Martin v. Southern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 July 1907 |
| Citation | 58 S.E. 3,77 S.C. 370 |
| Parties | MARTIN v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Fairfield County; Klugh Judge.
Action by Elizabeth B. Martin, by guardian, against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.
J. E McDonald, for appellant.
Buchanan & Hanahan, for respondent.
Elizabeth B. Martin, by her guardian ad litem, Milo B. Martin, brought this action to recover damages of the defendant railway company for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligent, reckless, and wanton conduct of the defendant in failing to stop its train at the usual stopping place at Dawkins, a station in Fairfield county, and put her off. The facts are as follows: On December 2, 1904, plaintiff, a girl of 13 years of age, being in Spartanburg attending school and wishing to go home for the holidays, purchased a ticket for Dawkins, her home, and boarded defendant's train. As the conductor was taking her ticket she requested him to help her off at her destination. He instructed her to keep her seat until the station was called, and promised then to see her off. When the train reached Dawkins it went into a side track to allow the up train to pass. It then came back on the main line, and, according to plaintiff's testimony, stopped some distance above the regular stopping place. Here one or two passengers alighted, and as many got on. Plaintiff thinking the train would stop at the regular place, kept her seat. Her father, who was at the station to meet her, asked the conductor if there were any passengers for that place, and on being motioned to the car nearby which the conductor was standing he boarded it. On failing to find his daughter, according to his testimony, he again asked the conductor if there were any passengers for Dawkins, and he responded that he did not know. Soon after the train began to move away, and plaintiff, who was in an extra car behind the one her father had entered, seeing her father and recognizing that the train was not going to stop again, jumped or was pushed off and injured. The defendant denied that it was negligent, and for a defense alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The case was tried at the March, 1906, term of court for Fairfield county, and resulted in a verdict of $1,000 for the plaintiff. Judge J. C. Klugh, the presiding judge, having refused a motion for a new trial, the defendant appealed.
1. The first exception alleges error in the part of the circuit judge in refusing to charge the jury that there was no evidence in the case tending to show wantonness, willfulness, or recklessness on the part of the defendant. Could such a charge have been made? The testimony was uncontradicted that the plaintiff asked the conductor to help her to alight from the train at Dawkins. He admitted himself that he told her to keep her seat until the station was called and he would then help her off as best he could; that he was approached by plaintiff's father and asked as to passengers for Dawkins. The overwhelming weight of the testimony was that the train stopped from 80 to 90 yards from the regular stopping place. From these facts the jury might infer that there was such a disregard of plaintiff's rights as to amount to recklessness; that the conductor's mind adverted to his duty, and he failed to perform it. It is possible that the crowded state of the train might have led him to forget for the time his promise to the plaintiff, a matter as regards which he did not testify, but we are unable to think it at all probable that he could honestly have failed of his duty after being questioned repeatedly concerning it. The question was properly submitted to the jury.
2. The circuit judge charged the jury as follows: "The defendant was bound, not only to stop its train at the usual place, and for sufficient time, but if there were other circumstances which required extra care, even beyond that, on the part of the defendant, then the defendant was bound to give such extra care to the plaintiff, and, if the defendant failed to do that, and some volunteer, attempting not to perform the duties of the defendant, but attempting to aid the plaintiff in her efforts to alight from the train, and in that way, the plaintiff, while exercising the prudence that the circumstances required of her, and that a person of her situation, of her condition, would ordinarily exercise, was attempting to alight from the train, if you find that some person, whether it was a stranger or passenger, or who, was attempting to aid her in her own efforts to do what, under the circumstances of the situation, she thought was proper and prudent for her to do, then, although that conduct on the part of the stranger along with the conduct of the plaintiff herself may have led to her getting off the train and suffering injury, yet if the negligence of the defendant brought about that state of things, and if the negligence of the defendant in failing to stop its train at the proper place, or for a sufficient time, and in failing to render any extra assistance, if it was required by the circumstances of the case, if that was still the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, then the defendant would still be liable, notwithstanding the fact that some other person may have also intervened and aided the plaintiff in her efforts to get off of the train." Defendant objected to this charge, on the ground that it in effect instructed the jury that the act of a third person in putting plaintiff off of the train could not be the proximate cause of her injuries if defendant failed to stop its train at the usual place, and for a...
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