Martinez-Armestica v. United States, CIVIL NO. 18-1384 (PG)

• Decision Date: 23 June 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 18-1384 (PG),Related Crim. No. 12-758[1] (PG)
• Parties: Joseph MARTINEZ-ARMESTICA, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

468 F.Supp.3d 470

Joseph MARTINEZ-ARMESTICA, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

CIVIL NO. 18-1384 (PG)

Related Crim. No. 12-758[1] (PG)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed June 23, 2020

Joseph Martinez-Armestica, Jonesville, VA, pro se.

Mariana E. Bauza, United States Attorneys Office, San Juan, PR, for Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is petitioner Joseph Martinez-Armestica ("Petitioner" or "Martinez") motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1), the government's opposition thereto (Docket No. 14), and Petitioner's motion to amend (Docket No. 16). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's motions are DENIED .

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2013, a grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment charging Martinez with two counts of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) and 2 (Counts One and Two) and one count of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2 (Count Three). See Superseding Indictment , Case No. 12-cr-758, Docket No. 33. The Superseding Indictment also charged Martinez with four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)¹ and 924(a)(2)² (Counts Four to Seven). These counts were added after "the police seized a cell phone from him, which was later found to contain at least four photos of Martinez with guns." United States v. Martinez-Armestica, 846 F.3d 436, 439 (1st Cir. 2017)

Martinez made a straight plea of guilty as to the carjacking counts (Counts One and Two) but decided to go to trial as to the firearms counts (Counts Three to Seven). See Case No. 12-cr-758, Dockets No. 41, 47. A jury found him guilty on all counts (Counts Three to Seven). See Case No. 12-cr-758, Docket No. 69.

Martinez was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 71 months for each of the carjacking and illegal possession offenses, to be served concurrently with each other, and to 109 months for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (Count Three), for a total term of imprisonment of 180 months. See Case No. 12-cr-758, Dockets No. 77-78.

Martinez appealed his conviction and sentence "arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he brandished a real gun during the carjacking, that the trial judge erred in admitting testimony from the government's firearms expert related to the illegal possession counts, and that his sentence was unreasonable." Martinez-Armestica, 846 F.3d at 438. The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Martinez's contentions and affirmed the lower court's determinations. Id. On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. See Martinez-Armestica v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 64, 199 L.Ed.2d 46 (2017).

On June 18, 2018, Martinez filed the pending motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 requesting that this court vacate his conviction and sentence. He claims that he received inefficient assistance of counsel. See Docket No. 1. After the government filed its response in opposition (Docket No. 14), on August 30, 2019, Martinez filed a motion to amend his original petition asserting claims under Rehaif v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019). See Docket No. 16. In June of 2019, the Supreme Court held in Rehaif that "in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm." Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200 (emphasis ours).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

According to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (a) ; Hill v. United States 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417, (1962) ; Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2008) ; David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. It has long been recognized that "the right to counsel means the right to effective legal assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ). Counsel can deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance by failing to render "adequate legal assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) ). Where, as here, a petitioner moves to vacate his sentence on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, he must show that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id.

"In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a ‘[petitioner] must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that it prejudiced his defense.’ " Rojas-Medina v. United States, 924 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2010) ). "To show that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, [petitioner] must demonstrate that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms." Walker v. Medeiros, 911 F.3d 629, 633 (1st Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2015) ). "This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and "a court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Petitioner must also show that he was prejudiced by counsel's "constitutionally deficient" representation. As to the prejudice prong, a petitioner must establish that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different ...." Rivera v. Thompson, 879 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). In undertaking the prejudice analysis, courts do not rely solely on "post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies." Lee v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017).

As discussed, a petitioner must demonstrate both incompetence and prejudice. "This two-pronged inquiry has equal relevance with respect to ineffective assistance claims in both tried cases and cases resolved by guilty pleas." United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 641 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ). "A [petitioner's] failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland analysis obviates the need for a court to consider the remaining prong." Tevlin v. Spencer, 621 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). Thus, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 679, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Against this backdrop, the court will address Petitioner's claims in turn.

1. Unsuccessful Challenge to Government's Theory

After careful review of Martinez's petition, the court understands³ his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be that his attorney failed to successfully challenge or adequately test the government's theory that the firearms he used during the carjackings and in the photos were real. See Docket No. 1-1. In response, the government argues that Petitioner's claims are unavailing because he fails to show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and does not show prejudice. See Docket No. 14. The undersigned agrees with the government.

The court must begin by stating that the record contradicts Petitioner's assertions. As the undersigned recalls, and the appellate court also noted in its opinion,⁴ defense counsel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain that the gun Martinez used was real both at trial and on appeal. During cross examination, he tested the victim's recollection and her ability to see firearm at night, the time in which the carjackings took place. See Transcript, Case No. 12-cr-758, Docket No. 88. In addition, defense counsel zealously questioned the qualifications and conclusions of the government's firearm expert during this witness's examination. See Transcript , Case No. 12-cr-758, Dockets No. 86. In closing arguments, Petitioner's attorney also argued that the government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearms used and depicted were real, and not toys or replicas. See Transcript , Case No. 12-cr-758, Docket No. 87 at pages 23-28.

A petitioner has an especially heavy burden when challenging counsel's tactical decisions. See Lucien v. Spencer, 871 F.3d 117, 129 (1st Cir. 2017). As pointed out by the government in its opposition, "[c]hoices made by counsel that could be considered part of trial strategy will almost never amount to deficient...