Martin v. State

• Decision Date: 31 October 1849
• Citation: 12 Mo. 471
• Parties: LEWIS C. MARTIN v. THE STATE OF MISSOURI.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

12 Mo. 471

LEWIS C. MARTIN

v.THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1849.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CRIMINAL COURT.

FIELD & HALL, for Appellant.

1st. The first point in this case is that the appellant was guilty of no contempt of the Criminal Court by willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued, by said court, Rev. Stat. p. 338, § 61. 2nd. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the case as presented by the return of the appellant, and therefore had full power and authority to discharge said Jackson from the custody of said appellant. Habeas Corpus act, 555, 556, §§ 1, 2. 3rd. The writ of habeas corpus issued by a court or judge, having by law the authority to issue the same, cannot be disobeyed. Habeas Corpus act, p. 557, 569, § 12. 4th. No order, process, or writ from the Criminal Court, would be any justification on the part of the jailor, in refusing to obey said writ. 10th section of Habeas Corpus act, p. 560. 5th. Jackson, after being brought before the Circuit Court, upon said writ of habeas corpus, and the cause of his imprisonment returned by the appellant, was in custody and under the control of the court, and not the appellant, and the order discharging him could not be disobeyed. Habeas Corpus act, p. 552, § 5. 6th. The officer obeying an order discharging a prisoner from his custody is not liable, either in a civil action or for contempt of court. Rev. Laws, § 24, p. 566.

LACKLAND, Circuit Attorney, for Appellee. The principle seems to have been settled by this court, in the case of George v. Murphy, 1 Mo. R. 558, in this wise a judgment of partition was rendered by the Circuit Court under our statute concerning Partition. Commissioners were appointed, who made partition, and made report to the court of their proceedings. The Circuit Court set aside the report, and proceeded to make partition without the intervention of commissioners. This court decided that the partition made by the Circuit Court was a nullity, because the statute gave no such power to the court. Much more must the act of Judge Hamilton be a nullity, when the section of Habeas Corpus act above referred to, expressly forbids such discharge, and virtually says that as to a party imprisoned on an indictment or process, to enforce the same, it shall be as though there was no Habeas Corpus act at all.

In all other counties in this State except this, the sheriff is jailor. By a special act, the jailor of this county is made an independent officer. In respect to the duties of his office, he may be considered as a sheriff, because as to the duties of his office, he stands in the same relationship to the court as the sheriff of other counties. The sheriff or other officer executing the orders of the court, is bound to know whether the court has jurisdiction of the matter, or whether the acts of the court are utterly void for want of jurisdiction, because upon this turns the question whether the officer, in executing these orders, is a legal agent of the court, or a mere trespasser. In support of this point-- vide Sewell on Sheriff, 44 Law Lib. 92; 8 Term. R. 432; Watson on Sheriff, 29; 5 Coke, 76.

If the order of Judge Hamilton were a nullity, then the jailor was without authority, and a wrong done in executing it, and he having executed it in disregard of a legal order made by the Criminal Court, a court having jurisdiction of the matter, was guilty of a contempt, and the Criminal Court had a right to sue Martin for such contempt. Act to establish Courts of Record and Prescribe their Duties, §§ 61, 62.

Supposing the indictment had lost its vitality by lapse of terms, even then we contend the Circuit Court nor the judge thereof, had no authority to discharge, for want of jurisdiction. 1st. Because the Habeas Corpus act merely gives the court or judge the power to inquire into the cause of detention and imprisonment when the charge for which he stands committed has not ripened into an indictment, and throughout its whole spirit conveys the idea that after an indictment be found habeas corpus cannot aid the the party, because by that writ neither the vitality nor validity of an indictment can be inquired into. And if his honer Judge Hamilton, or the Circuit Court, could go behind so grave a matter, and inquire into its vitality as above specified, he could also inquire into its validity, and say whether a motion to quash, or a demurrer would lay and sustain, or overrule them as he might think the case required, which we hold to be the exclusive province of the Criminal Court; and if Judge Hamilton or the Circuit Court could do this, so could Judge Blair, and the Court of Common Pleas, and also the County Court and the seven justices which compose the same, and the result of this construction of the act would be, that we would have as many Criminal Courts in this county as we have officers and courts in this county authorized to determine matters on habeas corpus.

2nd. The Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to discharge Jackson under the law, because it would in effect be admitting that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of a criminal cause, and could render a judgment therein. It cannot be supposed that Judge Hamilton, or the Circuit Court, brought Jackson out on habeas corpus to discharge him on bail, because he was discharged without bail, and we are forced to the conclusion that he was brought out for that purpose ( i. e.) to be discharged without bail, for which he had no jurisdiction or power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Circuit Court rendered its judgment discharging Jackson under certain supposed rights, that by virtue of the 25th section. 6th article, of Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases were extended to Jackson. This judgment of discharge is an absolute nullity, because the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction. 1. For the reason, that if Jackson had rights by virtue of the section of the act above mentioned, these rights could in no wise be enforced by habeas corpus, but must be by motion to discharge in the Criminal Court where the indictment is pending, which construction is abundantly strengthened by the 26th, 27th, and 28th sections of same acts which are in relation to matters in the same connection, which can only be performed by the Criminal Court.

The right to be discharged under said 25th section, often depending upon matters which must be judicially known, and can only be judicially known to the court having criminal jurisdiction, and in which the cause is pending, and must be obtained through the instrumentality of the Criminal Court; and secondly, for the reason that a discharge under said 25th section is not merely a restoration of personal liberty--or the rights of locomotion, which is the only use and object of the habeas corpus act, but it is a discharge “so far as relates to the offense for which he was committed”--a discharge of the offense. It seems plain that when a party is discharged properly under the provisions of the 25th section above referred to, that the offense for which he stands charged by operation of law, becomes res adjudicata, and that discharge could be plead in bar of any indictment subsequently found for the same offense. The Circuit Court undertakes to determine his right to a discharge, and to render a judgment of discharge in the matter--to make the matter res adjudicata, to render judgment in a criminal cause then pending in another court, to-wit: the Criminal Court; and that court having “all the original and appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases vested in the several Circuit Courts of the State.” Section 1, act to establish Criminal Courts. So far then as original and appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases is concerned, the Criminal Court is the Circuit Court in this county, and the Circuit Court, as to these matters, is no court at all. The 5th section of the act last mentioned says: “The Circuit Court of St. Louis county shall exercise its superintending control over the said Criminal Court only by appeal or writ of error allowed and prosecuted in the manner and with the effect prescribed by law in cases of appeals or writs of error to the Supreme Court,” &c. These, then, are the only means known to the law, by which the St. Louis Circuit...