Toolson v. New York Yankees

• Decision Date: 06 November 1951
• Docket Number: No. 13070.,13070.
• Citation: 101 F. Supp. 93
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: TOOLSON v. NEW YORK YANKEES, Inc., et al.

101 F. Supp. 93

TOOLSON v. NEW YORK YANKEES, Inc., et al.

No. 13070.

United States District Court S. D. California, Central Division.

November 6, 1951.

Harry W. T. Ross, Gene M. Harris and Howard C. Parke, all of Santa Barbara, Cal., for plaintiff.

Victor Ford Collins, Los Angeles, Cal., for Hollywood Baseball Ass'n.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Norman S. Sterry, Henry F. Prince, and Philip C. Sterry, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants Pacific Coast League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Los Angeles Baseball Club, Hollywood Baseball Ass'n and Clarence H. Rowland.

HARRISON, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action under the provisions of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 and 2, and the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. He alleges that he was, and now is, a professional baseball player and that as a result of the alleged monopoly, to which all defendants are allegedly party, he has been deprived of his livelihood. Plaintiff was under contract with the Newark International Baseball Club, Inc., which club assigned his contract to the Binghamton Exhibition Company, Inc. As a result of plaintiff's refusal to report to the latter club, and pursuant to the provisions of his contract with the Newark team and the regulations which govern the structure of "Organized Baseball" in general, he was placed on the "ineligible list" of the Binghamton team, and, defendants, because of this, have refused and still do refuse to allow plaintiff to play professional baseball.

The allegations of plaintiff's complaint with respect to the alleged monopoly to which the defendants are parties do not vary materially from those before the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs et al., 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 466, 66 L.Ed. 898, 26 A. L.R. 357, and those before the Second Circuit in Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402. The structure of "Organized Baseball" is therein outlined, and provisions of the Major-Minor League agreement pertaining to player contracts are listed. In addition, plaintiff, as did his counter-part in the Gardella case, supra emphasizes the broadcasting of baseball exhibitions through the media of radio and television, alleging that receipts from these activities exceed the sum of twenty per-cent of the net profits of professional baseball each year.

All the defendants have moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and that the complaint does does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant New York Yankees, Inc., has also moved to dismiss on additional grounds that are not pertinent here in view of my ruling on the question of jurisdiction of the subject matter. To me, the simple issue of this case is whether the game of baseball is "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Acts, and whether the structure known as "Organized Baseball" is engaged in such trade or commerce. The character of baseball, in the Federal Baseball Club case, was held to be not commerce or trade but sport. Mr. Justice Holmes for a unanimous court stated: "The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs." The decision of the Court of Appeals, said Justice Holmes, "went to the root of the case". 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465. In its opinion the Court of Appeals stated: "The fact that the appellants produce baseball games as a source of profit, large or small, cannot change the character of the game. They are still sport, not trade." National League of Professional Baseball Clubs et al. v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., 50 App.D.C. 165, 269 F. 681, 685.

Since the decision in the Federal Baseball Club case, supra, it has been cited with approval three times by the Supreme Court. Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange et al., 1923, 262 U.S. 271, 273, 43 S.Ct. 540, 67 L.Ed. 977; U. S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440; North American Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1946, 327 U.S. 686, 694, 66 S.Ct. 785, 90 L.Ed. 945. It has been cited at least six times by the Courts of Appeal, United States v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dyers' Ass'n, D.C., 1925, 5 F.2d 869, 873; Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange et al., 2 Cir., 1926, 12 F.2d 341, 47 A.L.R. 775; Boynton v. Fox West Coast Theatres, 10 Cir., 1932, 60 F.2d 851; Neugen v. Associated Chautauqua Company, 10 Cir., 1934, 70 F.2d 605; Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co., 2 Cir., 1947, 163 F.2d 310, 311, a Second Circuit case in which Judge Frank joined; and Martin et al. v. National League Baseball Club, 2 Cir., 1949, 174 F.2d 917, 919. The District Courts have cited it at least seven times, Federal Trade Commission v. Smith, D.C., 1932, 1 F.Supp. 247, 250; In re American State Public Service Co., D.C., 1935, 12 F.Supp. 667; Securities Exchange Commission v. Electric Bond & Share Co., D.C., 1937, 18 F.Supp. 131, 146; Niemiec v. Seattle Rainier Baseball Club, Inc., D.C., 1946, 67 F.Supp. 705; San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, D.C., 1946, 72 F.Supp. 825; McComb v. Turpin, D.C., 1948, 81 F.Supp. 86; Young v. Kellex Corp.,...