Martin v. State

• Decision Date: 13 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. SC17-200,SC17-200
• Citation: 259 So.3d 733
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: Dante MARTIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

259 So.3d 733

Dante MARTIN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC17-200

Supreme Court of Florida.

December 13, 2018

Rupak R. Shah of Escobar & Associates, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Wesley Heidt, Bureau Chief, Kristen L. Davenport and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent

Michael R. Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and M. Stephen Turner of M. Stephen Turner, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, For Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

Arthur (Buddy) Jacobs of Jacobs Scholz & Associates LLC, Fernandina Beach, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Professor Gregory S. Parks for HazingPrevention.org

CANADY, C.J.

For conduct committed in connection with the activities of the Florida A & M University's marching band, the Marching 100, Dante Martin was convicted of manslaughter, felony hazing resulting in death, and two counts of misdemeanor hazing. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed his convictions and sentences and rejected overbreadth and void-for-vagueness arguments Martin presented challenging the constitutionality of section 1006.63, Florida Statutes (2012), Florida's hazing statute. Martin sought review under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, based on the Fifth District's express declaration that the hazing statute is valid.

We granted jurisdiction, and we now consider Martin's various challenges to the constitutionality of the statute. Our analysis leads us to agree with the Fifth District's conclusion that Martin has presented no basis for declaring the hazing statute unconstitutional. We therefore approve the decision on review.

In explaining our decision, we begin with a review of the text of the hazing statute. We then briefly recount the facts regarding the episode involving the Marching 100 that was the basis for Martin's convictions. Next, we summarize the ruling of the district court rejecting Martin's arguments that the hazing statute is constitutionally invalid. Finally, we discuss the application of the relevant case law to Martin's overbreadth and void-for-vagueness claims regarding the hazing statute.

I.

The hazing statute, section 1006.63, contains both criminal and regulatory provisions. Subsection (1) provides a definition of hazing—including language specifically excluding from its coverage certain conduct—that is applicable to both the criminal and regulatory provisions. The specific criminal provisions are set forth in subsections (2)-(6), and the regulatory provisions are found in subsections (7)-(10). This case,

259 So.3d 736

of course, raises questions related to the criminal provisions. Of particular relevance here are the definition of hazing in subsection (1); the provisions of subsection (2) establishing the offense of third-degree felony hazing; the provisions of subsection (3) establishing the offense of first-degree misdemeanor hazing; and the provision of subsection (5) providing that certain enumerated circumstances are not defenses to a charge of hazing.

The definition of hazing is, of course, critically important to determining the scope of criminal liability under the statute. An act is not punishable as a crime under the statute unless it falls within the ambit of that definition. But an act may come within the definition of hazing and still not be a criminal offense. The provisions establishing felony hazing and misdemeanor hazing both contain additional elements that go beyond the definition of hazing. An examination of those elements readily reveals that they substantially narrow the scope of criminal liability under the hazing statute.

(1) As used in this section, "hazing" means any action or situation that recklessly or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health or safety of a student for purposes including, but not limited to, initiation or admission into or affiliation with any organization operating under the sanction of a postsecondary institution . "Hazing" includes, but is not limited to, pressuring or coercing the student into violating state or federal law, any brutality of a physical nature, such as whipping, beating , branding, exposure to the elements, forced consumption of any food, liquor, drug, or other substance, or other forced physical activity that could adversely affect the physical health or safety of the student, and also includes any activity that would subject the student to extreme mental stress, such as sleep deprivation, forced exclusion from social contact, forced conduct that could result in extreme embarrassment, or other forced activity that could adversely affect the mental health or dignity of the student. Hazing does not include customary athletic events or other similar contests or competitions or any activity or conduct that furthers a legal and legitimate objective.

§ 1006.63(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

The offense of felony hazing is established in subsection (2):

A person commits hazing, a third degree felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, when he or she intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing as defined in subsection (1) upon another person who is a member of or an applicant to any type of student organization and the hazing results in serious bodily injury or death of such other person .

§ 1006.63(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

Subsection (3) creates the offense of misdemeanor hazing:

A person commits hazing, a first degree misdemeanor, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, when he or she intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing as defined in subsection (1) upon another person who is a member of or an applicant to any type of student organization and the hazing creates a substantial risk of physical injury or death to such other person .

§ 1006.63(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

Subsection (5) contains a provision that negates certain potential defenses to a hazing charge:

It is not a defense to a charge of hazing that:

(a) The consent of the victim had been obtained;

(b) The conduct or activity that resulted in the death or injury of a person

259 So.3d 737

was not part of an official organizational event or was not otherwise sanctioned or approved by the organization ; or

(c) The conduct or activity that resulted in death or injury of the person was not done as a condition of membership to an organization.

§ 1006.63(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).

As pertinent here, the definition of hazing extends to an "action or situation that recklessly or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health or safety of a student." § 1006.63(1), Fla. Stat. A significant strand in the definition of hazing expressly extends its coverage to "any brutality of a physical nature, such as whipping" or "beating." Id. "[C]ustomary athletic events or other similar contests or competitions" are expressly excluded from the definition of "hazing." Id.

The offenses of felony hazing and misdemeanor hazing both require that the offender "intentionally or recklessly commits an[ ] act of hazing." § 1006.63(2) - (3), Fla. Stat. And the two offenses both contain an additional element related to the consequence of the act of hazing. The felony offense requires that "the hazing results in serious bodily injury or death" of the victim. § 1006.63(2), Fla. Stat. For the misdemeanor offense to be established, the act of hazing must "create[ ] a substantial risk of physical injury or death" to the victim. § 1006.63(3), Fla. Stat.

Under subsection (5), the consensual participation of the victim in the event or situation that constitutes hazing is not a defense. § 1006.63(5)(a), Fla. Stat. Likewise, it is no defense that the hazing was not officially sanctioned or that it "was not done as a condition of membership." § 1006.63(5)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat.

II.

On appeal from the judgment and sentences, the Fifth District set out the facts of the crimes:

[Martin] was a member of the percussion section of the Florida A & M University's marching band, the "Marching 100." Members of the percussion section are entitled to ride to away events in a motor coach known as "Bus C." [Martin] was president of Bus C.

A tradition or ritual known as "Crossing Bus C" has existed at the University for some time. The ritual consists of three components: 1) the hot seat, 2) the prepping, and 3) the crossing. During the hot seat, the participant takes a seat on Bus C (near the front) and is struck or hit repeatedly by others, including members of the percussion section. Next, the participant is prepped. During the prepping, the participant stands up and places his or her hands on the luggage rail and is then slapped a number of times with full force by the others on the bus. After the prepping, the participant crosses from the front of the bus to the back while others slap, kick, and punch the participant. [Martin], as bus president, decided when someone could cross Bus C.

On [November 19, 2011], Keon Hollis, Robert Champion, and [Martin], as members of the Marching 100, performed at the Florida Classic in Orlando, Florida. Immediately following the band's performance, [Martin] asked

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