Martin v. State
| Decision Date | 21 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 58173,58173 |
| Citation | 411 So.2d 169 |
| Parties | Thomas William MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
William R. Slaughter, II of Slaughter & Slaughter, Live Oak, and James K. Jenkins of Stroup, Goldstein, Jenkins & Pritzker, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Miguel A. Olivella, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, in and for Hamilton County which held constitutional section 570.15, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Appellant, Thomas William Martin, defendant below, filed his notice of appeal prior to the 1980 amendment of the jurisdiction of this Court. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972).
Defendant and a companion, who was driving, were travelling northward on Interstate 75 in defendant's van when they passed an agricultural inspection station without stopping. Agricultural Inspector E. M. Shope observed the van pass the station and, as a result of its failure to stop, pursued it and pulled it over to question the driver regarding its contents. After being told that the van contained several small bags of fruit, Mr. Shope requested permission to look inside the back section of the vehicle so that he might see the fruit himself. When the van's side door was opened, the inspector saw the bags of fruit and, for the first time, the defendant, who was lying on a raised platform in the rearmost section of the compartment. After identifying defendant, the inspector, because he could not see the space under the raised platform, asked that the door at the back of the van be opened. He was told that the rear door would not open. Not being satisfied with the thoroughness of his search, Mr. Shope informed the occupants of the van that they had to return to the inspection station.
Upon arrival at the inspection station, defendant, at Mr. Shope's request, again opened the side door so that the inspector could enter the van in order to search it more thoroughly. Removing the fruit, which had been re-stacked so that it covered the space under the raised platform, the inspector looked into the recessed area and saw several "brown bundles" which, upon being opened, were determined to contain cannabis. Defendant and his companion were then arrested and charged with possession of the marijuana.
After denial of his Motion to Dismiss and Suppress, defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion. He was thereafter sentenced to four years imprisonment and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. This appeal followed.
Defendant first argues that section 570.15 "is unconstitutional in that it arbitrarily distinguishes between passenger and recreational vehicles on the one hand, and all other vehicles on the other, with no rational basis related to the purported purpose of the statutory scheme-the regulation of agricultural products." We specifically held otherwise in our opinion in Gluesenkamp v. State, 391 So.2d 192, 200 (Fla.1980):
Applying the conventional standard, we hold that the distinction drawn by section 570.15 between vehicles designed, maintained, or used for the carriage of property on the one hand and passenger vehicles on the other is reasonably related to the Department of Agriculture's inspection functions and does not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution or the equality guaranty of the Florida Constitution.
Defendant also contends that section 570.15 "is unconstitutional in that it fails to give sufficient notice as to which vehicles are covered by the statutory provisions for inspection, especially when applied to van-type vehicles ..." Again, as with defendant's first argument, we held to the contrary in Gluesenkamp, when we stated:
We conclude that the offense defined in section 570.15(2) is not vaguely expressed by virtue of any indefiniteness of the term "truck." Furthermore, ordinary persons of common intelligence can conclude from the statute that van-type vehicles that are designed, maintained, or used for the purpose of transporting goods rather than passengers are included in the meaning of the word "truck" as used in section 570.15(2).
Our opinion in Gluesenkamp is also relevant to the argument in defendant's third point on appeal-that his van was excepted from the provisions of section 570.15 and so the detention and search complained of were illegal. Defendant notes that § 570.15(1)(a) gives agricultural inspectors full access to "(m) otor vehicles, except private passenger automobiles with no trailer in tow, travel trailers, camping trailers, and motor homes as defined in s. 320.01(1) (b) " (emphasis added), and that § 570.15(2) makes it unlawful for a truck to pass an inspection station without stopping for inspection. He then contends that his van was customized in such a fashion that it clearly is a motorhome, as defined in § 320.01(1)(b) and thus was exempt from the provisions of §§ 570.15(1)(a)7 and 570.15(2).
The appellants in Gluesenkamp similarly argued that their vans were not trucks within the meaning of Chapter 570. We disagreed, holding that their vehicles did come within the meaning of "truck", observing:
Some vans are designed or maintained so as to have a cargo area to the rear of the front seats. Such vans, since they are designed specifically for transporting things rather than passengers, fall within the statutory definition of a truck. Other vans, however, do not have such a cargo area. Instead they are designed and maintained with several rows of seats for the sole purpose of carrying passengers, with the remaining space being designed to carry luggage or other personal effects of the passengers. Such vans are frequently used for bus, sightseeing, and shuttle service. And, of course, many of them are in use as ordinary, private, personal or family passenger vehicles. It is the design, maintenance, and actual...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Avery, 87-0270
...Florida v. Royer; United States v. Mendenhall; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte; Jacobson v. State, 476 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985); Martin v. State, 411 So.2d 169 (Fla.1982); Denehy v. State, 400 So.2d 1216 (Fla.1980); Rosa v. State, 508 So.2d 546 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 515 So.2d 230 (Fla.1987); P......
-
State v. Fuksman
...States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 333, 58 L.Ed.2d 333 (1978); Martin v. State, 411 So.2d 169 (Fla.1982). It is the Wargin court's apparent departure from the application of that standard with which we disagree. In the instant case the ......
-
Shelton v. State, 87-1883
...of the permission given, as determined by the totality of the circumstances. State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464 (Fla.1989); Martin v. State, 411 So.2d 169 (Fla.1982); State v. Fuksman, 468 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Acquiescence in the apparent authority of the police to perform a search is ......
-
Palmer v. State
...finding that Palmer's thus-untainted-by-unlawful-restraint consent to search the tote bag was freely and voluntarily given. Martin v. State, 411 So.2d 169 (Fla.1982); Alzate v. State, 466 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA This brings us to the only challenging issue in the case: whether the officers w......