Martin v. Pride Offshore Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005 CA 2373.,2005 CA 2373.
• Citation: 950 So.2d 805
• Parties: David MARTIN v. PRIDE OFFSHORE COMPANY, INC.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

950 So.2d 805

David MARTIN v. PRIDE OFFSHORE COMPANY, INC.

No. 2005 CA 2373.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

November 3, 2006.

Timothy J. Young, N. Husted DeRussy, New Orleans, Counsel for Claimant/Appellant, David Martin.

Chris Broadwater, J. Alan Jordan, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Pride Offshore Company, Inc.

Before: CARTER, C.J., WHIPPLE and McDONALD, JJ.

WHIPPLE, J.

On November 7, 1996, claimant, David Martin, was employed by defendant, Pride Offshore Company, Inc. ("Pride"), as a roustabout on a fixed platform rig when he was injured in a single-car accident in Mississippi. At the conclusion of claimant's regularly scheduled seven-day "hitch," he was flown via helicopter from the rig to a parking lot in Venice, Louisiana, where his personal vehicle was parked. Approximately two to three hours and 132 miles from Venice, while traveling on Interstate 10 in Mississippi en route to his home in Alabama, claimant fell asleep at the wheel, ran off of the road, and suffered severe injuries. Claimant contended that in the week prior to the accident, he had worked approximately 123 hours and, thus, was overcome with exhaustion.

On September 23, 1998, claimant filed a disputed claim for workers' compensation benefits. However, the suit was stayed pending resolution of a suit claimant filed against Pride Offshore with the U.S. Department of Labor under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and a general maritime tort suit claimant filed against Pride in the Civil District Court of the Parish of Orleans, which was subsequently removed to the U.S. Eastern District Court. The stay was lifted once it was judicially determined that jurisdiction did not exist under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and claimant's federal tort action pending in the U.S. Eastern District Court was dismissed on summary judgment.

After the stay was lifted, Pride filed a peremptory exception of res judicata and motion for summary judgment, contending that claimant's accident did not occur within the course and scope of his employment. The matter was heard before the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) on March 7, 2005. At the hearing, Pride requested that the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata be passed on that date, reserving the right to raise it at a later date, and the parties proceeded with argument on the motion for summary judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the WCJ took the matter under advisement and subsequently rendered judgment on April 21, 2005, granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing claimant's disputed claim for compensation with prejudice.

Pursuant to claimant's request, the WCJ issued written reasons for judgment, concluding that Pride carried its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute; that under the undisputed facts, claimant was outside the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident; and that claimant failed to produce any evidence to suggest otherwise. The WCJ further rejected claimant's argument that working long hours constitutes an "accident" under LSA-R.S. 23:1201(1) and that fatigue is an "injury" as defined in LSA-R.S. 23:1021(8)(a).

From this judgment, claimant appeals, contending the WCJ erred in granting summary judgment. Pride filed an answer to the appeal, contending that claimant's appeal has no basis in law or fact and that claimant should accordingly be ordered to pay all costs incurred by Pride in the trial court and appellate court.

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts conduct a de novo review of the evidence, employing the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Gaspard v. Graves, 2005-1042 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/29/06), 934 So.2d 158, 160, writs denied, 2006-0882, 2006-0958 (La.6/16/06), 909 So.2d 1286, 1289. Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in the light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Davis v. Specialty Diving, Inc., 98-0458, 98-0459 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/01/99), 740 So.2d 666, 669, writ denied, 99-1852 (La.10/08/99), 750 So.2d 972.

On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden of proof remains with the mover. If, however, the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter before the court on the motion, the moving party must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. If the adverse party then fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment must be granted. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); Boland v. West Feliciana Parish Police Jury, 2003-1297 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/25/04), 878 So.2d 808, 813, writ denied, 2004-2286 (La.11/24/04), 888 So.2d 231.

An employee who sustains a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment is entitled to collect benefits from his employer under the Workers' Compensation Act. LSA-R.S. 23:1031(A). Thus, as a threshold requirement, a workers' compensation claimant bears the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment. Arabie Brothers Trucking Company v. Gautreaux, 2003-0120 (La.App. 1st Cir.8/04/04), 880 So.2d 932, 936, writ denied, 2004-2481 (La.12/10/04), 888 So.2d 846.

The requirement that an employee's injury occur "in the course of" employment focuses on the time and place relationship between the injury and the employment. McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, 2002-1539 (La.7/02/03), 851 So.2d 1135, 1139-1140. An accident occurs in the course of employment when the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of his duties during work hours, either on the employer's premises or at other places where employment activities take the employee. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140. The requirement that an employee's injury "arise out of" the employment relates to the character or origin of the injury suffered by the employee and whether this injury was incidental to the employment. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140. An injury arises out of employment if the risk from which the injury resulted was greater for the employee than for a person not engaged in the employment. Arabie Brothers Trucking Company, 880 So.2d at 936.

The terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" found in LSA-R.S. 23:1031 are dual requirements that cannot be considered in isolation from each other. Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 94-1767 (La.3/30/95), 653 So.2d 1152, 1154. In a close case, a strong showing made with reference to one requirement may compensate for a weak showing with reference to the other requirement. Guillory, 653 So.2d at 1154. However, when there is a weak showing with respect to both requirements, the employee is not entitled to compensation benefits. Lewis v. Houma Industries, 2001-0641 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/10/02), 818 So.2d 956, 958.

Generally, injuries sustained by an employee while traveling to and from work are not considered to have occurred within the course and scope of his employment, and thus, are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140. This rule, often called the "going-and-coming rule," is premised on the theory that, ordinarily, the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves his work to go home until he resumes his work. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140. Furthermore, an employee's place of residence is a personal decision not directly controlled by the employer, and treating commuting time as part of the determination of course and scope of employment would remove manageable boundaries from the determination. Orgeron ex rel. Orgeron v. McDonald, 93-1353 (La.7/05/94), 639 So.2d 224, 227.

The underlying facts are undisputed. As established in the record, the accident at issue herein did not occur during working hours, but occurred when claimant was traveling to his home in another state. At the time of the accident, claimant was operating his own personal vehicle, was not reimbursed for mileage, and was not paid for his travel time to work and home and vice versa. At the relevant time, claimant was not under the control of Pride but was approximately two to three hours and 130 miles away from the parking lot where he had entered his vehicle after being flown in from the rig at the end of his regularly scheduled "hitch." Pride did not have control or direction over the route that claimant chose to take to his home, and claimant was not pursuing an errand for Pride, nor was he traveling in the interest of Pride's business.

After a thorough review of the record and relevant jurisprudence, we find that the trial court's reasons for judgment, which we adopt and have attached hereto as "Exhibit A," thoroughly and adequately explain the decision. Further, the record demonstrates that Pride was entitled to judgment dismissing claimant's claims against it as a matter of law. We reject claimant's argument that, although he was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time, because his fatigue was sustained on his employer's premises during working hours, the "risk" of his accident "arose from his employment," and that the strength of this showing should overcome the total lack of any "course-of-employ...