Martinez v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations

• Decision Date: 15 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-1266,K-F,90-1266
• Citation: 478 N.W.2d 582,165 Wis.2d 687
• Parties: , 126 Lab.Cas. P 57,461 Jose MARTINEZ, Maria Leonor Martinez, Carlos Martinez, Maria Isabel Martinez, Jorge Martinez, Francisco Carrizales, Silvia Carrizales, Mario Rivera, Sr., Martha Rivera, Belinda Rivera, Margarita Guerrero and Jose Guerrero, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, Joint Committee on Legislative Organization and Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules, Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, LABOR AND HUMAN RELATIONS, Carol Skornicka, Secretary of The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Defendants-Appellants, Garth Towne, Also D/B/A Garth Towne's Farm, John H. Knoch, Also D/B/Aarms and G.R. Kirk Company, a foreign corporation, Defendants.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 582

478 N.W.2d 582

165 Wis.2d 687, 126 Lab.Cas. P 57,461

Jose MARTINEZ, Maria Leonor Martinez, Carlos Martinez, Maria Isabel Martinez, Jorge Martinez, Francisco Carrizales Silvia Carrizales, Mario Rivera, Sr., Martha Rivera, Belinda Rivera, Margarita Guerrero and Jose Guerrero Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners Joint Committee on Legislative Organization and Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, LABOR AND HUMAN RELATIONS, Carol Skornicka, Secretary of The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, Defendants-Appellants, Garth Towne, Also D/B/A Garth Towne's Farm, John H. Knoch, Also D/B/A K-Farms and G.R. Kirk Company, a foreign corporation, Defendants.

No. 90-1266.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Nov. 26, 1991.

Decided Jan. 15, 1992.

Lawrence G. Albrecht, argued and on brief, Kevin G. Magee and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., on brief, Madison, for plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners.

Jeffrey J. Kassel, argued and on brief, Brady C. Williamson and LaFollette & Sinykin, on brief, Madison, for intervenors-plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners.

Warren D. Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued and on brief, with whom on the brief was David C. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellants.

LeRoy A. Lokken, Madison, for Wisconsin Alliance of Cities, amicus curiae.

STEINMETZ, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether sec. 227.26, Stats., is unconstitutional. Section 227.26 authorizes the legislature's Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) to temporarily suspend administrative rules pending bicameral review by the legislature and presentment to the governor for veto or other action. ¹

The Dane county circuit court, the Honorable Susan Steingass, decided that the statute met the requirements of bicameral passage, and the presentment clause did not interfere with the separation of powers doctrine, and, therefore, was constitutional. The court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision concluding that sec. 227.26, Stats., intrudes on the executive branch of government. See Martinez v. DILHR, 160 Wis.2d 272, 280, 282, 466 N.W.2d 189 (Ct.App.1991). This court concludes that sec. 227.26 is carefully drawn to avoid a separation of powers challenge and meets presentment and bicameral requirements. Furthermore, the statute facilitates a cooperative venture between the legislature and administrative agencies to make and implement rules that are consistent with their statutory authorization. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the holdings of the trial court.

There is no dispute with regard to the factual background of this case. DILHR promulgated Wis.Admin.Code sec. Ind. 72.01(16), which created a new category of employee to whom employers could pay, for a 120-day repeating probationary period, a sub-minimum wage of twenty cents an hour less than the regular minimum wage. Acting under its statutory review authority, JCRAR held a public hearing on June 8, 1989, to hear concerns regarding the minimum wage regulation. ²

JCRAR found that sec. Ind. 72.01(16) failed to meet statutory requirements; it failed to comply with legislative intent; and it contained classifications that were arbitrary and capricious causing undue hardship to workers. On July 1, 1989, JCRAR voted to suspend part of the rule and amend it by shortening the probationary period from 120 days to three days. ³ The committee also eliminated the rule's repeating nature.

DILHR notified Wisconsin employers that they should ignore the changes made by JCRAR and advised them that it would not take action against employers who paid the sub-minimum wage in violation of JCRAR's amended rule.

Migrant farm workers were particularly aggrieved by DILHR's action since they usually work for an employer for only a few weeks at a time and migrate throughout Wisconsin and other states as the seasons and harvests change. Under the original rule, migrant workers were treated as probationary employees whenever they changed jobs and were perpetually paid less than the "living wage" set by DILHR. ⁴

Following JCRAR's partial suspension of DILHR's rule, a new rule was introduced in both houses of the legislature in accordance with sec. 227.26(2)(f), Stats. ⁵ While this matter was pending, the federal minimum wage was raised above Wisconsin's minimum wage. DILHR promptly promulgated a new training wage rule which established a non-repeating 60-day probationary period. The new rule was not suspended by JCRAR and took effect April 1, 1990. ⁶

Despite these changes, migrant workers affected by DILHR's actions in 1989 filed this lawsuit to challenge DILHR's action of unilaterally enforcing the sub-minimum training wage after JCRAR had suspended its implementation. ⁷ DILHR responded to the challenge by arguing that sec. 227.26, Stats., is unconstitutional reasoning that the statute violates the requirement of bicameral passage by both houses of the legislature; it violates the presentment clause of art. V, sec. 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and it violates the separation of powers doctrine. JCRAR intervened in the action and defended the constitutionality of the statute.

The trial court held that sec. 227.26, Stats., does not violate either the bicameral passage or the separation of powers requirements and therefore is constitutional. The court also concluded that the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations and its secretary exceeded their statutorily given authority and ordered DILHR to notify each employer in the state as to what the regulations actually were during the period from July 1, 1989, through March 23, 1990. Moreover employers were to pay back wages owed to any employees who were not paid in accordance with the proper regulations.

The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court reasoning that sec. 227.26, Stats., "deprives the executive branch of the opportunity to exercise its power to veto an act of the legislature," and it "encroach[es] on the executive power to implement properly promulgated rules." Martinez, 160 Wis.2d at 280, 282, 466 N.W.2d 189.

The case before us concerns whether sec. 227.26, Stats., interferes with the constitutional grant of powers to the three branches of state government. The case raises questions of law which the supreme court reviews de novo. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis.2d 710, 733, 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987). There is a strong presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional. State v. Sher, 149 Wis.2d 1, 10, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarantino, 157 Wis.2d 199, 212-13, 458 N.W.2d 582 (Ct.App.1990). Any doubt must be resolved in favor of upholding the statute. Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis.2d 172, 185, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987).

This state's separation of powers doctrine is implicitly created by the constitution. ⁸ Wisconsin courts interpret the Wisconsin Constitution as requiring shared and merged powers of the branches of government rather than an absolute, rigid and segregated political design. See Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 46, 11 N.W.2d 604, 621, 12 N.W.2d 699 (1944). In State v. Washington, 83 Wis.2d 808, 825, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978) the court stated that "it is neither possible nor practicable to categorize all governmental action as exclusively legislative, executive or judicial." In fact, the doctrine "must be viewed as a general principle to be applied to maintain the balance between the three branches of government, to preserve their respective independence and integrity, and to prevent concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch." Id. at 826, 266 N.W.2d 597. Thus, the separation of powers doctrine allows the sharing of powers and is not inherently violated in instances when one branch exercises powers normally associated with another branch. ⁹

When there exists a sharing of powers, we have stated that "one branch of government may exercise power conferred on another only to an extent that does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the other branch's role and powers." State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis.2d 352, 360, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989). The concern is with "actual and substantial encroachments by one branch into the province of another, not theoretical divisions of power." J.F. Ahern v. Building Commission, 114 Wis.2d 69, 104, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Ct.App.1983).

The separation of powers doctrine is violated when one branch interferes with a constitutionally guaranteed "exclusive zone" of authority vested in another branch. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis.2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990); In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis.2d 762, 776, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984). See generally Honorable George R. Currie & Warren H. Resh, The Separation of Powers Control of Courts and Lawyers, 47 Wis.Bar Bull. 7 (Dec. 1974). However, the "exclusive zone" of authority is not relevant in this case since the legislative branch and the executive branch share inherent interests in the legislative creation and oversight of administrative agencies.

We have long recognized that administrative agencies are creations of the legislature and that they can exercise only those powers granted by the legislature. Thomson v. Racine, 242 Wis. 591, 597, 9 N.W.2d 91 (1943). Legislative power may be delegated to an administrative agency as long as adequate standards for conducting the allocated power are in place. See J.F. Ahern, 114 Wis.2d at 88, 336 N.W.2d 679. The rule-making power exercised by DILHR and reviewed by JCRAR in this case is derived from authority delegated to DILHR by the legislature. See secs. 101.02(1) and 104.04, Stats. Under sec. 227.19(4)(d), Stats., the law sets forth the grounds upon which JCRAR may...