Martinez v. Bullock
| Citation | 535 P.2d 1200 |
| Decision Date | 22 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 2209,2209 |
| Parties | Ernesto MARTINEZ and Elido Martinez, husband and wife, individually and as next friends of Edwin Eugene Martinez and Edwardo Ernesto Martinez, minors, Appellants, v. Steven H. BULLOCK, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alaska (US) |
M. Ashley Dickerson, Anchorage, for appellants.
Kenneth P. Jacobus, Hughes, Thorsness, Lowe, Gantz & Powell, Anchorage, for appellee.
Before RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice, and CONNOR and BOOCHEVER, Justices.
We are called upon to review asserted errors in jury instructions that allegedly misled the jury, resulting in an inadequate award of damages.
In July of 1970 on Elmendorf Air Force Base, an automobile driven by Steven H. Bullock collided with a car in which the two Martinez children were riding. Edwin, then eight years old, and Edwardo, then eleven years old, suffered facial lacerations which produced scars. The scars were treated non-surgically because of a family history of 'bad scarring'. The total medical expenses incurred amounted to $80.20.
The parents of Edwin and Edwardo filed suit against Bullock, alleging that Bullock was negligent and seeking damages. Bullock admitted his liability, and, after a trial solely on the issue of damages, the jury awarded each child $500 for past and future pain and suffering. Motions for a new trial, to set aside the verdict, and for additur were denied, and Martinez appealed.
Martinez urges us to reverse and remand for a new trial, relying on three specific grounds: that the superior court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict as to 'some' amount of damages; that the court's instructions to the jury erroneously contained language which led the jurors to believe they were permitted to award no damages; and that the damages awarded are inadequate. Bullock counters by arguing that, if any errors occurred below, they were harmless because the verdicts are 'within the zone of reasonableness for the injuries sustained.'
On the second day of the three-day trial, after the presentation of Martinez' case, counsel for Bullock indicated that he would offer no witnesses and therefore '(rested) as well, except for introduction of the letter which will be taken up tomorrow.' The jury was then excused. The judge and both counsel proceeded with an extensive discussion concerning the proposed jury instructions. Various objections to the proposed instructions were noted, and the trial judge stated at the close of the discussion, 'I will grant you five minutes tomorrow morning to-you know, if you come up with something that's missed your attention . . ..'
On the next morning, just before the jury was called in to hear the final arguments and instructions, counsel for Bullock abandoned his attempt to introduce the letter. The superior court then invited further comments on the proposed jury instructions. Counsel for Martinez responded by making a motion for a directed verdict. The motion was couched in the following terms:
MRS. DICKERSON: Your Honor, prior to making a comment I would like to make a motion at this time, one that I usually would make at the close of the defendant's evidence, but in view of the defendant having presented none I did not make it. But my motion would be for directed verdict for the . . . two minor plaintiffs, not only as to liability which has been admitted by the defendant, but as to some damages. I believe that in view of the fact that there is no contradiction in the . . . testimony as far as the plaintiffs being injured their scars are clearly available. The pictures as presented to the court . . . clearly showed injuries. And in view of a recent supreme court decision and generally the record in this case I would move that as a matter of law we are entitled to a judgment in the amount of some damages. And based on that motion I would then ask that all of the references of damages, 'if any', in the instructions could be deleted. In view of the fact that it's quite clear that they are entitled to some damages and that all the jury has to determine is the amount. I think this would simplify the issues and also speed up the deliberations. (emphasis added)
The superior court apparently agreed that the Martinez children were entitled to some damages, but refused to grant the motion because of asserted practical difficulties involved in retyping the jury instructions containing the words 'if any'. The court observed:
I can't believe that the phrase 'if any' prejudices the plaintiff in any manner. I would agree with you if in . . . the unlikely event that the jury were to come back with a zero I would probably send them out again . . . with an additional instruction under the Alaska supreme court case that while the amount is in their discretion, they have to give something. But at this stage after we've already gone over the instructions, they've all been typed up, . . . it would take me a substantial amount of time to go through and check all the instructions to see everywhere the phrase 'if any' appears and mark it out. If I mark it out ther's the danger that the jury would say, well, . . . what was there and speculate as to what was there. The only way to avoid that is to retype the instructions and I don't believe in light of all of the facts and circumstances that would be necessary . . . here. And I think you're right that the jury should award some amount for pain and suffering, that the controversy between the parties is not as to that, but as to the amount and that will be the thrust of the argument. . . .
Martinez contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in failing to direct a verdict for 'some' damages.
The purpose of a motion for a directed verdict under Civil Rule 50(a) is to allow a judge to resolve a factual issue where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, fair-minded jurors could not reach different conclusions on the issue. 1 Here, however, it was beyond dispute that the Martinez children were entitled to some damages. The legal consequence of Bullock's admission of liability was that he became obligated to pay compensatory damages for any injuries proximately resulting from the accident.
Bullock's admission of liability coupled with the uncontroverted proof that the Martinez children sustained facial scars as a result of the accident compelled a jury verdict of some damages to compensate the children for their pain and suffering. But the damage issue still had to be submitted to the jury for a determination of the precise amount to be awarded. It is clear that a grant of a directed verdict motion as to 'some' damages would not have taken the damage issue away from the jury. Therefore, the purpose of a directed verdict would not have been served if the motion had been granted. We thus find no error in the superior court's refusal to grant the motion for a directed verdict for some damages.
Moreover, the failure to grant the directed verdict requested by Martinez would not be prejudicial if the jury were properly instructed on the damage issue. In fact, the thrust of Martinez' directed verdict motion seems to have been to convince the superior court to modify the purportedly erroneous and prejudicial jury instructions. Thus, we now turn to the specifications of errors relating to the jury instructions.
Martinez' major complaint is that Instruction Number 5 was errorneous, thereby confusing the jury and producing prejudicial error. Instruction Number 5 reads:
The defendant has admitted liability for any injury the plaintiff may have suffered, proximately resulting from the accident in question.
Thus you will be required to determine:
1. What injury, if any, the plaintiff received as a proximate result of the accident, and
2. The amount of damages, if any, to which the plaintiff is entitled as compensation for such injury.
The admission of liability should not prejudice you for or against the defendant. (emphasis added)
Martinez contends that the words 'if any' in Instruction Number 5 led the jurors to believe that they were permitted to bring in a verdict of zero damages. Accordingly, under Martinez' theory, the misconception that the jury could award no damages contributed to the 'inadequate' awards of $500 to each child.
Counsel for Martinez seeks to buttress the argument that the instructions confused the jury by directing our attention to an affidavit of counsel regarding a postverdict conversation with the jury foreman. 2 The affidavit states that after the jury had been discharged, the jury foreman in response to questioning, said:
Two jurors held out; one male juror for a much larger amount than the $500.00 per child and one female juror for zero, saying that her conscience would not let her award the children anything.
It is well-settled in Alaska that ordinarily a juror cannot impeach the jury's verdict by his testimony or affidavit. 3 It follows that an affidavit of counsel containing statements made by a juror also cannot be used to impeach a verdict. The rationale for this rule was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed.2d 1300 (1915):
But let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation; to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference. 4
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