Martin v. Somberg-Berlin Metals
| Decision Date | 04 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 60533,SOMBERG-BERLIN,No. 1,60533,1 |
| Citation | 407 Mich. 737,288 N.W.2d 574 |
| Parties | Preston MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.METALS and Michigan State Accident Fund, Defendants-Appellees, and Second Injury Fund, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar407 Mich. 737, 288 N.W.2d 574 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P. C. by Robert F. Auld, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellee.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Joseph M. Binno, Asst. Atty. Gen., Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal from a Worker's Compensation Appeal Board decision ordering the Second Injury Fund to pay differential benefits to plaintiff from seven years prior to the date he filed his application for benefits. The Second Injury Fund argues that the "one-year-back" rule in M.C.L. § 413.14; M.S.A. § 17.188, currently, M.C.L. § 418.833(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(833)(1), precludes the retroactive award of benefits for any period which antedates the filing of plaintiff's application by one year.
We hold that the one-year-back rule is inapplicable to this case and affirm.
Preston Martin has been receiving total disability benefits from his employer since he injured his lower back on November 11, 1963. On December 11, 1972, plaintiff filed a petition seeking differential benefits from the Second Injury Fund. He asserted that his condition had worsened and that he had become totally and permanently disabled from the back injury due to the loss of industrial use of both legs. M.C.L. § 418.361(2)(g); M.S.A. § 17.237(361)(2) (g).
A hearing was held in February 1974, and the hearing referee determined that plaintiff became permanently and totally disabled in August of 1965. He ordered the Second Injury Fund to commence paying differential benefits from August 1, 1965. This antedated the filing of plaintiff's application for benefits by seven years and five months.
The employer and the Second Injury Fund appealed the referee's order to the WCAB, arguing that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of proving the loss of industrial use of his legs. The Second Injury Fund also raised the issue of the applicability of the one-year-back rule, arguing that it should not be liable for payments of benefits prior to December 1, 1971.
The appeal board affirmed the referee's determination of plaintiff's permanent and total disability and held the one-year-back rule inapplicable.
The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, but this Court agreed to hear the Second Injury Fund's appeal, limited to the issue of whether the appeal board erred in refusing to limit the Second Injury Fund's liability in accordance with the one-year-back rule in M.C.L. § 413.14; M.S.A. § 17.188.
We hold that it did not.
At the time of the claimant's injury the one-year-back rule provided:
"If payment of compensation is made (other than medical expenses) and an application for further compensation is later filed with the commission, no compensation shall be awarded by the commission for any period which is more than 1 year prior to the date of the filing of such application." M.C.L. § 413.14; M.S.A. § 17.188.
In ruling on the applicability of the rule the WCAB said:
The argument of the Second Injury Fund in essence is that the one-year-back rule admits of no exceptions and consequently Every claim for compensation after compensation has once been paid is an application for "further compensation" subject to the rule.
While it may be literally true that once a worker has received compensation any compensation paid to that worker thereafter may be termed "further compensation" that phrase in the one-year-back rule has not been so read over the years.
In Morgan v. Lloyds Builders, Inc., 344 Mich. 524, 73 N.W.2d 880 (1955), the Court said:
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