Martinez-Sandoval v. Kirsch

• Decision Date: 24 August 1994
• Docket Number: P,MARTINEZ-SANDOVA,No. 14771,14771
• Citation: 118 N.M. 616,1994 NMCA 115,884 P.2d 507
• Parties: Susanlaintiff-Appellant, v. Father Robert J. KIRSCH, Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, and St. Thomas Apostle Church in Abiquiu, New Mexico, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 507

884 P.2d 507

118 N.M. 616

Susan MARTINEZ-SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Father Robert J. KIRSCH, Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, and St. Thomas Apostle Church in Abiquiu, New Mexico Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14771.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Aug. 24, 1994.

Certiorari Denied Nov. 3, 1994.

[118 N.M. 617] Steven L. Tucker, Steven L. Tucker, P.C., Santa Fe, Bruce E. Pasternack, Neil R. Blake, Bruce E. Pasternack, P.C., Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant.

Karen C. Kennedy, Simmons, Cuddy & Friedman, Arthur O. Beach, Nikki J. Mann, Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellees Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc., and St. Thomas Apostle Church in Abiquiu.

Nancy Hollander, J. Michele Guttmann, Freedman, Boyd, Daniels, Peifer, Hollander, Guttmann & Goldberg, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellee Father Robert J. Kirsch.

OPINION

HARTZ, Judge.

Susan Martinez-Sandoval (Plaintiff) appeals from the dismissal of her complaint against her former parish priest, Father Robert J. Kirsch (Kirsch), the Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe (the Archdiocese), and St. Thomas Apostle Church in Abiquiu (the Abiquiu Church). The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that she did not file the complaint within the time required by the statute of limitations. We affirm.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, who was born on January 1, 1958, predicates her complaint on alleged sexual abuse and sexual exploitation by Kirsch from 1973 to 1977. The core counts of the complaint allege battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and clerical malpractice against Kirsch, with the Archdiocese and the Abiquiu Church allegedly being liable as his employers. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the Archdiocese and the Abiquiu Church knew or should have known of prior misconduct by Kirsch and are therefore liable to Plaintiff for negligent failure to warn and negligent hiring, placement, and supervision. The complaint further alleges that the Archdiocese committed fraud by holding Kirsch out to the public as a trustworthy parish priest; that Kirsch and the Archdiocese had altered, hidden, or destroyed evidence corroborating Plaintiff's claims or would do so in the future; that the Archdiocese and Kirsch fraudulently concealed Kirsch's misconduct from her and misrepresented that Kirsch's conduct was not wrong and did not damage her; and that all Defendants are liable for punitive damages.

Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 28, 1991. The limitations period for actions for personal injury is three years. NMSA 1978, Sec. 37-1-8 (Repl.Pamp.1990). See NMSA 1978, Sec. 37-1-10 (Repl.Pamp.1990) (extending limitations period so that minors shall have one year after reaching majority to commence action). Hence, Plaintiff's complaint is time-barred unless her cause of action accrued after August 28, 1988 (the "limitations cutoff date") or the limitations period was tolled until then. Plaintiff contends that her complaint was timely because of (1) the discovery rule and (2) fraudulent concealment by the Defendants. We first address Plaintiff's discovery-rule argument.

II. DISCOVERY RULE

A. Background

Plaintiff asserts that her claim was filed within the limitations period because her cause of action did not accrue at the time of Kirsch's alleged misconduct from 1973 to 1977. Rather, she contends, her cause of action accrued when she discovered her claim while undergoing psychotherapy in 1991, well after the limitations cutoff date. She relies on a recent Supreme Court holding that "the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should have known of the injury and its cause." Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Servs., 114 N.M. 248, 257, 837 P.2d 442, 451 (1992) (medical malpractice claim).¹

Plaintiff does not contend that she repressed her memory of the events forming the basis of her claim. Also, she admits that as early as 1974 she knew that she was suffering from severe psychological problems. What she bases her invocation of the discovery rule on is her failure to ascertain the causal relationship between Kirsch's alleged misconduct and her severe psychological injury. She claims that not until her 1991 psychotherapy did she make that connection.

The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a factual basis for application of the discovery rule. The parties presented testimony both by deposition and through live witnesses. The chief matters of contention related to Plaintiff's understanding of the nature of Kirsch's conduct and the causal relationship between that conduct and her severe psychological problems. Defendants did not challenge Plaintiff's allegations of misconduct by Kirsch, and there was little dispute about the pertinent events. The evidence was as follows:

Plaintiff was raised in Abiquiu by a devoutly Catholic family. She first met Kirsch when he became the parish priest in 1970. A year later she began working in Kirsch's office. Kirsch initiated sexual contact with Plaintiff in the fall of 1973, when she was 15. The episode included intercourse. She described her first sexual contact with Kirsch as uncomfortable and moderately painful. Her second sexual encounter was awkward, uncomfortable, and embarrassing. She had sex with Kirsch almost weekly thereafter. Sometime in the next few months Kirsch told Plaintiff that he had an infection. She saw her family physician and was treated for a venereal disease.

Kirsch and Plaintiff continued to have sex on a weekly basis until the summer of 1974, when Plaintiff moved to Albuquerque. After the move Plaintiff was depressed and suicidal. Although Plaintiff continued to see Kirsch after her move to Albuquerque, the frequency of sexual contact dropped to once a month. She testified that during that period she found her relationship with Kirsch to be invasive, overwhelming, and suffocating.

In October 1974 a male friend of Plaintiff who suspected that she was involved with Kirsch asked her to speak to Father Arkad Biczak about her relationship with Kirsch. She met with Biczak, who said that he would discuss the situation with the Archbishop or other people in the Chancery office and would get back to her if there was a problem. At a church function about a month later Biczak told her not to worry, that there was no problem and he had taken care of everything.

Plaintiff moved back to Abiquiu in 1976 and resumed sexual contact with Kirsch at the frequency of about once a week. In July 1976 Kirsch took Plaintiff to a concert in Las Vegas, Nevada. They shared a hotel room. Plaintiff said that she had sex with Kirsch only because he had paid all the expenses and that the episode made her feel like "a piece of meat being paid for." Plaintiff returned to Albuquerque in August 1976 and became pregnant shortly thereafter. She had an abortion in the fall. She never told Kirsch about the pregnancy or abortion. Although she had also been having sexual relations with another man, she thought the father was probably Kirsch.

By that time Plaintiff had stopped attending mass because of what she was hearing about priests, including what Kirsch had told her about another priest who had sexual relationships with two boys. When Plaintiff was married in 1983, the marriage was not in the Catholic Church.

Plaintiff first saw a psychiatrist in 1976. To relieve her depression, the doctor placed her on medication. She never discussed with the doctor her relationship with Kirsch.

Although Plaintiff testified that on many occasions she protested to Kirsch about their sexual relationship, the relationship continued until December 1978, when she fell in love with the man she later married. Kirsch became furious when she told him that they could no longer have a sexual relationship. In several emotional conversations she asked him to continue a nonsexual relationship, but he responded that there would be no friendship without sex. She testified that the termination of the relationship was "hideously painful" for her.

Also in 1978 Plaintiff consulted with a psychologist for approximately six months concerning her disabling depression and was treated with medication. In 1979 she visited her psychiatrist again a few times. Plaintiff was prescribed medication for her anxiety in 1989 but did not seek any further therapy until 1991.

In June 1991 Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Edward Snyder, an Albuquerque psychologist, to whom she was referred by her family physician. During the course of the consultations she disclosed her relationship with Kirsch, and that relationship was identified as the source of her severe psychological problems.

The district court, relying on a recent Supreme Court footnote, Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 623 n. 16, 845 P.2d 130, 146 n. 16 (1992), decided that it had authority to resolve disputed questions of fact on the discovery-rule issue. After the hearing the court made findings of fact in rejecting Plaintiff's contentions. The court also ruled, however, that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding application of the statute of limitations and therefore Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See SCRA 1986, 1-056(C) (grounds for granting summary judgment).

We assume, without deciding, that fact finding with regard to application of the discovery rule is a matter for the jury, rather than the trial judge. Compare Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (1973) (fact finding regarding application of the discovery rule is a matter for the judge) with Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 787 (1991) (collecting cases to show that majority rule is that fact finding regarding discovery rule is for the jury). Cf. Roberts, 114 N.M. at 257, 837 P.2d at 451 ("We believe that whether plaintiff in the instant...