Martin v. Niblett

• Decision Date: 17 February 1888
• Citation: 7 S.W. 123,86 Tenn. 383
• Parties: MARTIN v. NIBLETT. LOGAN v. SAME. GUNN v. SAME.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

7 S.W. 123

86 Tenn. 383

MARTIN v. NIBLETT.

LOGAN v. SAME.

GUNN v. SAME.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 17, 1888

Appeal from chancery court, Montgomery county; GEORGE E. SEAY Chancellor.

Suits by James Martin, William Logan, and Anna Gunn against James D. Niblett, executor of B. S. Keesee, to quiet title to land. Complainants obtained decrees, and defendant appeals.

Smith & Lurton, for appellant.

Thos L. Yancy, for appellees.

JUDD Special Judge.

These cases are here by appeal from the chancery court of Montgomery county. Sufficient facts appear in the record to show that one H. H. Paston owned a lot of land lying in the suburbs of the city of Clarksville, and that he contracted to sell it to one Jesse Metcalf, who having failed to pay the purchase money, a bill was filed by Paston in the chancery court to enforce the lien for the same. Such proceedings were had as resulted in a decree at the November term, 1872 ordering a sale of the land upon a credit of 6, 12, and 18 months. The sale was had, when Paston became the purchaser, which was confirmed, but so far as appears there was no decree divesting and vesting title. Paston's decree against Metcalf was for $386, $290 of which had by Paston been transferred to B. S. Keesee, defendant Niblett's testator. And at the November term, 1873, an agreement signed by Paston, B. S. Keesee, and one Taylor was produced in open court dated August 14, 1873, whereby it was stipulated that said Taylor should become and be the purchaser of said land, and that he should become indebted to Keesee in the sum of $290.08; that the title to the land should be divested out of the parties to the cause, and vested in Taylor, the purchaser, and a lien to be retained on the land to pay the same. Thereupon a decree was rendered, as it seems in accordance with the request of the parties, by which the title was divested out of Paston and Metcalf, and vested in Taylor, his heirs and assigns, forever, subject to a lien on the same in favor of said Keesee for the sum of $290.08, with interest thereon from the 2d day of September, 1873. The decree then directs that the clerk shall make a deed to Taylor or furnish hin a certified copy of the decree for registration, and if a deed is made the lien mentioned in the decree will be reserved in the same. Keesee died in the year 1875, and defendant Niblett soon thereafter qualified as his executor, and August 25, 1881, filed his bill against Taylor, to enforce his lien reserved in the decree upon the balance of unpaid purchase money of about $200. Under this bill a decree was rendered, ordering a sale, which was made, reported to the court, and confirmed, and writ of possession ordered to put the purchasers in possession. At this point the three complainants in this cause came into court with their bills, alleging that they, and those under whom they claim, had bought, each for himself, a part of this lot of land from Taylor, and had been in actual adverse possession, under conveyances claiming the same, for more than seven years before the filing of Niblett's bill, and claiming title under the statute of limitation.

The facts show that the complainants, and those under whom they claim, have claimed and held the different parcels of land for a period of time exceeding seven years before Niblett's bill was filed; that this claim was adverse and open. Whether during all this time the suit of Paston against Metcalf constituted a lis pendens, so as to affect the purchasers under Taylor with notice of the terms of the decree under which the latter bought, and whether the defendant Niblett, as executor of Keesee, could have come into court and taken a judgment, by motion, for the balance of the unpaid purchase money in that cause,--are questions which seem to us to be wholly irrelevant, since the executor himself treated the case as out of court by instituting a new and independent proceeding by original bill to enforce the lien. No deed was made to Taylor by the clerk, nor was the decree registered; neither do the facts show any laches upon the part of Keesee or his executor because the former was in bad health, and unable to look much after business, from about the time the money fell due till his death, and the executor knew nothing about the existence of the lien until informed of it by his counsel at the time of the filing of the bill. Some effort is also made to show that one or more of the complainants informed Keesee, in his life-time, of their purchases, with a view to affect him with notice of their claim and holding, but the proof falls far short of the end suggested. So that the case is narrowed down to the single question of the effect of the lien retained in the decree. It will be observed that Keesee's executor claims his rights under this decree, and that the complainants claim also under this decree, through Taylor, who gets his title thereunder, so that the decree becomes a common source of right and title to both complainants and defendant.

Now under the facts before recited, did the statute of limitations run against Keesee's estate, and is the title of the complainants complete, so that they cannot be disturbed in their holding? In the case of Lincoln v. Purcell, 2 Head, 142, it is said: "An...