arrested. However, “[t]he District Attorney[2] did not stop the torture and terrorism” but instead “has conspired with corrupt prison officials to send [Plaintiff] back to prison for crimes [he] did not commit.” Defendant Marshall “is engaging in malicious prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct and obstructing justice.” And the District Attorney is prosecuting him on “false charges.”
For his second claim, Plaintiff states that the District Attorney has misrepresented facts in open court. Defendant Marshall has attempted to violate his rights regarding self-representation by asking the state court to deny him pro per status. Further, the District Attorney has partnered with the Madera County Sherriff and correctional officers to withhold evidence of his innocence. The District Attorney and Judge Dale J. Blea “are rescheduling [his] court dates without notice and without [his] permission.” The District Attorney's Office and Judge Blea are attempting to send him to prison on charges that they know to be false and are holding his hearings in secret.
For his third claim, Plaintiff states that Defendants Moreno, Marshall, the County of Madera, and the City of Madera-along with non-parties[3] Judge Blea and the Madera County Sherriff's Office-“have used their resources for racism, abuse, corruption, [and] illegal and unconstitutional convictions.” They are trying to set up Plaintiff to go to prison on false charges because he is “poor and black” and to “keep themselves in power.” Plaintiff cannot afford to post bail or hire an attorney. Lastly, Plaintiff has been charged with crimes that the District Attorney knows he is not guilty of, and the District Attorney is withholding and suppressing evidence.
As for relief, Plaintiff seeks millions in monetary damages, assistance from the United States Attorney, FBI protection, a restraining order and injunctions, a jury trial, and to be free from “set ups and abuse.”
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978).
Plaintiff's complaint primarily contests the prosecution's case against him in a pending criminal case and seeks injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court first looks at the law regarding ...
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