Martin v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1939
• Docket Number: 35245
• Citation: 125 S.W.2d 19,344 Mo. 83
• Parties: Donald Martin, Administrator de bonis non of the Estate of Albert Ray Martin, Appellant, v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, a Corporation
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

125 S.W.2d 19

344 Mo. 83

Donald Martin, Administrator de bonis non of the Estate of Albert Ray Martin, Appellant, v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, a Corporation

No. 35245

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 21, 1939

Appeal from Cooper County Circuit Court; Hon. Nike G Sevier, Judge.

Affirmed.

Roy D. Williams and W. W. Carpenter, Jr., for appellant.

Arthur S. Brewster, John H. Windsor and E. W. Clause for respondent; S. L. Harris of counsel.

(1) The amended petition wholly fails to allege decedent was survived by anyone capable of inheriting and fails to allege the names of any beneficiaries for whom the action was prosecuted and therefore, fails to state a cause of action. (a) In order for the administrator of the estate of a deceased person to sue for his wrongful death, there must be known persons capable of receiving the amount to be recovered and for whose benefit the action may be prosecuted under the statute. Sec. 3262, R S. 1929; Troll v. La clede Gas Light Co., 182 Mo.App. 600, 169 S.W. 337; Barker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280; Kirk v. Wabash Ry. Co., 265 Mo. 341, 177 S.W. 592; Bonnarens v. Lead Belt Ry. Co., 309 Mo. 65, 273 S.W. 1043; Lee v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 337 Mo. 1169, 88 S.W.2d 337; O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762; Chandler v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35. (b) In order to state a cause of action, the petition must allege such facts. Barker v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280; Kirk v. Wabash Ry. Co., 265 Mo. 341, 177 S.W. 592; Bonnarens v. Lead Belt Ry. Co., 309 Mo. 65, 273 S.W. 1043; Lee v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 337 Mo. 1169, 88 S.W.2d 337; Chandler v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35; O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762; Troll v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 182 Mo.App. 600, 169 S.W. 337. (c) Such defects cannot be waived by the respondent. Chandler v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35; O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762. (2) A judgment, rendered after a demurrer to the petition has been sustained and the plaintiff refusing to plead further, is final and has the same effect as if the case had been tried by the court and jury and the issues found for the defendant. Custer v. Kroeger, 280 S.W. 1035, 313 Mo. 130; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. So. Surety Co., 51 S.W.2d 221.

Westhues, C. Cooley and Bohling, CC., concur.

OPINION

WESTHUES

Plaintiff filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cooper County seeking to recover the sum of $ 10,000 damages from the defendant for the alleged wrongful death of Albert Ray Martin. The respondent corporation filed a general demurrer to the plaintiff's petition which the trial court sustained. Plaintiff declined to plead further and judgment was entered against him, whereupon he appealed.

An opinion in this case was adopted at the May Term, 1938 reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case for trial. The respondent filed a motion for rehearing which the court sustained and the case was resubmitted in January, 1939. A point now briefed by respondent, which was not briefed on the former submission, is, that the petition did not state that the deceased, Albert Ray Martin, left anyone surviving him who was capable of inheriting, and failed to allege the names of any beneficiaries for whom the action was being prosecuted. It is asserted that this failure rendered the petition fatally insufficient. This court has so ruled on numerous occasions. We will dispose of the point by quoting from a recent case. See Lee v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 337 Mo. 1169, 88 S.W.2d 337, where this identical question was before Division One of this court. Note what the court said:

"The petition, among other things, alleges that deceased, at the time of her death, 'was single and unmarried and was not a minor, and left no widower, minor child or children, either natural born or adopted,' but did not allege that she left, surviving, heirs capable of inheriting under the laws of descent and distribution. The petition at the trial was not attacked, and defendant answered by a general denial. Because of the absent allegation, defendant contends that the petition wholly fails to state a cause of action. It was shown at the trial, over objection and exception, however, that plaintiff administratrix was a sister of deceased. Since this evidence went in over objection and exception, the rule, that the petition will be considered as amended to conform to the evidence when no objection is made, cannot be invoked. But if the evidence that plaintiff administratrix was a sister of deceased had gone in without objection, still the rule referred to could not be invoked in the present case. That deceased left, surviving, heirs capable of inheriting under the statute of descent and distribution, was an essential fact necessary to be found in order for plaintiff to recover, and plaintiff's instructions authorized a verdict without a finding as to that fact. [Titus v. Delano et al. (Mo.), 210 S.W. 44.] An attack on a petition after verdict is unavailable unless the petition wholly fails to state a cause of action. [Sec. 774, R. S. 1929, Mo. Stat. Ann., sec. 774, p. 1010; Brock v. Mobile & O. Railroad Co., 330 Mo. 918, 51 S.W.2d 100; Colvin v. Gideon & N. I. Railroad Co. (Mo. App.), 200 S.W. 715, 718.] The question, therefore, is: Does the petition wholly fail to state a cause of action, because of the absent allegation above mentioned? The answer is that it so fails. It was so held in Kirk v. Wabash Ry. Co., 265 Mo. 341, 177 S.W. 592; Johnson v. Dixie Mining & Development Co. (Mo.), 187 S.W. 1; Troll, Admr., v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 182 Mo.App. 600, 169 S.W. 337; Garbee, Admr., v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 220 Mo.App. 1245, 290 S.W. 655; Colvin v. Gideon & N. I. Railroad Company, supra."

Appellant however, argues that respondent waived this point because it was not briefed on the first submission of this case. To this we cannot agree. This court may rightfully refuse to grant a rehearing on a point that was not briefed, but when a rehearing has been granted the case stands on the docket as though it had not been heard. The parties...