Martin v. Smylee

• Decision Date: 28 February 1874
• Citation: 55 Mo. 577
• Parties: JOHN L. MARTIN AND THOMAS H. MARTIN, Appellants, v. SAMUEL SMYLEE, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

55 Mo. 577

JOHN L. MARTIN AND THOMAS H. MARTIN, Appellants,

v.SAMUEL SMYLEE, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February Term, 1874.

Appeal from Ray County.

J. W. & J. E. Black, for Appellants.

I. Fraud in the execution of a note, negotiable in its character, does not affect its validity in the hands of a bona fide purchaser before maturity for value, in the usual course of trade. (Kent. Com. 9 Ed., Vol. 3, §§ 79, 80; Story Prom. Notes, 4 Ed., p. 193 n. 2; Farmers' Bank vs. Garten, 34 Mo., 119; Mattoon vs. McDaniel, 34 Mo., 138; Tumilty vs. Bank of Mo., 3 Mo., 275.) Appellants had no knowledge of any fraud in the original execution of the note, nor were there any circumstances surrounding its purchase that would excite the suspicion of a prudent man. (Sto. Bills, § 416, Edw. Bills, 506 2 Pars. Bills, 277, 278, 279; Sto. Prom. Notes, [Ed., 1868,] § 382; Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Pet., 1; Goodman vs. Simonds, 20 How., 343; Bank vs. Neal, 22 How., 96; Murray vs. Laraner, 2 Wall., 110; Brush vs. Scribner, 11 Conn., 388; Redf. Lead. Cas., Notes & Bills, 257; Phelan vs. Moss, 67 Penn. St., 59; Magee vs. Badger, 34 N. Y., 247; Bank vs. Hge, 35 N. Y., 65.)

Banister, Shotweli, and Esteb & C. F. Garner, for Respondent, relied on Briggs vs. Ewart, 51 Mo., 245; and authorities cited; also Washington Savings Bank vs. Ecky, 51 Mo., 272; Hamilton vs. Marks, 52 Mo., 78, and authorities cited.WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is identical in principle with the case of Briggs vs. Ewart, (51 Mo., 245,) and must be controlled and governed by it. The present case was an action commenced on a negotiable promissory note made by the defendant and assigned to the plaintiffs before maturity. The defense was, that it was never signed by the defendant as a note; that one England came to the defendant's house, and wanted him to take the agency for the sale of a patent gang plow; that he consented and was told that it was necessary for him to sign a contract of agency, which all agents were required to sign; that England then produced some papers and filled up the blanks, and, showed the defendant where to sign the same. All of the papers looked alike, were of the ordinary size of foolscap, and none of them had the appearance of promissory notes. England left one of the papers and took the others with him. It appears that the papers were signed solely and exclusively on the representation that they were mere contracts of agency, without any knowledge whatever on the part of defendant that there were notes among them, and that defendant never would have signed them had he known that they were notes. These allegations were denied in the replication, and on the trial there was evidence introduced, going to prove the issues tendered on each side respectively. The jury found a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed. The jury who were the proper judges of the weight of testimony, must have found that the note was obtained and the signature procured in the manner stated by the defendant, and if no error was committed in giving declarations of law, the judgment cannot be disturbed.

The court refused certain instructions asked for by the plaintiff, but that will make no difference, providing others were given in lieu thereof, which fairly stated the law. In the first instruction given by the court of its own motion, the jury are told, that if they believe from the evidence that defendant executed the note sued on, as his note, with a knowledge of its contents, and that the same was transferred to plaintiffs for value and before maturity, and without notice to plaintiffs of the fraud alleged in procuring its execution, they should find for the plaintiffs. The second instruction declares the law to be, that if...