Chatagnier v. 1st Incs, L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 26 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2012 CA 1314.,2012 CA 1314.
• Parties: Gabrielle Marie Louisa CHATAGNIER v. 1ST A SOUTHEAST INCS, L.L.C.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

115 So.3d 1167

Gabrielle Marie Louisa CHATAGNIER

v.1ST A SOUTHEAST INCS, L.L.C.

No. 2012 CA 1314.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana,First Circuit.

April 26, 2013.

Brent J. Rhodes, Houma, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Gabrielle Chatagnier.

Wade A. Langlois, III, Gretna, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, 1st A Southeast Incs, L.L.C.

Before WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON, and HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.

McCLENDON, J.

[1 Cir. 2]In this workers' compensation case, an employer appeals the judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC) in favor of the employee. For the reasons that follow, we affirm,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 9, 2010, Gabrielle Marie Louisa Chatagnier was employed as a Senior Team Leader/Receptionist for 1st A Southeast Incs, L.L.C. (1st A Southeast), a company providing services for the elderly and mentally challenged. Ms. Chatagnier worked in the Houma office, under the supervision of the main office in Gretna. Ms. Chatagnier testified that she worked as a receptionist at 1st A Southeast in the mornings from 8 a.m. to noon and then as a senior team leader from noon to 4 p.m.¹ She stated that she did not clock out for lunch. Ms. Chatagnier also testified that having transportation was a prerequisite of her job and that she did a lot of driving with her job, for which she received $80.00 per month for gas.

On the morning of September 9, 2010, Ms. Chatagnier received a call on the office telephone from Sonya Geason, an employee based in the Gretna office. Ms. Geason asked Ms. Chatagnier if she could pick up a canister from Burke's Outlet Store for her. Ms. Geason mentioned that she and Stephanie Jackson, the owner of 1st A Southeast, had forgotten to pick it up when they were in Houma the day before. Ms. Geason did not tell Ms. Chatagnier what the canister was for.

Ms. Chatagnier went out to lunch that day with a co-employee for her birthday. After lunch, instead of making the turn to return to the office, Ms. Chatagnier passed the office and proceeded on Tunnel Boulevard towards Burke's Outlet to pick up the canister. While she was stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Tunnel Boulevard and Polk Street, the vehicle Ms. Chatagnier was driving was rear-ended.

[1 Cir. 3]On May 5, 2011, Ms. Chatagnier filed a disputed claim for compensation, seeking the payment of wage benefits and medical bills, as well as authorization for future medical treatment. Ms. Chatagnier alleged that she suffered injuries to her neck, head, and back and that at the time of the accident she “was on a mission from [her] employer to Burke's Outlet to obtain a metal canister for corporate.” 1st A Southeast answered, denying that Ms. Chatagnier was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the injury and also denying that her injuries were related to or caused by the accident.

Following a trial on April 3, 2012, the OWC found that Ms. Chatagnier was acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the automobile accident and that she suffered injury as a result of the accident. The OWC determined that 1st A Southeast was liable for Ms. Chatagnier's medical expenses.² The OWC also ordered 1st A Southeast to pay continuing indemnity benefits from the date Ms. Chatagnier left her employment, on October 14, 2010, until there was a material change in circumstances. ³ Additionally, the OWC authorized the recommended surgery on Ms. Chatagnier's lumbar spine and ordered that 1st A Southeast pay for the surgery, as well as all reasonable and necessary treatment incidental to the surgery. Judgment was signed on April 13, 2012, and 1st A Southeast appealed, urging two assignments of error:

1. The [OWC] made an error of law in determining that the claimant proved course and scope of employment based upon her perception or belief that she was on a business mission at the time of her motor vehicle accident when the correct legal standard of proof is not based upon the claimant's perception but on the actual facts of the case.

2. Alternatively, Claimant failed to prove a causal connection between the [motor vehicle accident] and her injury/disability because she was not forthcoming about her prior injuries and treatment.

[1 Cir. 4]DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

In workers' compensation cases, the appropriate standard of review to be applied by the appellate court to the OWC's findings of fact is the “manifest error-clearly wrong” standard, Dean v. Southmark Const., 03–1051 (La.7/6/04), 879 So.2d 112, 117. For an appellate court to reverse a factual finding of the OWC, it must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993); Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987). Thus, the reviewing court must do more than simply review the record for some evidence that supports or controverts the OWC's finding. The reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the OWC's finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Dawson v. Terrebonne General Medical Center, 10–2130 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/19/11), 69 So.3d 622, 626.

The issue to be resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the fact finder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Dawson, 69 So.3d at 626–27.

Course and Scope

1st A Southeast initially argues that the OWC erred in concluding that Ms. Chatagnier was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of her motor vehicle accident. Specifically, 1st A Southeast contends that the OWC erred in findingthat because Ms. Chatagnier reasonably perceived that she was on a business mission she was in the course and scope of her employment [1 Cir. 5]entitling her to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. 1st A Southeast maintains that Ms. Chatagnier was required to prove that she was actually “actively engaged in the performance of her duties.” However, Ms. Chatagnier argues that she was on a specific mission for 1st A Southeast and that she was doing work for her employer under circumstances where 1st A Southeast's consent could be fairly implied. Thus, according to Ms. Chatagnier, she was within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident.

Under the Workers' Compensation Act, employers are responsible for compensation benefits to employees only when the injury results from an accident “arising out of and in the course of his employment.” LSA–R.S. 23:1031; McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc., 02–1539 (La.7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1135, 1139. The requirement that an employee's injury occur “in the course of” employment focuses on the time and place relationship between the injury and the employment. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1139–40. An accident occurs in the course of employment when the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of his duties during work hours, either on the employer's premises or at other places where employment activities take the employee. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140;Mundy v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 593 So.2d 346, 349 (La.1992). The requirement that an employee's injury “arise out of” the employment relates to the character or origin of the injury suffered by the employee and whether this injury was incidental to the employment. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140.

The terms “arising out of” and “in the course of” found in LSA–R.S. 23:1031 are dual requirements that cannot be considered in isolation from each other. Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 94–1767 (La.3/30/95), 653 So.2d 1152, 1154;Martin v. Pride Offshore Co., Inc., 05–2373 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 950 So.2d 805, 808. In a close case, a strong showing made with reference to one requirement may compensate for a weak showing with reference to the other requirement. However, when there is a weak showing [1 Cir. 6]with respect to both requirements, the employee is not entitled to compensation benefits. Guillory, 653 So.2d at 1154;Martin, 950 So.2d at 808.

Generally, injuries sustained by an employee while traveling to and from work are not considered to have occurred within the course and scope of employment, and thus, are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. This rule, often called the “going-and-coming rule,” is premised on the theory that, ordinarily, the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves work to return home until he resumes his work. McLin, 851 So.2d at 1140;Martin, 950 So.2d at 808. However, this rule has been subject to a number of jurisprudentially established exceptions. For example, these exceptions have arisen: (1) if the accident happened on the employer's premises; (2) if the employee was deemed to be on a specific mission for the employer, such as making a trip in the interest of his employer's business or pursuant to his employer's order; (3) if the employer had interested himself in the transportation of the employee as an incident to the employment agreement either by contractually providing transportation or reimbursing the employee for his travel expenses; (4) if the employee was doing work for his employer under the circumstances where the employer's consent could be fairly implied; (5) if the employee was hurt while traveling to and from one worksite to another; (6) if the employee was injured in an area immediately adjacent to his place of employment and that area contained a distinct travel...