Martin v. White

• Decision Date: 14 May 1920
• Citation: 188 Ky. 153,221 S.W. 528
• Parties: MARTIN v. WHITE.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

221 S.W. 528

188 Ky. 153

MARTIN v. WHITE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 14, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Gallatin County.

Action by Pearl Martin against Gill White. From judgment for defendant on demurrer to the petition, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, with directions.

James H. Settle, of Owenton, for appellant.

R. B Brown, of Warsaw, and J. W. Cammack, of Owenton, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

The petition in this case charges that the defendant and appellee, Gill White, maliciously spoke, in the presence and hearing of Carrie Warren and others, of and concerning the plaintiff, the false and slanderous words:

"You often went to Dr. Duvall's office, pulled the blinds down and locked the door, and stayed for hours, and got the medicine you went for. You are a bitch, and I can prove it."

The petition contained an innuendo that--

"The defendant intended to accuse and did thereby accuse the plaintiff of adultery, lack of chastity and moral turpitude and intending thereby to defame the reputation and good moral character of the plaintiff."

The court sustained the demurrer filed to the petition, and, plaintiff declining to plead further, her petition was dismissed, and, complaining of that judgment, she prosecutes this appeal.

At the common law there were only five classes of cases in which slanderous words, orally spoken, were per se actionable. They are set out and discussed in the case of Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459, 140 S.W. 661, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 974, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1151, in which many authorities are referred to, but we need not repeat those classifications here, since at common law it was not per se slanderous to charge a female with adultery or fornication, as will be seen from the case just referred to and 25 Cyc. 317. The only reason assigned in the books for this harsh, strange, and inexcusable condition of the common law is that the temporal courts did not have jurisdiction of the offenses of adultery and fornication; they being cognizable exclusively in the ecclesiastical courts. But enlightened jurisprudence has long since recognized the fact that there can be no more poisonous shaft aimed at the reputation of a woman than a false accusation concerning her chastity, and to remedy the defects in the common law statutes in most states have been enacted making such accusations per se slanderous, ours being section 1 of the Kentucky Statutes, which says:

"A charge of incest, fornication or adultery against a female shall be actionable; and in such cases the plaintiff shall not be held to allege or prove special damages."

See, also, Nicholson v. Rust, 52 S.W. 933, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 645.

But, notwithstanding the statute, it is still a question for the courts to determine under the general law of slander what words will constitute the charge of adultery or fornication, and the general rules for determining the sufficiency of the language to constitute the particular slander sued for applies in this case. As in other cases, it is not necessary that the charge be made in direct, specific language so as to show affirmatively and beyond doubt what the speaker meant, but it is sufficient if the entire words employed, in their natural and ordinary meaning, were calculated to impress the hearers with the belief that the speaker intended to charge the particular slander involved, and that they so understood him. Thus in Cyc. supra, p. 319, the text, speaking of the defamation here involved, says:

"It is not necessary, in order to constitute actionable slander, that the words should amount to a directly affirmative charge of fornication, adultery, or unchastity; it is sufficient if the words were calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person against whom they were uttered was guilty of unchastity."

And in 17 R. C. L. 282, the text upon this subject is:

"As to the construction and meaning of words imputing want of chastity or the commission of a sexual offense, endless litigation has arisen owing to the fact that the words uttered are generally of an insinuating character or consist of provincial expressions, slang, or words not found in dictionaries. As a rule, the words complained of are to be taken and understood in that sense which is most natural and obvious, and according to the ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are addressed. It is not essential that the charge be made in direct terms; but it is sufficient if the words used are such as impute unchastity, adultery, or fornication, and were so understood by those who heard them. In ascertaining the meaning of words constituting an alleged charge of unchastity, their context and the circumstances under which they were spoken or written must also be considered."

This court, as will be seen from the case of Nicholson v. Rust supra, and others...