Martinez v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 08 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1:15-cv-00315-RB-LF |
| Parties | DANIEL J. MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. JOHN SANCHEZ, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Daniel Martinez's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1. The Honorable Robert C. Brack referred this case to me to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case. Doc. 15. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the relevant law, I recommend that the Court deny Martinez's petition.
In 2011, Martinez pled guilty to attempted kidnapping, a second degree felony. Doc. 10-1 at 1 (Exh. A), 5 (Exh. B).1 The state court sentenced Martinez to a total of ten years imprisonment (nine years for the attempted kidnapping and one year as a habitual offender) and suspended all but one year, followed by five years of supervised probation. Doc. 10-1 at 2 (Exh. A). As a term of his probation, the court required Martinez to obey all municipal, county, state, and federal laws. Id.
During the probationary period, Martinez was charged with breaking and entering and aggravated battery on a household member. Doc. 12 at 9. The state court held a probationrevocation hearing and found that Martinez violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the offense of battery on a household member. Doc. 10-1 at 13 (Exh. C), 59 (Exh. N). Consequently, the state court revoked Martinez's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his nine-year sentence. Doc. 10-1 at 16-17 (Exh. D), 59-60 (Exh. N); Doc. 10-2 at 51 (Exh. W). Notably, the state court did not find that Martinez had forced his way into the residence and did not base the revocation on the charge of breaking and entering. Id.
At the revocation hearing, the state called the investigating officer who, over a hearsay objection, testified about statements made by Lesley Koury, Martinez's wife,2 and her daughter, as well as a written statement made by Ms. Koury at the time of the event. Doc. 10-2 at 2 (Exh. P). The officer often referred to the information in his police report during his testimony. Doc. 10-2 at 40 (Exh. R). Ms. Koury told the officer that Martinez entered her residence through the window, yelled at her, and pushed her into the wall, causing injuries to her shoulder. Doc. 10-1 at 49, 54, 55, 57 (Exh. M); Doc. 10-2 at 12-13 (Exh. R). The officer also interviewed Ms. Koury's nine-year-old daughter who was present during the altercation. Her description of the events was consistent with Ms. Koury's. Doc. 10-1 at 54-55 (Exh. M); Doc. 10-2 at 13, 15 (Exh. R). At the hearing, however, Ms. Koury recanted her allegations and testified that she fell against a door. Doc. 10-2 at 10, 16 (Exh. R). The state court found Ms. Koury's live testimony unreliable and instead relied on the officer's testimony and photographic evidence to find that Martinez committed a battery on a household member in violation of the terms of his probation. Doc. 10-1 at 59 (Exh. N); Doc. 10-2 at 10 (Exh. R).
Martinez appealed the probation-revocation order, arguing that the court erred by basing the revocation on hearsay testimony. Doc. 10-2 at 1-3 (Exh. P). He later sought to amend his docketing statement to include a claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness or present evidence that would have corroborated Martinez's defense. Doc. 10-2 at 8-29 (Exh. R). The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. It noted that under New Mexico law, hearsay evidence may be used in a probation revocation hearing if it has probative value, and it found "ample support for the district court's determination that [Martinez] willfully violated his probation." Doc. 10-2 at 32 (Exh. S). The court also denied Martinez's motion to amend for lack of support in the record. Doc. 10-2 at 31-32 (Exh. S). Martinez filed a petition for writ of certiorari on these same two issues to the New Mexico Supreme Court, Doc. 10-2 at 35-50 (Exh T), which the court denied, Doc. 10-2 at 49 (Exh. U). Finding no relief in the state courts, Martinez filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court.
As in his prior appeals in the state courts, Martinez contends that the state court erred by relying on hearsay testimony as the basis for revoking his probation. Doc. 5 at 5. Martinez additionally contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to submit evidence from the landlord in support of his defense. Id. Finally, Martinez requests an evidentiary hearing "based on prima facie evidence of civil rights violations." Doc. 5 at 15. Martinez's claims are without merit, and the Court should dismiss his petition.
The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA"), govern this case. A petition for habeascorpus under § 2254 attacks the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and continued detention. A federal court cannot grant habeas relief pursuant to § 2254(d) with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the petitioner's state-court proceeding:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In this two-step inquiry, the threshold question is whether the applicant seeks to invoke a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time the conviction became final. Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). If the law was clearly established, then the court determines whether the state court decision was "contrary to or involved the unreasonable application of that clearly established federal law." Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The term "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [those] cases." Id. at 405. The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "contrary to" as meaning, inter alia, "diametrically different" and "opposite in character and nature." Id. Therefore, habeas relief under § 2254 may be granted only where the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at aresult different from [that] precedent." Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). Significantly, it is unnecessary for the state court to cite applicable Supreme Court cases or even to be aware of such cases, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [that precedent]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
A state court decision makes an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent if it "identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. However, "[i]t is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm conviction that the state court . . . [applied] clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable." Id. at 76.
Pursuant to AEDPA, state court findings of fact are "presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Accordingly, petitioners challenging a state court's decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), must show by clear and convincing evidence that the determination was factually erroneous. See Miller-el v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005).
Lastly, where state courts have adjudicated a claim on its merits, federal courts are limited to reviewing the record as it stood before the state courts. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181-82 (2011) (citing § 2254(d)(1)). Evidentiary hearings are not permitted in federal court on claims that a state court decided on their merits. Id. at 181-83; Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 857 (10th Cir. 2013). "'Adjudicated on the merits' [means] a decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claimadvanced, rather than on a procedural, or other ground." Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284, 1308 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2013). Thus, summary decisions—even those completely devoid of any reasoning at all—can constitute decisions "on the merits" for purposes of AEDPA. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
"Even if a state court resolves a claim in a summary fashion with little or no reasoning, [federal courts] owe deference to the state court's result." Paine v. Massie, 339 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003). The standard is "highly deferential" to state courts and "difficult to meet," as it demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 (citing Richter,...
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