Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 53289,53289
• Citation: 755 S.W.2d 638
• Parties: Michael MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 638

755 S.W.2d 638

Michael MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 53289.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Two.

June 28, 1988.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

Aug. 3, 1988.

Application to Transfer Denied Sept. 13, 1988.

Charles A. Mogab, Thomas J. Gregory, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

Sam P. Rynearson, Kevin P. Schnurbusch, Marie-Anne Woodruff, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.

STEPHAN, Presiding Judge.

This is a civil action for personal injuries brought by plaintiff, Michael Martin, under the uninsured motorist provision of his own automobile insurance policy. Martin, a mechanic employed by the City of University City, was injured on October 28, 1982, while working on a vehicle. Not realizing that Martin was there, a fellow employee of University City, Sylvester Alexander, began backing a four ton dump truck owned by the city out of its parking place and, in so doing, drove over both of Martin's legs. The liability insurance policy which University City maintained on the dump truck specifically excluded coverage for any "bodily injury to any fellow employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his or her employment." Alexander had no liability insurance of any kind. Accordingly, plaintiff Martin sought recovery from his own insuror, defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Company, under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm. Martin appeals; we reverse and remand.

The uninsured motor vehicle provision in Martin's policy provided:

We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.

An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:

* * *

4. owned by any government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.

State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment based on this exclusion. The motion was granted on May 12, 1987, and this appeal followed.

A motion for summary judgment shall be sustained if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 74.04(c). On appeal, we review the entire record in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment is entered. Fisher v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 664 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Mo.App.1984).

In his first point, Martin alleges that the State Farm uninsured motorist provision should apply to him despite the fact that it contains a clause which bars his claim. In order to be considered "uninsured" under the State Farm "uninsured motorist provision", certain contractual requirements must be met. The contract specifically states that "[a]n uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle ... owned by any government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies." This language is clear and unambiguous. We, therefore, give the language its plain meaning even though it is contained within a restrictive clause. Harrison v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 607 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Mo. banc 1980).

This contract precludes a claim which arises out of an accident in which the negligently operated vehicle is government owned. The City of University City did own the dump truck that injured Martin. He has, therefore, failed to meet the contractual requirement defining "uninsured motor vehicle." Point I is denied.

Martin's second point asserts that the exclusion under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy, exempting government-owned vehicles, should be void as against public policy. This point raises an issue of first impression for Missouri courts, but has been addressed elsewhere.

Missouri's Uninsured Motorist Act, § 379.203.1, RSMo 1979, provides as follows:

No liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 303.030, RSMo, for the protection of persons insured thereunder ...

State Farm claims that the uninsured motorist statute does not apply here because § 303.350 specifically exempts government-owned vehicles from the requirements of the Safety Responsibility Law (Chapter 303). We do not agree.

Vaught v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 413 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.1969) involved Arkansas statutes similar to those here. In both cases, the Uninsured Motorist Act and the Safety Responsibility Act were codified in separate chapters. The insurance company in Vaught argued that since the Safety Responsibility Act contained an exclusion for government vehicles, so should the Uninsured Motorist Act. The court there held that "if the legislature had so intended it could have been as explicit with respect to the one as it was with the other." Vaught, 413 F.2d at 541.

We agree. If the policy is designed to restrict insured parties from the benefits provided by law, then the purpose of the law has been evaded and is void as against public policy. Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mutual Insurance Co., 565 S.W.2d 716, 725 (Mo.App.1978). We do not wish to "whittle away" at the uninsured motorist statute by furthering exclusions and exceptions which were not placed there by the legislature. Johns v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 337 So.2d 830, 831 (Fla.App.1976).

We hold that summary judgment was not proper as a matter of law. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial on the merits.

PUDLOWSKI, J., concurs.

SATZ, J., concurs in separate opinion.

SATZ, Judge, concurring.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I reach the result, however, for different reasons.

Provisions in insurance policies providing for "uninsured motor vehicle coverage" or, as some prefer, "uninsured motorist coverage," are a source for unceasing court decisions and legal commentary. See, e.g., Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, 2 vol. (2d ed. 1985). I bow to no man in my inability, at times, to understand the convoluted language of insurance policies, nor do I take a back seat to anyone in my inability, at times, to resolve conflicting interpretations made by the courts of the same or similar policy language, based upon the same or similarly worded statutes. Thus, admittedly, I set out my reasons for differing with the majority with trepidation.

The uninsured motor vehicle provision in plaintiff's policy provides:

We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.

Uninsured motor vehicle--means:

1. ...

2. A land motor vehicle insured ... for bodily injury liability at the time of the accident; but

a. ...

b. the insuring company denies coverage....

To me, this language is clear. If plaintiff is injured by the negligent operation of an insured vehicle, plaintiff is covered by the uninsured motorist provision of his own policy if the insurer of the vehicle denies liability coverage. These are the facts here; for, according to defendant's trial memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, "[c]overage was denied plaintiff under [University City's casualty] policy under the co-employee exclusion contained in that policy."

My interpretation of the noted policy language may be deceptively simple. Those expert in the arcane rules of interpreting insurance policy provisions may insist that the phrase "denial of coverage" must be narrowly construed to mean a denial of liability based upon the failure of an insured to meet a "condition" of the policy, such as a failure to report the accident or a failure to cooperate; this failure, in turn, would "void" the policy; and a "void" policy would be the basis of the "denial of coverage." This, the expert would insist, is different than a "denial of coverage" based upon the facts of a particular accident which simply "exclude" the named vehicle from coverage in that instance, with the policy still valid and subsisting.

This subtle distinction may be made manifest to the expert by the phrase "denial of coverage." It certainly would not be clear to the usual, normal purchaser of liability insurance. Thus, I see no reason to so limit this phrase.

Admittedly, the interpretation of uninsured motor vehicle provisions are not broadly interpreted in some one car collisions. See e.g., Harrison v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 607 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. banc 1980). In Harrison, a husband was the driver of a vehicle in which his wife and daughter were passengers. The vehicle was insured by MFA. The car turned over, the husband was killed, and the wife and daughter were injured. MFA denied liability coverage to the wife and daughter under a "household member" exclusion. The wife and daughter then sued under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy. Since there was no liability coverage, they contended, the vehicle was an uninsured vehicle as to them.

Our Supreme Court held that the vehicle was not an "uninsured highway vehicle" under the husband's policy. The Court reasoned: L.C. 140

An "uninsured highway vehicle" is defined in the policy to exclude "an insured automobile or a highway vehicle furnished for the regular use of the named insured, his spouse, or a relative." (emphasis added). An "insured automobile" is defined to mean...