Martinez v. C.O. Aycock-West

• Decision Date: 01 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 12-CV-4574 (KMK),12-CV-4574 (KMK)
• Citation: 164 F.Supp.3d 502
• Parties: Juan Martinez, Plaintiff, v. C.O. Aycock-West, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

164 F.Supp.3d 502

Juan Martinez, Plaintiff,

v.C.O. Aycock-West, Defendant.

No. 12-CV-4574 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed February 1, 2016

Juan Martinez, New York, NY, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Charles E. Carey, Esq., Jeffrey S. Dantowitz, Esq., New York City Law Department, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, Counsel for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS

, District Judge

Plaintiff Juan Martinez (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this Action against Defendant Correction Officer Aycock-West (“Defendant”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

, alleging that Defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical need. Defendant moves under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Complaint and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion.¹ On May 22, 2012 at approximately 7:30 p.m., Plaintiff, while incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) at Rikers Island Prison Facility, slipped and fell at the “7-MOD mini clinic” while on a sick call visit. (Compl. ¶¶ II.A–D (Dkt. No. 2).)² Defendant, together with other inmates and medical staff, witnessed Plaintiff's fall, yet allegedly did nothing to assist him. (Id. ¶ II.D.) As a result of the fall, Plaintiff suffered lower back and neck pain. (Id. ¶ III.)³

According to the Injury Report, Plaintiff received medical attention at 1:46 a.m. on May 23, 2012, approximately 30 hours after the initial injury when “he slipped on a wet area causing him to fall backwards.” (Pl.'s Ltr. at unnumbered 2.)⁴ The section completed by a corrections officer states that Plaintiff “claimed he fall [sic] and hit his back while ... at sick call.” (Id. ) The latter portion of the Injury Report, completed by a doctor, indicates Plaintiff suffered a “spasm of [his] neck muscles” and “some soreness of [his] lower back” but retained “NL [normal] ambulation.” (Id. ) The attending physician prescribed “Motrin

/Robaxin as needed” and a 60 mg intramuscular (“IM”) injection. (Id. )⁵ Plaintiff signed the bottom of the Injury Report, indicating that he “certif[ied] that the cause of injury as stated herein is to [his] knowledge true and medical attention was provided.” (Id. at unnumbered 3.)

Plaintiff thereafter contacted the Inmate Grievance Review Committee (“IGRC”) to complain that Defendant “denied [him] medical attention.” (Compl. ¶¶ IV.D, E.) The Complaint alleges that he “complaine[d] to all” about the incident but received no response. (Id. ¶¶ IV.E, G.) Regarding any steps he took to appeal to the highest level of the grievance process, the Complaint merely notes that Plaintiff “contact[ed] [the] IG to complain[ ].” (Id. ¶ IV.E.)⁶ Along with his “cross-motion” dated November 24, 2012, Plaintiff included an “Inmate Grievance and Request Program Statement Form” that he appears not to have completed. (See Carey Decl. Ex. 3, at 1–2; see also supra n.7.) Although the form includes space available for the signature of a grievance program staff member and a time stamp, that space is blank. (Carey Decl. Ex. 3, at 3.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 7, 2012. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 2.)) On November 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for pro bono counsel and an interpreter, (Dkt. No. 13), which the Court denied on February 6, 2013, (Dkt. No 17). On November 19, 2012, the Court held a pre-motion conference at which Plaintiff appeared by telephone. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Nov. 19, 2012).) Pursuant to a scheduling order set by the Court at the conference, (see Dkt. No. 14), Defendant filed her Motion To Dismiss and supporting papers on December 21, 2012, although those documents were not docketed until July 6, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 21–24). Plaintiff did not file an opposition.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (holding that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Rather, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In short, a complaint must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” but if a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.; see also

Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.”' (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) )).

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)

; see also Dixon v. United States , No. 13–CV–2193, 2014 WL 23427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2014)

(“For the purpose of this motion to dismiss, we assume that the facts alleged in [the plaintiff's] complaint are true.”). Further, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court ... draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T

&

M Prot. Res., Inc. , 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC , 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2012) ). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y. , 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Hendrix v. City of N.Y. , No. 12–CV–5011, 2013 WL 6835168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (same).

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must “construe [ ] [his] [Complaint] liberally and interpret[ ] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of Am. , 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir.2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Farzan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , No. 12–CV–1217, 2013 WL 6231615, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013) (same). However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell , 980 F.Supp.2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Caidor v. Onondaga Cty. , 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir.2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics and internal quotation marks removed)).

Furthermore, as noted, in deciding a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, it is appropriate to consider “materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” Alsaifullah , 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n. 3

(internal quotation marks omitted), including “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers,” Agu v. Rhea , No. 09–CV–4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n. 6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010) ; see also

Walker v. Schult , 717 F.3d 119, 122 n. 1 (2d Cir.2013) (noting that a court may consider “factual allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion”); Rodriguez , 2013 WL 4779639, at *1 (“Although the Court is typically confined to the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint, when analyzing the sufficiency of a pro se pleading, a court may consider factual allegations contained in a pro se litigant's opposition papers and other court filings.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, the “failure to oppose Defendant's [M]otion [T]o [D]ismiss does not, by itself, require the dismissal of [Plaintiff's] claims.” Leach v. City of N.Y. , No. 12–CV–2141, 2013 WL 1683668, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013)

. Rather, even though “a party is of course to be given a reasonable opportunity to respond to an opponent's motion, the sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the court is capable of determining based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law.” McCall v. Pataki , 232 F.3d 321, 322–23 (2d Cir.2000).

B. Analysis

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on two grounds. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA. (Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. To Dismiss the Compl. (“Def.'s Mem.”) 1 (Dkt. No. 23).) Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate...