Martinez v. Bush
| Citation | 234 F.Supp.2d 1275 |
| Decision Date | 03 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-20244-CIV-JORDAN.,No. 02-10028-CIV-JORDAN.,02-20244-CIV-JORDAN.,02-10028-CIV-JORDAN. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | Honorable Mayor Raul L. MARTINEZ, Bishop Victor T. Curry, Hattie D. Harden, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, Inc., Robert Pope, James O. Brown, State Senator Betty Holzendorf, Dr. Carl Warren, State Representative Denise Lee, State Representative Gary Siplin, State Representative Matthew Meadows, State Representative, Dorothy Bendross-Mindingall, Rev. Richard P. Dunn, III, Enid Pinkney, Jacqui Colyer, Alexander Kelly, Maria B. Reckley, Councilman Philippe Derose, Unrepresented People's Positive Action Council, Inc., Nury Molina, State Representative Cindy Lerner, Patrick Vilar, Lorenzo S. Ruiz, Jose A. Paez, and Lavita Holmes Plaintiffs v. John Ellis "Jeb" BUSH, Katherine Harris, Tom Feeney, John McKay, and Robert Butterworth Defendants Peter R. Deutsch, etc., et al. Intervenor-Plaintiffs v. John Ellis "Jeb" Bush, et al. Defendants George Maurer Plaintiff v. State of Florida, Jeb Bush, Katherine Harris, Tom Feeney, and John McKay Defendants |
Norman C. Powell, Miami, FL, Thomasina H. Williams, Miami, FL, J. Gerald Herbert, Alexandria, VA, Ephraim Roy Hess, Colleen Kathryn O'Loughlin, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Ronald A. Kalain, Jeremy B. Bash, Goodwin Liu, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.
Paul F. Hancock, Maxine S. Ryan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Fort Lauderdale, FL, George Waas, Senior Assist. Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, FL, for State of Florida.
Dean Colson, Roberto Martinez, Colson Hicks Eidson, Coral Gables, FL, Charles Canady, Tallahassee, FL, for Governor Jeb Bush.
Deborah K. Kearney, Tallahassee, FL, for Secretary of State.
Christopher Carver, Miami, FL, J. Thomas Cardwell, Orlando, FL, Miguel Angel De Grandy, Miami, FL, Jason Lawrence Unger, George N. Meros, Jr., Tallahassee, FL, Joseph W. Hatchett, Tallahassee, for Speaker Feeney.
Edward Joseph Pozzuoli, III, James A. Scott, Alexis M. Yarbrough, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Thomas Emerson Scott, Jr., Miami, FL, for president McKay.
George Maurer, Key West, FL, pro se.
Before TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and HINKLE and JORDAN, District Judges.*
Every ten years, after the census, the Florida legislature is required to redraw the State's congressional districts and the State Senate and House districts to adjust for population shifts. The 2000 census revealed that Florida's population grew by more than 3 million people during the 1990s. As a result, Florida was apportioned two additional representatives in the United States House of Representatives, and the Florida legislature, which was controlled by a substantial Republican majority in each house, adopted a redistricting plan for the State's Congressional districts to adjust for the shifts in population and the increase in the number of representatives. On March 27, 2002, Governor John Ellis "Jeb" Bush signed into law House Bill 1993, which established the lines for Florida's 25 congressional districts.
Following the 2000 census, the Republican-controlled Florida legislature also adopted redistricting plans for the State Senate and House districts to adjust for the population changes since the 1990 census. On March 22, 2002, the Florida legislature passed House Joint Resolution 1987, which established the lines for Florida's 40 Senate districts and 120 House districts.
Following the passage of the redistricting legislation, plaintiffs and intervenors brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, the President of the Florida Senate, the Governor of Florida, the Florida Secretary of State, and the Florida Attorney General.1 Plaintiffs alleged (1) that the process used to arrive at the redistricting plan was inadequate under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, because minorities were not given sufficient opportunity to participate; (2) that the reapportionment plan led to the dilution of black2 voting power3 in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973; and (3) that the Florida legislature politically gerrymandered the congressional districts to favor Republicans, thereby violating the rights of Democratic voters guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 We address each of these claims in turn.5
In part I, we address the plaintiffs' "process" claims. First, we present detailed findings of fact regarding the redistricting process and the opportunity afforded Florida citizens to participate in that process. We conclude that plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to show that defendants were motivated by discrimination against blacks or Hispanics in deciding what redistricting software or allocation method to use, where to hold public hearings, when to hold public hearings, what type of notice to provide, or whether to consider input from Florida citizens and Democratic legislators in drawing the redistricting plans. Absent such a showing, plaintiffs' process claims must fail.
In part II, we address plaintiffs' vote dilution claims. We present detailed findings of fact comparing voting behavior by race in performing black districts existing before and after the redistricting process at issue in this litigation. We conclude that in the districts under challenge in this litigation, black candidates of choice6 will continue to prevail in most elections. We outline the three Gingles preconditions for prevailing on a claim of vote dilution under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: (1) geographic compactness, (2) political cohesiveness, and (3) bloc voting on behalf of the majority group. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766-67, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). Because it is undisputed that these preconditions are met, section 2 clearly required the drawing of at least some number of districts likely to perform for black candidates of choice. We conclude that the legislature satisfied its section 2 obligation by drawing performing black districts which are, in fact, likely to perform for black candidates of choice. Therefore, under the redistricting plans, black voters will not have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice," 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)—i.e., black voting power has not been diluted— and plaintiffs have failed to establish a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Finally, in part III, we address plaintiffs' political gerrymandering claims. We begin by holding that the three Gingles preconditions apply to equal protection claims in the political gerrymandering context just as they do in the racial vote dilution context. Next, we address the two-prong Bandemer test for unlawful political gerrymandering—legislative intent to discriminate and discriminatory effects. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2808, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986). Although we conclude that the Florida legislature intended to draw the congressional districts in a way that favors Republicans, we conclude that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate discriminatory effects that are serious enough to warrant federal court intervention. Plaintiffs failed to establish the preconditions of geographic compactness, political cohesiveness, and bloc voting on behalf of the majority group. Plaintiffs also failed to establish that, under a totality of the circumstances, the redistricting plan gives Democrats "less opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice." Id. at 131, 106 S.Ct. at 2809. Thus, this final claim too must fail.
The Martinez plaintiffs alleged in count I of their second amended complaint that the process, practice, and procedure adopted and employed by Florida's legislature in conducting redistricting hearings and adopting the state's congressional and legislative plans violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also alleged a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, based on the same conduct. We refer to these claims as the "process" claims.7 Because, as we explain below, these claims all require a showing of intentional discrimination, and because the question of discrimination is a question of fact, and not an issue of law we briefly summarize the legal framework which governs the "process" claims.
The central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, as articulated by cases like Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), is "racial neutrality in governmental decision making." Clark v. Putnam County, 293 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir.2002). "[A]s a general rule, `[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon a doctrine of equality.'" Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646, 68 S.Ct. 269, 275, 92 L.Ed. 249 (1948) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1385, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943)).
To prevail on their equal protection claim relating to the redistricting hearing and adoption processes, the Martinez plaintiffs must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Florida legislature acted with racially discriminatory intent. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 240, 96 S.Ct. at 2048 (); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan House. Dev. Corp., ...
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