Martinez v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 23 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2012-CA-000257-MR,NO. 2011-CA-001674-MR,2011-CA-001674-MR,2012-CA-000257-MR |
| Parties | ALBERT S. MARTINEZ APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
The following facts are not in dispute. On October 29, 2005, Martinez was operating a vehicle westbound on Highway 30 near Jackson, Kentucky. At the same time, Bruce White was traveling on the same highway, headed east. Two witnesses reported seeing Martinez's vehicle before the crash wander into and out of the eastbound lane. In a curve in the road, Martinez's vehicle crossed into White's lane, and the two vehicles collided. White was airlifted to Kentucky River Medical Center where he later died. Martinez, also severely injured, was transported to the University of Kentucky Medical Center where, at the request of authorities, a sample of his blood was taken. These lab results showed the presence of methadone and alprazolam in Martinez's system, at levels of .034 mg% and .008mg%, respectively. There was no alcohol present in Martinez's blood.
On March 7, 2008, a grand jury indicted Martinez for murder and for being a persistent felony offender ("PFO"). At the time of his indictment, Martinez was serving a twelve-month sentence pursuant to a prior guilty plea tononsupport, a misdemeanor. The trial court set a trial date for September 9, 2008. However, four days before the trial was set to begin, the Commonwealth requested a continuance due to its inability to locate the phlebotomist who took Martinez's blood. The trial was postponed, and on November 13, 2008, Martinez agreed to plead guilty to the lesser charge of Manslaughter in the second degree and PFO in the first degree. At sentencing, the trial court informed Martinez of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his plea of guilty. Martinez stated that he was satisfied with his trial counsel's performance to that point. Martinez admitted that he operated his vehicle in a wanton and reckless manner the night of the accident. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Martinez to fifteen years' imprisonment. The trial court gave Martinez credit for zero days already served on the misdemeanor charge, despite trial counsel and the prosecutor's belief that Martinez was entitled to at least some credit under statute. The trial court noted on the judgment of sentence that the issue of prison time credit was "contested."
On December 17, 2010, Martinez filed a pro se motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of what he deemed was an "illegally obtained" blood sample taken at the hospital. Upon initially hearing the motion the next month, the trial court stated that it was denying the motion, but would grant Martinez an evidentiary hearing on his claim. The trial court set a date for that hearing of February 11,2011. However, the hearing was later postponed due to a delay in Martinez's assignment of an attorney with the Department of Public Advocacy.
On July 19, 2011, while his RCr 11.42 claims were pending and after correspondence with the Kentucky Department of Corrections provided him no remedy, Martinez filed another motion with the trial court requesting a credit of 285 days on his felony sentence for the time he had already served for the misdemeanor charge. Martinez argued that he was entitled to credit under Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS") 532.120. This motion renewed his claim made at sentencing in 2008 when the trial court granted him no credit.
Ten days after this motion, Martinez's post-conviction counsel entered a supplemental RCr 11.42 motion. This motion brought additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including the allegation that trial counsel was deficient in failing seek the opinions of an accident reconstructionist and toxicologist; and in failing to seek an instruction on the defense of involuntary intoxication. Martinez, through his post-conviction counsel, argued that, but for these failures, he would not have pled guilty. The motion requested an evidentiary hearing on the merits of these claims, as well as Martinez's original pro se claim.
Three weeks later, the trial court entered an order denying Martinez's motion for RCr 11.42 relief and canceling the scheduled evidentiary hearing. The trial court's holding was based on several conclusions, including: 1) that at trial, even if counsel had sought suppression of the blood sample, the Commonwealth would have established a sufficient chain of custody and the outcome of the casewould have remained unchanged; 2) that the abundance of eyewitness testimony and other physical evidence would have caused any expert arguing to the contrary "great difficulty" and would not have led to a different result; 3) that the wantonness of Martinez's actions would have been sufficiently proven by his excessive rate of speed; and 4) that because Martinez could have achieved the same result through effective cross-examination of the Commonwealth's toxicologist, his counsel did not err in failing to consult one on Martinez's behalf. The court further held "many toxicologists and/or pathologists have testified and will testify that narcotics have different effects on different people."
The court's order, however, made no mention of Martinez's motion regarding prison time credit. Martinez subsequently petitioned Little Sandy Correctional Complex to grant him the 285-day credit he previously requested from the trial court. An official at Little Sandy informed Martinez that he would have to contact the Department of Probation and Parole to receive an answer regarding his credit. The Department of Probation and Parole subsequently refused Martinez's request on the basis that he was sentenced prior to an important amendment to KRS 532.120 and because its records showed that he was not served with the felony indictment while serving the nonsupport sentence, as required. Martinez filed another motion with the trial court on January 17, 2012, requesting his prison time credit, arguing that it was the court's prevue, not the Department of Probation and Parole's, to do so. Three days later, the trial court entered an order denying Martinez's motion and instructing him to proceed according to an attachedmemorandum from the Department of Corrections. This July 2011 memorandum informed prosecutors and trial courts that, pursuant to the amended KRS 532.120, jurisdiction to grant prison time credit now lay with Probation and Parole, not the sentencing court.
Martinez timely appealed both the trial court's orders denying his RCr 11.42 motion and denying his request for prison time credit. These appeals were combined into the action currently before this Court.
The circuit court's orders regarding both Martinez's claim for prison time credit and ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact and are reviewed de novo. Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008) (citing Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1997)). The reviewing court may set aside the trial court's factual determinations if they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure ("CR") 52.01).
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 6746 (1984).
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction . . . has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requiresshowing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Id. at 687, S.Ct. at 2064. The defendant bears the burden of identifying specific acts or omissions alleged to constitute deficient performance. Id. at 690, S.Ct. at 2066. To prove prejudice, Id. at 694, S.Ct. at 2068. Generally, a reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.
In determining the necessity of a hearing on allegations made in an RCr 11.42 motion, a trial court must find whether there are material issues alleged which cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by examination of the record. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (...
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