Martin v. Rose, 75-1373
| Decision Date | 23 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1373,75-1373 |
| Citation | 525 F.2d 111 |
| Parties | Grady Wigfall MARTIN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James ROSE, Warden, Tennessee State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
R. A. Ashley, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Tenn., Bart Durham, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for respondent-appellant.
Grady Wigfall Martin, Jerry H. Summers, Chattanooga, Tenn., for petitioner-appellee.
Before EDWARDS and CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
In this case the state appeals from the District Judge's grant of a writ of habeas corpus pertaining to petitioner-appellee's conviction for bank robbery in a Tennessee state court. The petitioner-appellee had been tried previously in federal court for the same offense of bank robbery and had been acquitted. Prior to his state court trial for the identical bank robbery, he sought and was denied a transcript of his federal court trial. In the state court trial he was convicted and sentenced to 30 years.
The requirement of provision of a transcript in the circumstances described above is set out clearly in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971). As a consequence we have no doubt that error of constitutional magnitude was committed in the state court proceedings.
It is the state's contention, however, that this constitutional error should be measured against the Chapman standard, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), wherein the Supreme Court held that some constitutional errors might be deemed harmless if the court could hold that the constitutional error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." The state relies upon United States v. Bamberger, 482 F.2d 166 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1041, 94 S.Ct. 543, 38 L.Ed.2d 332 (1973), where the Ninth Circuit did apply the Chapman rule.
Our consideration of this appeal starts with the language of the majority of the Supreme Court in Britt v. North Carolina, supra:
We agree with the dissenters that there would be serious doubts about the decision below if it rested on petitioner's failure to specify how the transcript might have been useful to him. Our cases have consistently recognized the value to a defendant of a transcript of prior proceedings, without requiring a showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case. 3 As Mr. Justice Douglas makes clear, even in the absence of specific allegations it can ordinarily be assumed that a transcript of a prior mistrial would be valuable to the defendant in at least two ways: as a discovery device in preparation for trial and as a tool at the trial itself for the impeachment of prosecution witnesses.
Britt v. North Carolina, supra, 404 U.S. at 228, 92 S.Ct. at 434.
See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).
The majority opinion in Britt in affirming the conviction relied upon the fact that an adequate alternative to the transcript sought there had been available to the accused. It appears to us that the decision of the Ninth Circuit rests basically upon somewhat similar facts although we recognize that the Court did also term refusal of the transcript to be harmless error.
Our circuit in United States v. Young, 472 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1972), enforced the strictures of the Britt case finding no satisfactory substitutes there for the furnishing of the transcript. See also, United States ex rel. Wilson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1969).
As we read Britt, it calls for consideration of two factors:
Griffin v. Illinois and its progeny establish the principle that the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners. While the outer limits of that principle are not clear, there can be no doubt that the State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior proceedings, when that transcript is needed for an effective defense or appeal. The question here is whether the state court properly determined that the transcript requested in this case was not needed for an effective defense.
In prior cases involving an indigent defendant's claim of right to a free transcript, this Court has identified two factors that are relevant to the determination of need: (1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices...
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Kennedy v. Lockyer
...(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "wealthier defendants tend to purchase transcripts as a matter of course"); Martin v. Rose, 525 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir.1975) ("[W]e can think of no more valuable document for defense counsel approaching a contested trial than the record of the previou......
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...alternative exception" to the general rule outlined in Britt. Cf. United States v. Mullen, 550 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1977); Martin v. Rose, 525 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1975). We believe, however, that the district court did not err in refusing to grant the request for a transcript, coming as it did......
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...for trial; and (2) the availability of alternative devices. Britt, 404 U.S. at 227, 92 S.Ct. at 433; see also Martin v. Rose, 525 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir.1975). Noting the availability of adequate alternatives to a transcript, the Britt Court held that the State was not required, on the part......
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Harris v. Stovall
...transcript from the prior proceeding has been held to be reversible error. Riggins v. Rees, 74 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.1996); Martin v. Rose, 525 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.1975). Michigan courts have also held that the failure to provide a transcript of a first trial that ended in mistrial to a defendant......