Martin v. Schneider
| Decision Date | 24 September 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 1842,1842 |
| Citation | 622 S.W.2d 620 |
| Parties | Staton MARTIN and Wife, Evelyn Martin, Appellants, v. J. R. SCHNEIDER and Wife, Virginia D. Schneider, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Thomas Drought, Brite, Drought, Bobbitt & Halter, San Antonio, for appellants.
Richard Hall, Gary, Thomasson, Hall & Marks, Corpus Christi, for appellees.
Before NYE, C. J., and UTTER and KENNEDY, JJ.
Appellants, Staton Martin and wife, Evelyn Martin, brought suit against J. R Schneider and wife, Virginia D. Schneider and Betty L. Smith, appellees, seeking a declaratory judgment construing a warranty deed. Appellants contended below that the deed to them from appellees conveyed to them all of the uranium and royalties from the production thereof on a certain tract of land. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted appellee's motion. We affirm.
The warranty deed was dated May 28, 1963 and conveyed 265 acres of land in Live Oak County from appellees (and others) to appellants. The pertinent portion of the deed contained the following reservation:
There is excepted from this conveyance and reserved unto Grantors, their heirs and assigns, an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to all of the oil royalty, gas royalty, and royalty in casinghead gas, gasoline, and royalty in other minerals in, on, under and that may be produced from the above described lands for a term of twenty (20) years from the date hereof, and so long thereafter as there is production of oil, gas or any other mineral from the above described lands or any portion thereof, or from a pool or unit which includes all or any part of said land.
Other portions of the deed contained provisions, the net effect of which was to make unnecessary the execution or ratification by appellees of any subsequent leases entered into by appellants. The effect of these provisions and the actions taken by the parties with respect thereto were argued on appeal but it is unnecessary to comment on these matters for the reasons hereinafter stated.
Pursuant to a mining lease executed by appellants, uranium has been discovered on the land in question in commercial quantities, and operations commenced. For purposes of this appeal, three facts which have been established through affidavits must be noted: (1) Uranium ore deposits are found below the land in question at an average depth of 55 to 66 feet, with the shallowest deposit at 20 feet. (2) Two methods of extraction are available, both of which have been employed on appellants' land since 1979. The solution, or in-situ method, entails no destruction or depletion of the surface. On the other hand, the surface, or pit mining method requires destruction of the surface. (3) As of 1963, the time of the Schneider-Martin conveyance, surface mining was the only available means of extraction.
Appellants rely upon Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.) and Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.) and, the re-trial of Reed as reported in 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.). In Acker the subject was iron ore which was located, as in the present case, near the surface. The criteria laid down for determining whether the ore belonged to the mineral estate or the surface estate were: (1) location with respect to the surface; (2) methods of production, and (3) the effect of production upon the surface. Based upon these criteria the Supreme Court held that the ore belonged to the surface estate and therefore no interest therein passed by the deed.
In the two cases of Reed the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Acker and extended its ruling somewhat so that the test today as to whether the substance sought to be produced remains a part of the surface estate is "whether any reasonable method, including a method as of the date of this opinion, of removal of lignite, coal or iron will consume, deplete or destroy the surface." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case before us we are presented with a different situation from those of either Acker or Reed in each of which the dispute was between a surface owner and an owner of the mineral estate or some portion thereof. Appellees claim no ownership of any minerals on the subject land. They claim only a portion of the royalty...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
South Hampton Co. v. Stinnes Corp.
...F.2d 467, 471 (5th Cir.1981); R & P Enterprises v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.1980); Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.Civ.App.1981) writ ref. n.r.e.; see generally, 14 Texas Jur.3d Sec. 375 at 630-31 (1981).2 R & P Enterprises v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & ......
-
Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Colley
...S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1977, no writ). The Corpus Christi court has held to the contrary. Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Appellant argues that the presumed intent on which the decision in Reed I and Reed II, is based should ......
-
Pickens v. Hope, 04-87-00475-CV
...no right to lease the land to another for mineral development or to produce the minerals himself. Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A "non-participating royalty" does not entitle the owner to produce the minerals himself, or permit ......
-
Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews
...affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. To the extent that it conflicts with this opinion, we disapprove the holding of Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no GAMMAGE, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority unnecessarily perpetuates th......