Martinez v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 15 March 2001
• Docket Number: 00-01990
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals
• Parties: MILLISA MARTINEZ individually and ex rel. AARON CHAVEZ, et al. v. CHARLES MARTINEZ, et al.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

MILLISA MARTINEZ individually and ex rel. AARON CHAVEZ, et al.

v.

CHARLES MARTINEZ, et al.

No. E2000-01990-COA-R3-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

December 7, 2000 Session

FILED MARCH 15, 2001

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County, Nos. L-11688 and L-11689

W. Dale Young, Judge

This case presents a question of first impression. We are asked to decide whether, and, if so, under what circumstances, a driver who motions to another driver intending to turn left in front of the signaling driver can be assigned fault in the event of a resulting accident. In the instant case, the trial court granted the signaling driver summary judgment, finding on the facts before it that there could be no liability. We find that summary judgment is not appropriate and accordingly vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Vacated; Case Remanded

Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Houston M. Goddard, P.J., and D. Michael Swiney, J., joined.

A. James Andrews, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Millisa Martinez, individually and as next friend of Aaron Chavez and Christopher Chavez.

James Y. Reed, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Charles Lee Young.

Billy J. Stokes and Jon M. Cope, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Sandra Cochenour.

No brief filed on behalf of the appellant, Charles Martinez.

OPINION

I.

Certain core facts are not in dispute. On October 11, 1997, Aaron Chavez and Christopher Chavez, both of whom were minors, were riding as passengers in a vehicle driven by their stepfather, Charles Martinez ("Mr. Martinez").¹ Mr. Martinez was traveling south on Louisville Road, a four-lane highway divided by a median in Blount County. He brought his vehicle to a complete stop in a paved portion of the median and waited to turn across the two lanes of northbound traffic into a business establishment. At the same time, the defendant Sandra Cochenour was proceeding north on Louisville Road in the inside left through lane, near the entrance to the business establishment into which Mr. Martinez was attempting to turn. Traffic proceeding northbound had stopped, thereby preventing Mr. Martinez from turning left. When northbound traffic started to move again, Cochenour, who had a green light, did not proceed, but instead motioned to Mr. Martinez. Interpreting Cochenour's hand movement as a signal to make his turn, he proceeded to move across traffic, whereupon his vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant Charles Lee Young, who was traveling in the lane to the right of Cochenour.

Millisa Martinez, the mother of the two minors, brought an action on behalf of her children and herself against her husband, as well as against Cochenour, Young and others. The trial court consolidated her action with an action brought by Mr. Martinez against Cochenour, Young and others. The trial court later granted Cochenour's motion for summary judgment in both actions and certified its judgment as a final judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. This appeal followed.

II.

A.

The appellants argue that summary judgment is not appropriate (1) because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Cochenour was negligent in signaling Mr. Martinez to turn in front of her; and (2) because Cochenour breached a statutory duty to proceed forward when she had a green light. The first issue requires us to examine a question that has not been squarely addressed in Tennessee: the liability of a driver who signals another driver to turn left in front of the signaling driver. Finding no Tennessee cases directly on point,² we turn our attention to other jurisdictions in search of an appropriate rule.

There is a plethora of cases from around the country addressing the liability of a signaling driver in various and sundry factual situations.³ See, e.g., Frey v. Woodard, 748 F.2d 173 (3d Cir. 1984); Boucher v. Grant, 74 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D.N.J. 1999); Haralson v. Jones Truck Line, 270 S.W.2d 892 (Ark. 1954); Kerfoot v. Waychoff, 501 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1987); Rodi v. Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., 62 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1952) (en banc); Cunningham v. National Service Indus., Inc., 331 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Shirley Cloak and Dress Co. v. Arnold, 90 S.E.2d 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Diaz v. Krob, 636 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Dace v. Gilbert, 421 N.E.2d 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Dawson v. Griffin, 816 P. 2d 374 (Kan. 1991); Lennard v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 649 So. 2d 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Martin v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 553 So. 2d 994 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Perret v. Webster, 498 So. 2d 283 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Massingale v. Sibley, 449 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 430 So. 2d 1103 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Shank v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 903 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 351 So. 2d 809 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Wille v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 320 So. 2d 288 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Howard v. Insurance Co. of North America, 162 So. 2d 165 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Dix v. Spampinato, 358 A.2d 237 (Md. Ct. App. 1976); Kemp v. Armstrong, 392 A.2d 1161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Sweet v. Ringwelski, 106 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. 1961); Peka v. Boose, 431 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Gamet v. Jenks, 197 N.W.2d 160 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Thelen v. Spilman, 86 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 1957); Johnson v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 793 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); Miller v. Watkins, 355 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1962); Thorne v. Miller, 722 A.2d 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998); Barber v. Merchant, 580 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Valdez v. Bernard, 506 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Riley v. Board of Educ., 223 N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962); Duval v. Mears, 602 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Bell v. Giamarco, 553 N.E.2d 694 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Askew v. Zeller, 521 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Keating v. Belcher, 119 A.2d 535 (Pa. 1956); Giron v. Welch, 842 P.2d 863 (Utah 1992); Devine v. Cook, 279 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1955); Ring v. Poelman, 397 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1990); Cofield v. Nuckles, 387 S.E.2d 493 (Va. 1990); Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Wray, 266 S.E.2d 882 (Va. 1980); Alston v. Blythe, 943 P.2d 692 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); Armstead v. Holbert, 122 S.E.2d 43 (W. Va. 1961); Wulf v. Rebbun, 131 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1964).

The cited cases reach uneven results. Some arguably stand for the proposition that a signaling driver cannot, as a matter of law, be held liable for merely giving a signal. See, e.g., Miller, 430 So. 2d at 1104-05 (finding no error in a charge instructing the jury that a signaled pedestrian "was not entitled to rely upon the alleged signal of the bus driver that the way was clear for [the pedestrian] to cross the street"); Duval, 602 N.E.2d at 274 (affirming summary judgment in favor of a signaling driver upon finding that, as a matter of law, a signaling motorist owes no duty to a signaled motorist to ascertain safe passage across an intersection).

In order to understand and properly evaluate the meaning of these many decisions from other jurisdictions, it is necessary to consider them in light of their facts and in the context of how they were disposed of at the trial level, i.e., summary judgment, directed verdict, jury verdict, bench trial, etc. Many of the cases address the issue of whether summary judgment is appropriate by endeavoring to decide whether the signal, under the circumstances, is properly characterized as (1) a mere yielding of the right of way, a sort of "you go first and I will not hit you" characterization; or (2) an indication that the way is "all clear," a sort of "it is safe to proceed to your destination" characterization. Speaking in general terms, the cases indicate that a driver giving a "you go first" signal is much less likely, if at all, to be held liable for negligence than is a driver giving an "all clear" signal.

Many of the cases have decided the issue in favor of the signaling driver as a matter of law based upon a finding that, under the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the signaled driver to interpret the signal as an indication that the way was all clear. See, e.g., Kerfoot, 501 So. 2d at 590 (on certified question, approving the decision of a federal trial court to grant a directed verdict to a signaling driver upon finding that, under the circumstances, it was unreasonable to interpret the signal as an indication that it was safe to proceed); Dawson, 816 P. 2d at 379 (affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to a signaling driver upon finding that, under the circumstances, the only reasonable interpretation of the signal was that the signaling driver was yielding the right of way); Shank, 390 So. 2d at 904, 905 (reversing the trial court's judgment against a signaling driver and holding, as a matter of law, that the signaling driver was not negligent based upon finding that the only reasonable interpretation of the signal was that the signaling driver wished the signaled pedestrian to "move on"); Dix, 358 A.2d at 239 (affirming a directed verdict in favor of a signaling driver upon finding that, under the circumstances, the only reasonable interpretation of the signal was that the signaling driver was yielding the right of way); Peka, 431 N.W.2d at 400, 401 (affirming the trial court's summary dismissal of a claim against a signaling driver upon finding as a matter of law that, under the circumstances, the signal was merely a yielding of the right of way); Giron, 842 P.2d at 864, 865 (affirming a summary judgment in favor of a signaling driver upon finding that, under the circumstances, the interpretation of the signal as an "all clear" signal was unreasonable); Devine, 279 P. 2d at 1082 (finding that, under the circumstances, the only reasonable interpretation of the signal was...