Martin v. Rush, LLC

• Decision Date: 22 January 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-CV-00005-JDL
• Parties: JACKIE MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. RUSH, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

JACKIE MARTIN, Plaintiff,
v.
RUSH, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-CV-00005-JDL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER DIVISION

January 22, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 72, 73.) Plaintiff Jackie Martin ("Mr. Martin" or "Plaintiff") has filed a motion for summary judgment on liability and liquidated damages (Doc. No. 72), to which Defendant Rush, LLC ("Rush" or "Defendant") has filed a response (Doc. No. 77), and Plaintiff has filed a reply (Doc. No. 80). Defendant has also filed a motion for summary judgment seeking judgment on its affirmative defense and no liquidated damages (Doc. No. 73), to which Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. No. 76), and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. No. 79). For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 72) is GRANTED as to liability on his Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claim. Defendant's motion (Doc. No. 73) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On January 3, 2020, Plaintiff Jackie Martin filed this action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated to recover unpaid overtime wages from Rush pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (Doc. No. 1.) To date, no additional plaintiffs have opted into this action. As alleged,

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Plaintiff contends he was paid hourly at a straight rate and was not paid overtime by Rush for the hours he worked in excess of 40 hours per week in violation of the FLSA. Id. at ¶¶ 24-28.

On April 16, 2018, Rush CEO, John Rush, sent Plaintiff an offer letter for employment at Rush Resources. (Doc. No. 72-7.) "Rush Resources is an industrial services organization offering construction project management, commissioning and startup, and consulting and provides solutions to clients in a variety of industries including Oil & Gas, Power Generation (Nuclear & Fossil), Refinery/Chemical and other industries." (Doc. No. 72-4, at ¶ 4.) The offer letter stated that Plaintiff's title would be that of "Chief Inspector" and his start date would be April 23, 2018. Id. In terms of compensation, the offer letter stated that as an exempt hourly employee, Plaintiff would be paid weekly at a straight-time rate of $75.00. Id. Plaintiff signed the offer letter and accepted employment that same day. Id.

As discussed further herein, while the parties dispute certain aspects of the duties and performance of Plaintiff's job as Chief Inspector, they agree that he was hired to work on a project for Rush's customer, Williams, in North Carolina. (Doc. No. 72-4); (Doc. No. 72-6, Deposition of John Rush ("Rush Tr.") at 116:3-20; 147:5-17); (Doc. No. 72-11, Deposition of Jackie Martin ("Martin Tr.") at 156:16-24). Plaintiff's role as Chief Inspector involved inspection of work being performed by third party contractors on William's jobsite to ensure compliance in the installation of a new Fiber Optics network as upgrades to the electrical system were being made. Martin Tr. at 175:5-15; 242:21-243:10; Doc. No. 72-4. Rush had contracted with Williams for this construction oversight project, and in turn, Rush hired Plaintiff as Chief Inspector for the project. (Doc. Nos. 72-9, 72-7.) The project duration was intended to be 18 weeks (Doc. No. 72-9, at 3), and Plaintiff worked the project from approximately April 21, 2018 to July 15, 2018. (Doc. No. 72-1; Doc. No. 72-4, at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was paid weekly and compensated based upon the number of hours he

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worked in that week. Id.; (Doc. No. 76-3.) According to the payroll detail report, Plaintiff was paid $75.00 per hour for the total number of hours worked. Id. This pay rate is consistent with the straight-time rate listed in his offer letter. (Doc. No. 72-7.) Indisputably, the pay rate did not change if Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per week, which he appears to have done all but his first week. (Doc. No. 72-1.) For this reason, Plaintiff contends that Rush failed to pay him overtime in violation of the FLSA. (Doc. No. 72.) Rush contends that Plaintiff is exempt from overtime pay. (Doc. No. 73.) This dispute is the basis of the parties' cross motions for summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56 as mandating "the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

The party moving for summary judgment "must 'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1999). Issues of material fact are "genuine" only if they require resolution by a trier of fact and if the evidence is such that

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a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Merritt-Campbell, Inc., 164 F.3d at 961. If the moving party "fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

If the movant meets this burden, Rule 56 requires the opposing party to go beyond the pleadings and to show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir. 1996); Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1996). The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by argument, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a mere scintilla of evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986); Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court is required to view all justifiable inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); Merritt-Campbell, Inc., 164 F.3d at...