Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 259

• Decision Date: 02 June 1949
• Docket Number: Docket 21340.,No. 259,259
• Citation: 174 F.2d 917
• Parties: MARTIN et al. v. NATIONAL LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUB.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

174 F.2d 917 (1949)

MARTIN et al. v. NATIONAL LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUB.

No. 259, Docket 21340.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

June 2, 1949.

John L. Flynn, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Baker, Hostetler & Patterson, Cleveland, Ohio, Willkie, Owen, Farr, Gallagher & Walton and E. P. Feeley, New York City, Mark F. Hughes, New York City, argued, for defendants.

Before L. HAND, Chief Judge, and SWAN and FRANK, Circuit Judges.

L. HAND Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an order denying an injunction, pendente lite, in an action under the Anti-Trust Acts, 15 U.S. C.A. §§ 1-3, 13-15, to restore the plaintiffs' to their privileges as baseball players and for damages for their exclusion from "organized baseball." It is a sequel of our decision in Gardella v. Chandler,¹ in which a majority of the court held that the complaint set out a claim under the Anti-Trust Acts against the defendants in that action, who together with others are defendants in this. The plaintiffs in the case at bar moved for an injunction, pendente lite, to compel the defendants to take them off the "suspended" list, and to restore them to their former position as "eligible" baseball players, freed from the "reserve clause" contained in contracts under which they had been employed until 1946 when they accepted engagements elsewhere. The complaint alleged that the defendants, who are the owners and officers of the "Major Leagues" in baseball, regularly broadcast the games play by play to distant audiences by radio and television; but neither in the complaint nor in any supporting affidavits is it alleged how great a part these activities constitute, either absolutely, or proportionately to the total activities or to the income of the business. By the "reserve clause" a player promises that "while under contract or reservation he will not play baseball * * * otherwise than for the Club or a Club assignee" — 4(a) — and that "on or before February 15 * * * of the year following the last written notice to the player * * * the Club or any assignee hereof may renew this contract for the term of that year" at a salary agreed upon, "or in default of agreement the Player will accept such salary rate as the Club may fix, or else he will not play baseball otherwise than for the Club or for an assignee thereof." The club is given the privilege of terminating the contract upon ten days notice, so that in effect the player agrees to an indefinite employment at any salary — after the first year — which the club may fix, subject to discharge at the club's pleasure. Although the complaint and the affidavits alleged generally that the defendants had a monopoly of the whole business of "organized baseball," this was denied and stands unproved, saved as we could take judicial notice of it, which we cannot.

The plaintiffs during 1946 were players with the St. Louis team under contracts containing the "reserve clause"; but, finding better pay elsewhere, they joined Mexican teams. Whereupon the defendants, acting for the "Major Leagues" and for the "Minor Leagues" (59 other teams, affiliated with them), "suspended" them for five years, under the sanction that no players in the "Major Leagues" or the "Minor Leagues" are allowed to play on any team with a "suspended" player. The plaintiffs allege that this has substantially excluded them from their calling by confining them to non-professional, or "semi-professional" teams. The defendants counter by alleging that the "reserve clause" was "indispensable" to the conduct of professional baseball, and that they had not prevented the plaintiffs from playing on any teams except those of the "Major" and ...