Martin v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. 17938,17938
• Citation: 126 S.E.2d 365,240 S.C. 460
• Parties: N. A. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 365

126 S.E.2d 365

240 S.C. 460

N. A. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 17938.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 25, 1962.

Bolt & Bowen, Greenville, for appellant.

Rainey, Fant & Horton, Greenville, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice.

In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the defendant because of the alleged wrongful discharge of the plaintiff by the defendant, in violation of a contract. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was granted by the circuit judge on the following grounds:

'That the plaintiff failed to make out a cause of action in that there was no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the defendant breached any contractual obligation which it owed the plaintiff.

'That the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the plaintiff was not discharged until after all contractual obligations had been complied with.'

The plaintiff appealed from the order directing a verdict against him and also challenges certain rulings of the circuit judge in the course of the trial.

The plaintiff, a resident of Georgia, was employed by the defendant for many years as a conductor. It is conceded that during this period of time the defendant had in effect Operating Rule G which provided:

'The use of intoxicants or narcotics at any time is detrimental to good service and is cause for discipline. Employees who indulge in the use of intoxicants or narcotics while on duty, or who report for duty while under the influence of either, will be dismissed.'

It is further conceded that at all pertinent times there was in effect between the defendant and 'Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen' an agreement which inured to the benefit of the plaintiff. Article 31 of said agreement reads as follows:

'Conductors will not be discharged or demerited without an investigation, which will be made by a proper officer within five days if possible, and in their presence. They will have the privilege of bringing to the investigation, to assist them a representative of their own selection, provided such person is an employee in good standing. If found blameless, they will be paid for time lost. If discharged, they will be furnished with a letter showing cause of dismissal, term of service, and the capacity in which employed * * *.'

On December 14, 1958, while the plaintiff was on a run from Salisbury, North Carolina, to Atlanta, Georgia, there is evidence to the effect that the plaintiff and the roundhouse foreman for the defendant in Spartanburg, South Carolina, had a disagreement as to whether the train conducted by the plaintiff was in safe condition to proceed to Greenville. Following this disagreement the plaintiff proceeded with the train to Greenville, and the foreman called the chief dispatcher at Greenville and told him 'to tell Mr. Henley to meet Train 19 and talk to the conductor, that there was something wrong with him.'

As a result of this report the trainmaster, accompanied by several other officials of the railroad, met the train upon its arrival in Greenville where the plaintiff was relieved from duty upon the ground that he was under the influence of liquor, but was allowed to continue on the train to his home in Lula, Georgia.

Pursuant to notice from the defendant that he had been officially charged with violation of 'Operating Rule G while acting as a conductor on Train 19, passing Greenville on December 14', a hearing was held at the office of the superintendent on December 16, 1958, in which hearing both plaintiff and defendant participated, both producing witnesses. The following day, the superintendent of the defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff dismissing him from service and stating the cause as violation of Operating Rule G on the occasion referred to. Thereafter plaintiff's representtatives appealed the matter to various officers of the failroad in accordance with his rights under the agreement. Meeting with no success in these efforts, the plaintiff elected not to pursue the matter before the National Railway Adjustment Board, as he had a right to do under the Railway Labor Act, and instituted this action for alleged breach of contract.

Briefly stated, the contention of the defendant before the court below and here is that while it admittedly had no right to discharge the plaintiff without good or sufficient cause, that when it had complied with Article 31 of the agreement as to a hearing and thereafter decided the issue of good or sufficient cause adversely to the employee, its decisions thereabout are final and binding upon the employee and the employee cannot recover in an action for wrongful discharge in the absence of a showing of bad faith or arbitrary action on the part of the defendant. The circuit judge agreed with this contention. The plaintiff, however, contends that he is entitled to have a jury pass upon the issue of whehter, in point of fact, he violated Rule G as charged by the defendant and, if, in point of fact he did not violate the rule, he is entitled to recover for wrongful discharge in violation of the contract, without being required to prove bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the defendant

The precise issue before us for determination has not heretofore been passed upon by this court. There have been several cases before this court involving somewhat similar contracts although the precise issues were not the same. This court, in the case of Johnson v. American Railway Express Co., 163 S.C. 191, 161 S.E. 473, had occasion to construe a contract which contained provisions substantially identical with the contractual provisions here involved. There, the court said:

'While the term of service of the plaintiff was clearly indefinite, it appears that the clause in the agreement between the union and the express company had the effect of limiting the indefiniteness of the term and the consequent right of the company to discharge an employee, with or without case, by providing, in effect, that the company could not discharge an employee without cause, at all, and that it could not discharge one with cause until an investigation establishing the alleged charge against him had been formally made after due notice to the employee and an opportunity to appear personally and with a representative. We think that this view is sustained by the further provision in the agreement that if the charge should not be sustained the employee should be restored to his position.' (Emphasis added.)

In that case no hearing had been accorded the employee so that the question of the effect of a hearing, if any, was not before the court.

The issue here presented has, however, been before a number of courts, all of whom without exception have decided the issue adversely to the contention of the defendant here, and the decision of the court below.

In Illinois Central R. Co. v. Moore, 112 F.2d 959 (Fifth Circuit, 1940) wherein the contractual provisions were similar to the provisions here involved, the plaintiff, a switchman, pursuant to the contractual provision, was accorded a hearing, just as was the plaintiff here, and discharged as 'an unsatisfactory employee.' He then sued for wrongful discharge. It is true, as pointed out by the lower court here, that there was some evidence that the action on the part of the railroad in that case was arbitrary, but the decision of the court in favor of the switchman, in our view, does not turn on that point. The court, in construing the contract, said:

'The provision in the collective agreement for a hearing before the carrier's officers, with appeal to the highest, is in line with the requirements of the statute, but neither it nor the statute intends to make the employer's adverse decision binding on the employee. The requirement that relief be sought up through the highest operating officer seems to be a prerequisite to an appeal to the Adjustment Board, but not to a suit in court.' (Emphasis added.)

On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089, it was held that a discharged employee is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act as a prerequisite to bringing a suit for wrongful discharge. Hence, it is clear that a failure of the plaintiff here to take the matter to the National Adjustment Board is no bar to this action.

In Oswald v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 200 F.2d 549 (Eighth Circuit, 1952) the discharged employee was not accorded a hearing but the absence of a hearing did not enter into the decision of the court, the holding being that the railroad employee claiming to have been wrongfully discharged may maintain an action for recovery of damages for the breach of his contract of employment regardless of The Railway Labor Act.

The case of Moore et al. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 264 F.2d 754 (Fifth Circuit, 1959), involved similar contractual provisions, and both of the plaintiffs therein were discharged following an investigation and full hearing, just as was done in the instant case. The District Judge there, just as the lower court here, proceeded on the theory that the plaintiffs could not recover in the absence of a showing that the railroad officials had acted capriciously, arbitrarily, unfairly or dishonestly, and so charged the jury. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, which the District Judge set aside on motions by the defendant for judgment non obstante veredicto. In reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held as follows:

'We are in no doubt: that the...