Martin v. State Bd. of Parole

• Decision Date: 07 February 1966
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: John J. MARTIN v. STATE BOARD OF PAROLE.

Page 925

213 N.E.2d 925

350 Mass. 210

John J. MARTIN v. STATE BOARD OF PAROLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 5, 1966.

Decided Feb. 7, 1966.

Edward J. Barshak, Boston, for plaintiff.

Richard W. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK, and REARDON, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, who is serving a sentence at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole, seeks a binding declaration as to (1) whether he was entitled to a hearing upon revocation of his parole by the defendant board, and (2) whether upon return to imprisonment he should have received credit for time elapsed between revocation of parole and arrest. The case was heard upon agreed facts by a single justice, who reserved and reported it without decision to the full court.

In 1956 the plaintiff was sentenced, and on October 31, 1960, was paroled. On November 23, 1960, a parole officer filed a report with the board that the plaintiff's whereabouts were unknown, and that he had left his home and work without permission. On the same date the board, after study of that report and of another report of his background, revoked his permit to be at liberty. G.L. c. 127, §§ 147, 148, 149. ¹

There are no written rules and regulations whereby parolees are entitled prior to revocation to a hearing to determine whether a permit to be at liberty shall be revoked. It is not the custom or practice of the board to grant such hearing. No hearing of any sort was provided or offered to the plaintiff. There are written rules whereby parolees are entitled to an interview with the board subsequent to revocation, usually within sixty days, at which time the violation may be explained and reparole sought. In many instances a parolee whose permit to be at liberty has been revoked has been released on reparole as a result of the interview. In that event to credit is given for time served between revocation and return to prison.

On December 28, 1960, the plaintiff was discovered by the police in Brockton, and arrested for assault with intent to rob. On January 6, 1961, he was indicted, and on January 9, 1961, ² was sentenced to seven to ten years to be served forthwith with credit for eleven days in jail awaiting trial and to be served 'concurrently with any sentences subject may now be serving or with any sentences he may later serve as a result of violation of parole brought about by this case.' On January 9, 1961, the plaintiff was returned to the correctional institution, and the warrant of the parole board was served upon him. ³ On October 9, 1962, upon an indictment for attempted escape the plaintiff was sentenced to the term of three to five years to be served concurrently with the sentences then being served.

The Commissioner of Correction and the board have determined that the plaintiff became eligible for consideration for parole on October 8, 1964. In determining eligibility for parole and credit for time served, the commissioner and the board excluded the period from November 23, 1960, until December 28, 1960. ⁴

The plaintiff contends that the constitutional mandate of due process of law entitled him to a hearing on the revocation of his permit, that such a hearing should have taken place as soon as feasible after the revocation, and that he was also entitled to have the assistance of counsel and to present evidence. He relies upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. We do not accept these contentions. On these questions it may be conceded that there is a division of judicial authority. See 29 A.L.R.2d 1074, which has a full annotation to Ex parte Anderson, 191 Or. 409, 229 P.2d 663, 230 P.2d 770, 29 A.L.R.2d 1051. No protracted discussion is called for, however, as we think that the sounder reasoning is with the majority view and adverse to the plaintiff.

In Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 55 S.Ct. 818, 79 L.Ed. 1566, a case of revocation of probation, the decision was unanimous. The opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo held that a provision of an act of Congress requiring that upon rearrest for violation of parole a probationer 'shall forthwith be taken before the court' was mandatory. But the opinion, which the plaintiff does not cite, states (pages 492-493, 55 S.Ct. page 819), 'In thus holding we do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266. But the power of the lawmakers to dispense with notice or hearing as part of the procedure of probation does not mean that a like dispensing power, in opposition to the will of Congress, has been confided to the courts. The privilege is no less real because its source is in the statute rather than in the Fifth Amendment.' In Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982, 986 (6th Cir.), relied upon by the plaintiff, the Zerbst case was erroneously cited as an authority. See Ex parte Anderson, supra, 191 Or. 438, 439, 229 P.2d 663, 230 P.2d 770, 29 A.L.R.2d, supra, 1081-1082.

The Supreme Court of the United States has likened a parole violator to 'an escaped convict.' Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196-197, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247; Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 361, 58 S.Ct. 872, 82 L.E.2d 1399.

The plaintiff was originally convicted in accordance with due process of law. While serving his sentence he was released on parole. He not only violated the conditions of...