Martin v. State

• Citation: 16 So. 82,104 Ala. 71
• Parties: MARTIN v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 10 August 1894
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

16 So. 82

104 Ala. 71

MARTIN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

August 10, 1894

Appeal from city court of Mobile; O. J. Semmes, Judge.

Reuben Martin was convicted of receiving money, knowing it to be stolen, and appeals. Reversed.

The appellant was indicted jointly with his wife, Julia Martin for the larceny of $600, and for receiving $600, knowing it was stolen, and not having the intent to restore it to the owner. On the trial of the defendants jointly the said Julia Martin was convicted of the larceny, and the appellant in this case was convicted of receiving the money, knowing it to be stolen. The evidence for the state tended to show that Julia Martin, the codefendant of the appellant, and his wife stole from Mr. and Mrs. Thomas McDonald $600 in gold, and that this defendant received from his said wife $80 of said money, knowing it to be stolen. The evidence for the state further tended to show that shortly after the alleged theft the defendant Reuben Martin spent about $300 in the purchase of a lot, and for building material and carpenter's labor in the erection of a house thereon. The evidence for the defendant tended to show that he had worked and earned during the year previous to the theft $200, that his brother-in-law had sent him $70, and that his wife had borrowed $100 in gold from Mrs. McDonald. Mr. Thomas McDonald, one of the parties from whom the money was alleged to have been stolen, being examined as a witness for the state, was asked: "Do you know whether or not the defendants apparently had any means before the time this money is alleged to have been stolen?" The defendants objected to this testimony on the ground that it called for immaterial and irrelevant evidence, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their objection. The witness answered that "before said time they apparently had no means." The defendants moved to exclude this answer, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their motion. The same witness was asked the following question: "Did defendants, before this money is alleged to have been stolen, rent a place?" To which question he answered, "They lived in a place where a man had died." This same witness was also asked whether or not, shortly after this money was taken, defendants had built a house, and he answered that they had. The defendants separately excepted to each of these questions, and moved to exclude each of the answers to the respective questions, and separately excepted to the court's overruling each of their several objections and exceptions. Upon the examination of Mrs. McDonald as a witness, and after she had testified that she had money of her own, the defendant, on cross-examination, asked her, "Where did you keep the money that belonged to yourself?" The solicitor objected to this question, and, his objection being sustained, the defendants duly excepted. On the examination of Ephraim Matthews, a witness for the state, and after he had testified that he was a carpenter, and had been one for several years he was asked by the solicitor if he had not, "in last January, built a house for the defendants." The defendants objected to this question on the grounds that it called for immaterial and irrelevant evidence, and, their objections being overruled, they duly excepted. The witness answered that he did, and the defendants moved to exclude this answer, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their motion. This witness was then asked, "What would the lumber in that house cost?" The defendants objected to this question on the ground that the witness was not shown to be an expert, that the cost of the lumber generally would not prove what Reuben Martin paid for it, and that the question was immaterial and irrelevant. The court overruled this objection, and the defendants duly excepted. Upon the examination of Thomas McDonald, Jr., as a witness for the state, he was asked: "Was there any apparent difference in defendants' living before and after December 28, 1893 [the day the money was supposed to have been taken]?" The defendants objected to this question on the ground of irrelevancy and immateriality, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their objection. The witness answered that there was; that the children dressed better, and defendants seemed to have more money to spend. The defendants objected to this answer, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their objection. Frank Annan, a witness for the state, on rebuttal, was asked: "What are Reuben's habits? Is he a sober, industrious man, or an idle spendthrift?" The defendants objected to this question on the ground that the defendant's character was not in issue, and that it was immaterial what his habits were. The solicitor stated that "the question was not for the purpose of attacking defendant's character, but for the purpose of rebutting the inference raised by evidence for defendant, that he had saved up this money he had spent, by showing he was not a steady worker, but a drinker and a gambler." The court overruled the defendants' objection, and they duly excepted. The witness, in answer to this question, stated that the defendant was not a steady worker; that he did not think he worked one-half of his time. The defendants moved to exclude this answer, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their motion. This same witness was asked the following question: "Have you, or not, seen the defendant Reuben Martin gambling during the last year?" The defendants objected to this question as being immaterial, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their objection. The witness answered that he had seen the defendant gambling, but he did not know whether he would lose or win,-whether he was a successful gambler or not. The defendants moved to exclude this answer from the jury, and duly excepted to the court's overruling their motions. The defendants asked the court to give the following written charges to the jury, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them: (1) "The fact that Reuben Martin had in his possession a portion of the money alleged to have been the property of Mrs. McDonald raises no presumption that he received it knowing it to be stolen, if it was stolen." (2) "The court charges the jury that it is their duty to carefully read and consider these written charges, and that in weighing the testimony they should apply the law as set forth in the written charges as well as that in the oral charge of the court."

John E Mitchell, for appellant.

Wm. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKELL C.J.

1. The condition of the defendant and his family, whatever it may have been, prior or subsequent to the larceny, unconnected with other evidence, would not have been relevant and admissible. From that condition, as a separate, distinct fact, no reasonable presumption or inference could be drawn as to his guilt or innocence. 2 Bish. Cr. Proc. § 748. The larceny,-that the money of the prosecutor had been stolen,-there was evidence tending to prove. There was also evidence having a tendency to fix upon the wife of the defendant the stealing of the money, which was a...