Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 December 1895
• Citation: 42 N.E. 416,148 N.Y. 117
• Parties: MARTIN v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

148 N.Y. 117

42 N.E. 416

MARTIN

v.NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 19, 1895.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Second department.

Action by Edward Martin against the New York Life Insurance Company on a contract of employment. From a reversal by the general term (26 N. Y. Supp. 283) of a judgment of the special term for plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, he appeals, under stipulation that, if the order is affirmed, judgment shall be entered for defendant. Order affirmed, and complaint dismissed.

James M. Hunt, for appellant.

William B. Hornblower, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

The plaintiff sued to recover salary at the rate of $10,000 a year from the 1st day of May, 1892, until the 1st day of January, 1893, with interest. The plaintiff entered the employ of the defendant in 1881, and was placed in charge of the real-estate department at a salary of $5,000 a year. From the 1st of January, 1883, he received salary at the rate of $6,500 a year, under an arrangement made in February, 1883. In February, 1884, the salary was increased to the rate of $10,000 a year, payable from January 1, 1884. Salary was paid monthly. Without further agreement of any kind plaintiff continued in the discharge of his duties until April 13, 1892, when he received a letter from the president of the defendant notifying him that his services would not be needed after April 30, 1892. Plaintiff replied to this letter April 14, 1892, stating that he accepted the defendant's ultimatum. A week later he wrote a second letter, in which he sought to explain the first one as follows, viz.: ‘What I meant then, and what I mean now, is that, while I concede your power to dispense with my services after April 30th, I do not concede your power to break my contract with the company without making the company liable to me. I wish you to distinctly understand that my employment is, and has been since January 1, 1884, a yearly one, at a salary of $10,000 per year, commencing on January 1st, and that I am entitled to my salary for the balance of the year.’

We are unable to agree with the learned general term that the legal effect of these letters was to release both parties from the obligation of an existing entire contract, if one did exist. The letter of the defendant was an absolute discharge of the plaintiff, and cannot be regarded as a part of negotiations to abrogate an existing contract. The plaintiff's replies to that letter did not in any way affect the legal rights of the parties in this aspect of the case. The two questions presented by this appeal are: Does the evidence establish a contract of hiring by the year? And, if not, does a general hiring import an employment by the year?

We do not think the plaintiff proved an original contract with defendant whereby he was employed to render service for a year, nor was the evidence so conflicting on this point as to have warranted the trial judge in submitting the question to the jury. A verdict finding that such a contract was entered into by the parties would be set aside, as unsupported by the evidence. The correspondence between the plaintiff and defendant, already referred to, tends to show that plaintiff, when he wrote his first letter, did not consider he was rendering service under a contract by the year, and his...